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Why do some norms make international advances more easily than others? What do nuclear 
safety and human rights have in common? Norms do not simply spread, they are adopted by 
governments and internalized by societies and while both steps are necessary for norm 
promotion, neither is sufficient. My argument disputes the dichotomy implicit in existing 
literature between “enlightened” civil society and norm-violating governments and suggests 
that often the roles are reversed. I also challenge the notion that once norms reach the 
international realm, their evolution stops. I test the theory by applying it to the 2004 
enlargement of the European Union (EU), in which policies were presented to the acceding 
Eastern European states in a non-negotiable package deal. The primary, and contrasting case 
studies are in nuclear safety and ethnic minority rights, both of which have met only 
intermittent success but each for different reasons. The dissertation combines two levels of 
comparison – between norm types and across countries (Lithuania, Slovakia, Czech 
Republic). I use a mix of quantitative (computer-assisted text analysis, factor analysis) and 
qualitative methods. In terms of boarder impact, the project develops the norm promotion 
angle to assess the legitimacy of conditionality arrangements, which international 
institutions impose on divided and relatively resource-poor societies. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
“Slovak villages fly the EU flag with pride!” read one newspaper headline shortly after 
the 2004 enlargement of the European Union (EU), in which post-communist countries joined 
the club for the first time. This pride in displaying EU symbols reflected a sense of relief over the 
reduced vulnerability that Eastern Europeans thought the “return to Europe” had brought. The 
same pride underpinned also the willingness to undergo the often painful reforms, only to meet 
the requirements of international organizations and especially the EU. Once they digested pre-
accession standards as strict as those accompanying the Union’s common agricultural policy, 
Slovak villagers seemed content to quietly comply with all other EU regulations entering their 
lives. An idyllic rustic picture? Not for long. The acceptance of EU-devised improvements ended 
when the annual pig-butchering tradition was threatened by health regulators from Brussels. The 
new mandatory veterinarian checks before and during meat processing were likely to undermine 
the age-old way of producing, consuming, and most importantly, socializing around food. Yet, 
the response from Slovak farmers was not to tear down the flag poles. Many subsidies were still 
streaming in from Brussels after all. Some villagers gave up and settled for the more convenient 
grocery-store meat variety. But those that persisted lived grudgingly around the new norm, 
bending some corners and complying only with the absolutely necessary minimum demands. 
Their actions were influenced primarily by the social and emotional attachment to the local 
custom. Health concerns, which to some extent were always part of the practice, gained no 
increased prominence simply because some Eurocrat said they should. Today, the EU flag still 
flies in Slovak villages but as far as tradition (and pork) lovers are concerned, a little less 
proudly. 
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Public health regulations represent only one example of a norm that arrived from the 
European Union to its new member states. It can also be taken to exemplify an international 
norm more generally. As commonplace as the pork production example may seem, it is 
illustrative of broader dynamics surrounding international norm proliferation that this project 
seeks to explore. How deep is the reach of international norms? How careful a look should we 
take before we conclude that such norms are widely accepted? Is it enough to look at the level of 
official legislation or do we need to search the smallest Eastern European village for answers? 
The European regional integration project has outpaced similar efforts anywhere else but the 
uniqueness of this experience does not prevent us from using it to learn about the processes 
surrounding norm transfers across societies. The peculiarity of the enlargement experiment lay in 
membership conditionality, designed to enforce core changes. The candidate countries had to 
demonstrate actual progress on all aspects of norm adoption leading up to their EU entry. From 
the perspective of international norm promotion more generally, the opportunities of EU 
enlargement must have seemed almost dream like. And yet, one decade later, little progress has 
been made in some issue areas, while threats of outright reversal loom in others. The fate of the 
conditionality mechanism – highly praised at first and nostalgically longed-for in the end – 
illustrates the main puzzle tackled by this project: despite generally favorable conditions, there 
has been considerable variation in the success of individual norms promoted by Brussels. The 
answer does not lie with country differences because, although considerable, no candidate had 
difficulty with all norms, and no countries cruised to EU membership trouble free. We have to 
look to specific issue areas, or as I will argue, norm categories, for explanations about limits of 
international norm promotion. 
   
 
 3  
To do this, we must examine the process of norms becoming universal, rather than just 
assuming that they are so. To fully acknowledge the complexities of the norm proliferation 
process we have to turn our attention to the discursive negotiation of norms at the domestic level. 
Similarly, their subsequent re-entry into the international, or supranational realm in an altered 
form is important for our understanding of why some norms spread more easily than others. I 
present a dynamic framework that accommodates such evolution of norms over time. It includes 
explanations of how some norms can suddenly gain international prominence, as the 
environmental norm focusing on climate change has in recent years. By the same token, my 
approach allows for detecting continuous changes in the criteria on which we judge certain 
norms as successful. Such insights can be particularly useful in studying the fall from fame of 
some norms, as happened in the case of the “Washington consensus” about the requisites of 
economic growth. Relatedly, my project will also be attentive to the power dynamics that make 
certain standards and values more appealing than others and to the links between individual 
norms and relevant regimes or hegemonic structures that they may support. 
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A Second Look at International Norms 
  
To uncover the processes that link international norm proliferation at the international 
level with tangible policy change domestically, we have to be prepared to straddle levels of 
analysis. State elites commonly populate accounts of norm compliance,
1
 documenting the fact 
that they remain at the center of the decision making involved in policy shifts. Yet, as we know, 
top-down decisions do not guarantee efficacy and their reach becomes especially limited in a 
changing normative context. For this reason, I propose examining the response to international 
norms at the societal level as well. Individual citizens, alone or in groups, can facilitate, but also 
impede the adoption of a norm no less readily than their respective governments. For a norm to 
spread successfully, it must be accepted by both sets of actors.
2
 This argument underscores the 
inadequacy of a narrow focus on political elites alone in mapping the developments during which 
Western norms penetrated Eastern European societies.
3
  
 
Power in Norm Promotion (and Its Limits) 
 
When the Berlin Wall was crumbling and Eastern Europe took its first steps to transition 
away from communism, countries in Western Europe were in the midst of their own ambitious 
                                                 
1
 Vaughn P. Shannon, "Norms Are What States Make of Them: The Political Psychology of Norm Violation," 
International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 2 (2000); Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Why Comply? Social Learning and European 
Identity Change," International Organization 55, no. 3 (2001); Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert, and Heiko 
Knobel, "Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia 
and Turkey," Journal of Common Market Studies 41, no. 3 (2003). 
2
 In methodological language, both government and societal approval is necessary but on its own, neither is 
sufficient for international norms to take root domestically. 
3
 This is not to deny that in order to meet the European standards, these governmental actors found themselves 
acting as “transmitters of supranationally established norms.” Laszlo Bruszt and David Stark, "Who Counts? 
Supranational Norms and Societal Needs," East European Politics and Societies 17, no. 1 (2003): 76. 
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undertaking. Occupied with finalizing the single European market, elites in what was then the 
European Community showed little ambition to extend the still-evolving project eastward. The 
momentum shifted with East European demands for the opportunity to join European integration 
structures and so alleviate emergent economic and political insecurities. These were demands for 
the EU to make demands. Reluctance on the part of old member states and uncertainty about the 
effect that such a daring move would have on the fate of the Union balanced against the sense of 
responsibility for developments in the Eastern neighborhood. The EU-15 suddenly found itself 
wielding unexpected influence over the institutional and economic changes in aspiring candidate 
countries and in a snowball-like fashion exploited the possibilities that the new power 
distribution offered. Abandoning initial hesitation, EU’s norm promoters became overly 
ambitious, ignoring signs that their conditionality-based efforts were only skimming the surface 
of deep-seated legacies interfering with lasting normative change. 
It is important to consider the limits of enlargement legitimacy in the context of post-
Cold War rearrangement of priorities by countries on both sides of the former Iron Curtain. 
Whereas before domestic politics may have played a secondary role, trumped by international 
alignments, with the dissolution of the Soviet bloc reforms as indicators of progress towards 
democracy grew in salience. There were two aspects of East European societies’ participation in 
this shift of international priorities. On the one hand, they were proud co-instigators of the 
dramatic changes that replaced authoritarian regimes with calls for human rights and civil 
liberties. On the other hand, they would carry the brunt of the political and economic cost that 
the rapid transformation entailed. They soon found out that their existing understanding of the 
relationship between citizens and the state conflicted with the requirements put forth by Brussels. 
Crucially, it was not immediately apparent to common Eastern Europeans how the reforms 
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necessitated by the free market economy, for example, outperformed the relative predictability of 
the planned system. Policies that came to be understood as rights, from free healthcare, to 
subsidized public transport, to cheap newlywed loans, were gradually disappearing. Freedom, 
they were told, was the return trade-off. But to many this meant a reduced standard of living, 
higher levels of crime, and increased social diversity that some found threatening.  
Previous scholarship has pointed to identity-driven motivations for the Westward turn 
and their role in extending people’s tolerance for the harsh new policies.4 Time was a crucial 
factor in reform execution. And the more societies could offer, the more their governments and 
the EU would ask for. Time, however, could not solve everything. The praise showered on the 
conditionality mechanism
5
 implicitly hinged on candidates’ temporary obligation to complete 
requisite changes without compromise. The moment of accession proved decisive – after that, 
EU’s most powerful levers of control disappeared and new members rediscovered their ability to 
object. Issues previously relegated to the back burner became the subject of electoral competition 
across the region, raising concerns about backsliding on previous commitments.
6
 Compelling 
arguments can be made about the country-level differences behind the difficulty in meeting EU 
requirements
7
 and sustaining the reforms made after 2004. Nevertheless, the focus here will be 
on the norms themselves. Standardizing our study of norm promotion without resorting to 
country-specific factors offers more effective analytical tools applicable not only to past and 
                                                 
4
 Rawi Abdelal, National Purpose in the World Economy: Post-Soviet States in Comparative Perspective (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2005). 
5
 Wade Jacoby, The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO: Ordering from the Menu in Central Europe 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, The 
Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); James Hughes, 
Gwendolyn Sasse, and Claire Gordon, eds., Europeanization and Regionalization in the Eu's Enlargement to 
Central and Eastern Europe: The Myth of Conditionality (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,2004). 
6
 Philip Levitz and Grigore Pop-Eleches, "Why No Backsliding? The European Union’s Impact on Democracy and 
Governance before and after Accession," Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 4 (2010); Ulrich Sedelmeier, "After 
Conditionality: Post-Accession Compliance with EU Law in East Central Europe," Journal of European Public 
Policy 15, no. 6 (2008). 
7
 Milada Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage & Integration after Communism (Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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future rounds of EU enlargement but also to other efforts to endorse international norms in the 
global arena. 
This is not to say that domestic variables were unrelated to the success of West-
originating reforms in the East. Even the desire for EU membership itself is an immediate 
product of political and economic trajectories that launched states from their totalitarian past into 
the unfamiliar but promising democratic future. They could not have simply wished away the 
lingering institutions and behavioral patterns that had the capacity to interfere with EU-generated 
norms.
8
 Further, each communist legacy – whether economic, socio-demoraphic, or institutional 
– had the potential to affect the receptivity of these societies to new norms. This concerned 
especially norms that were not truly new but instead arrived as alternatives to established ways 
of organizing social, political, and economic life.  
Rather than presenting them as the core determinants of success (or lack thereof) in the 
EU waiting room, however, this project treats past legacies as a filter for the incoming norms. 
Differences between the East and the West were inevitable, almost a given. Merely pointing 
them out tells us little about the process of norm adoption. The dominant element in these 
exchanges were the norms and I will argue that communist heritage would have greater impact 
on some of them than on others. In other words, the variation here rests with the norms 
themselves, not with countries and their respective legacies. Let us note that on the country level, 
intransparencies in the judicial system or lagging decentralization of government, for instance, 
influenced the entire accession process. They did not, however, affect all norms equally. For 
example, these legacies had only minor impact on the norm of cross-regional cooperation and 
                                                 
8
 Grigore Pop-Eleches, "Between Historical Legacies and the Promise of Western Integration: Democratic 
Conditionality after Communism," East European Politics and Societies 21, no. 1 (2007); Grigore Pop-Eleches and 
Joshua Tucker, "Communism's Shadow: Postcommunist Legacies, Values, and Behavior," Comparative Politics 43, 
no. 4 (2011). Mark Beissinger and Stephen Kotkin, eds. Historical Legacies of Communism, forthcoming. 
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development, but they interfered heavily with reintegration of Eastern Europe’s Roma. The 
legacy argument runs the risk of sliding down the slippery slope of ad hoc and non-generalizable 
explanations. On the other hand, a focus on norms, while still permitting the incorporation of 
country variance, allows us to examine the sensitivity of the EU-required policy changes to those 
country-level differences in a systematic way. In other words, I will not ask why some countries 
struggled with the minority rights norm, to name just one, while others did not. The main subject 
of inquiry here are the attributes of minority rights that made them (potentially) problematic. 
The first step is to recognize that even norms that appear universal are a reflection of 
previous discourse and of delicate positioning among international actors (not limited to states). 
Norm promotion is about making arguments. Naturally, their power varies with who presents 
them and their impact depends on how ready the targets are to listen. Notwithstanding these 
facts, I will argue that the content of individual norms poses the main constraint on how far any 
of them will travel. In other words, availability of alternatives, internal inconsistencies of norms, 
and the effect they have on daily life of those affected are key for their performance. In the 
European context, the overarching rejection of the Soviet past resulted in powerful inertia to 
normative changes that followed. At the same time, however, there was no shortage of costly 
trade-offs, norm questioning, and eventually also near-heretical approaches, as Euroskepticism 
grew in popularity. The universal appeal of norms is neither automatic, nor permanent, nor 
absolute. 
If a norm was deemed an essential component of EU membership it would appear 
broadly applicable, as long as the desire to join the Union persisted. The assumption that general 
support for membership equaled a blank check on the extent of possible reforms, however, was a 
key mistake by EU officials, and to some extent also candidate governments. Moreover, although 
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the gap between expectations set out by old member states and the openness of Eastern 
Europeans to change became apparent well before the enlargement was complete, the template 
for approaching the transfer of norms and regulations remained unchanged. Overextension of 
authority on EU’s part and (initial) timidity of candidate countries in raising objections about the 
conditionality mechanism lay behind the failure to differentiate between issue areas.  Having said 
that, the purpose of this project is less to serve as commentary on the various options available to 
EU’s enlargement officials and more to underscore the limits of international norm promotion. 
Emphasis will remain on situations of uneven power distribution that may lead the suppliers of 
norms to require too much, and their recipients to offer too little. 
The norms that were entering candidate countries embodied the interests of actors from 
the societies in which they had originated. They emerged from a consensus among the old 
member states and now were to become law in the acceding countries. As Mlada Bukovansky 
put it in relation to the global war on corruption, the problem lies in “external imposition of 
contingent standards on societies that are not fully participating in defining those standards.”9 In 
other words, before these norms and the related policies could gradually start appealing to the 
societies expected to subscribe to them, they were imposed on the EU candidates with the hope 
that time would mend any flaws generated by this process. The power asymmetries inherent in 
EU accession made such pressure possible and seemingly effective.
10
 My goal is to outline the 
limits of such power. Imposition of rules may work in some policy areas but not in others. 
Whereas the high-stakes process of conditionality may have benefited formal judicial reform, it 
had limited reach on the related challenge of judicial corruption, and it hardly influenced citizen 
                                                 
9
 Mlada Bukovansky, "The Hollowness of Anti-Corruption Discourse," Review of International Political Economy 
13, no. 2 (2006): 184. 
10
 Tanja A. Boerzel and Ulrich Sedelmeier, "The EU Dimension in European Politics," in Developments in 
European Politics, ed. Paul M. Heywood, et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
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trust in the justice system at all. Along these lines, forcing societies to eschew their beliefs on 
sensitive issues can prove futile and even counterproductive in areas where domestic backlash is 
a real risk.  
It is difficult to appreciate the weight of this dilemma without a proper understanding of 
how international norms emerge and spread. Norms do not inherently make for good transplant 
material, as they have a specific function to play. They capture not just a single idea that is easily 
agreed or disagreed with, but a complex system of priorities that guides our solutions to 
problems emerging through social, economic, or political interactions. Corresponding policies, in 
turn, constitute the framework for executing the norm-derived prioritizations and their legitimacy 
is directly linked to the ideas underlying them. Transferring these contextualized meanings 
haphazardly may “create contestation at best and conflict at worst.”11 In order to assess the limits 
of legitimating the policies transferred to EU candidate countries, we have to look at the norms 
that underpinned them and the degree to which the Western and Eastern ones overlapped. 
Crucially, the room for non-compliance with these norms exists not only among the governments 
and political elites, but also with the societies at large. 
 
Beyond the Received Wisdom 
 
Past research on the spread of international norms offers useful conceptualizations of the 
pressures faced by non-complying states and the role of transnational actors in forcing them to 
comply. What persists, however, is an implicit acceptance of the unchanging split between 
                                                 
11
 Antje Wiener, "Enacting Meaning-in-Use: Qualitative Research on Norms and International Relations," Review of 
International Studies 35, no. 01 (2009). 
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transgressing governments and norm-supportive societies.
12
 In their study of norm life cycle, 
Finnemore and Sikkink, for example, recognize that the new norms “never enter a normative 
vacuum but instead emerge in a highly contested normative space where they must compete with 
other norms and perceptions of interest.”13 Yet, the authors fail to extend their argument to 
dynamics surrounding the (re)entry of internationally “cascading” norms at the domestic level. 
Since it is the domestic context where these norms actually end up making a difference, the 
authors’ focus on the interaction between states and on states as main recipients of norm-related 
socialization is surprising. The most problematic aspect of this approach is the assumption that 
once a norm reaches the international level, its evolution stops. For instance, while recognizing 
the role of domestic level influences, Finnemore and Sikkink argue that these are “strongest at 
                                                 
12
 To be sure, there are some notable exceptions to the more and less overt state-centrism characterizing the 
foundational studies on international norms. Several authors have raised questions about the tendency toward moral 
universalism and “norm proselytizing” implicit in the works disregarding agency of local actors in norm dispersion, 
transformation, and adoption. Among these authors, Christian Reus-Smit stresses the need to study normative 
change in world politics. Christian Reus-Smit, "The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature 
of Fundamental Institutions," International Organization 51, no. 04 (1997).  Gregory Flynn and Henry Farrell 
challenge the tendency of mainstream norms literature to treat norms as unchanging parts of a structure, while 
Jeffrey Checkel calls for unpacking norms arguments at the domestic level. Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Norms, Institutions, 
and National Identity in Contemporary Europe," International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 1 (1999). Alexandru 
Grigorescu asks why norm diffusion sometimes stops at the point of institutionalization or habitualization by 
governments and why even reaching these stages is not a guarantee of norm success. Alexandru Grigorescu, 
"Transferring Transparency: The Impact of European Institutions on East-Central Europe," in Norms and Nannies: 
The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and East European States, ed. Ronald H. Linden (Oxford: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002). Amitav Acharya in his discussion of norm localization contends that as 
norms reach the local levels they do not uncompromisingly replace existing norms systems, but rather transform and 
adapt to better fit existing structures. Amitav Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian 
Regionalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). Another author to have looked attentively to the domestic 
level in answering the question of which norms matter, how and how much, is Jeffrey Legro, who hypothesizes that 
international norms are rooted in other types of social entities (regional, national, or subnational). Jeffrey W. Legro, 
"Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the "Failure" of Internationalism," International Organization 51, no. 01 (1997). 
More recently, David Leheny showed in his study of Japan that governments wanting (or needing) to implement a 
concrete norm will find themselves transplanting it to the domestic context using norms (corresponding to local 
identities and material realities) already present in their respective societies. David Leheny, Think Global, Fear 
Local: Sex, Violence, and Anxiety in Contemporary Japan (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006). My 
paper joins this stream of research by drawing attention to the interaction between governmental and societal 
responses in receiving an international norm, as well as questioning the evenness in acceptability of norms between 
these two groups of actors and across issue areas. 
13
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the early stage of a norm’s life cycle and domestic influences lessen significantly once a norm 
has become institutionalized in the international system.”14  
I will show that while this may be true of some norms (such as human rights), the 
argument is incomplete and even misplaced with respect to less universalizable norms (e.g. anti-
corruption).
 15
 The norm cascade model cannot explain the variation in norm compliance 
between states. In addition, the cascade metaphor has a certain air of inevitability about it that 
does not reflect differences between norms and changes in their international status over time. 
When they were developed, both the cascade and norm spiral models were useful in mapping the 
spread of international norms and identifying recurrent patterns in that process. This narrow 
account, however, is no longer sufficient. It is just as important for us to understand which norms 
have more trouble gaining global appeal than others and why.
16
 From there it is only a small step 
to noting that just like not all norms will meet with success, those that gain international 
relevance need not enjoy it forever. To shed some light on these issues, we have to pay attention 
to norm competition at the domestic level, which follows the initial promotion of an 
“international” norm.  
Beyond amending the existing consensus on “international” norms, one objective of this 
project is to apply the proposed analytical framework to the EU context and there are sound 
theoretical reasons for doing so. The objectionable focus on states as main targets of socializing 
pressure apparent in the international norms literature is paralleled in the scholarship on 
Europeanization. These approaches emphasize institutional change and government behavior in 
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assessing policy (and norm) compliance.
17
  In studying the adoption of European Union policies 
at the member-state level, authors exploring Europeanization inevitably pay attention to domestic 
dynamics. But the promise of the distinction between governmental and non-governmental actors 
falls flat, when much of the analysis centers on trade-offs framed in terms of interests and 
pressure groups operating in domestic institutional contexts.
18
 The member-state governments 
are being pressured from the outside by their peer states (be they existing members or fellow 
candidates) or EU institutional watchdogs. From within, the pressure is magnified by domestic 
actors, who both pursue their own interests and respond to the leverage raised by European 
institutions.
19
 I argue this picture is not complete and in addition to differentiating between types 
of norms, I call for an examination of how non-state actors navigate the complex normative and 
institutional space in the EU. 
The final theoretical stepping stone for developing the present framework is offered by 
Meyer et al.’s macrophenomenological approach.20 The authors do not aspire to provide a grass-
roots account of norm proliferation and as such the framework does not provide an answer to the 
question raised above. However, their detailed conceptualization of the global-level pressures 
and the (in)effectiveness of these is nevertheless helpful. The authors recognize the importance 
of state, as well as non-state actors, all of whom are subject to the legitimation pressures of the 
world-level social reality stemming from widely accepted models of organization and behavior. 
They allude to “common world forces at work”21 in explaining extensive isomorphism in 
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domestic change and uniform definitions of rational actorhood, but they also recognize that states 
find it “much easier to adopt the latest structural forms than to make them work effectively.”22 
Their argument relies on the observation of significant similarity in state organization and 
behavior despite variation in factors that we would normally think govern that behavior.  
Given these underlying differences, the influence of the world culture must either be so 
strong that it eliminates dissent and makes the implementation of the culture’s imperatives an 
unthinking routine, or its operation can be observed in a more superficial form. This shallow 
adoption of the culture’s premises is made possible by a mechanism that allows states to comply 
with the culture and resist it at the same time. Meyer et al.’s approach takes up the latter position 
and describes the mechanism at work as “decoupling” – separation of general values from 
practical action.
23
 As they put it, “decoupling is endemic, because nation-states are modeled on 
an external culture that cannot simply be imported wholesale as a fully functioning system.”24 If 
norms are to spread internationally, Meyer et al.’s argument implies a sort of gradual 
enculturation process through which the initially resisted world culture becomes increasingly 
pervasive.  
My project applies this explanation to the recent EU enlargement episode and explores 
the consequences of not giving the candidates sufficient time to undergo the gradual 
enculturation that Meyer et al. refer to. To make things worse, the candidate countries were 
subjected to considerable external pressure and encountered ideal conditions for decoupling.
25
 
                                                 
22
 Meyer et al., 154. 
23
 Meyer et al., 154-156. 
24
 Meyer et al., 154. 
25
 Or shallow Europeanization, in the language of another set of scholars. Malgorzata Czernielewska, Christos J. 
Paraskevopoulos, and Jacek  Szlachta, "The Regionalization Process in Poland: An Example of 'Shallow' 
Europeanization?," Regionalization and Federal Studies 14, no. 3 (2004). Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, The 
Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe. Tanja A. Boerzel, "Participation through Law Enforcement: The 
Case of the European Union," Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 1 (2006). Also see Elena A. Iankova and Peter 
   
 
 15  
The empirical relevance of this question is linked to the theoretical input of my research effort. I 
will show that the dense policy environment that emerged in the EU over several decades of 
integration can serve as a unique laboratory for studying norms that aspire (or are pushed)  to 
gain international relevance.  
It is true that shared cultural heritage and overlapping values present in EU member states 
are relatively homogeneous, especially when compared to the global context. To use Meyer et 
al.’s language, the “European culture” is much thicker than the “world culture.” Nevertheless, 
there are important differences between EU’s member states when it comes to recent historical 
experiences, political cultures, or social and economic conventions and priorities. And though it 
is not fair to draw a clear dividing line between old and new member states, the Eastern 
enlargement has presented the greatest test so far of the values enshrined in EU treaties and 
institutions. The solutions to these tensions have been slow to come. As the Deputy Prime 
Minister for European Affairs of the Czech Republic put it, the EU was still “digesting the last 
enlargement”26 five years on. Any similarities across European societies have been far 
outweighed by the complexity and depth of the changes that EU accession has brought to Eastern 
Europe. I will argue that the hiccups en route to EU membership can be quite telling about the 
process of normative change more generally. This dissertation will take full advantage of 
observing the rare experiment that has been under way in Eastern Europe and draw theoretical 
lessons for studying international norms in the global context as well. In addition to exploring the 
motivations of governments in accepting certain norms, it will focus on the role played by 
societies as sites of the clashes between pre-existing norms and those coming in from the outside.  
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The attention to societal openness to international norms should not bypass the unique 
patterns of state-society interaction in Eastern Europe. As a function of communist history and a 
tradition of dissent from official doctrine, the civil society in the region has been positioned 
against the state, rather than helping to construct it from below through a well-defined public 
sphere.
27
 This legacy affects the receptivity of EU candidate societies to norms streaming in 
(with the endorsement of their own government elites). The inclination to contest these changes 
may have been suppressed in the period immediately preceding membership but as a populist 
backlash across Eastern Europe evidenced,
28
 the EU was not the only actor with some 
enlargement “digestion” to do. Poland’s Kaczyński brothers drove to electoral victory in the first 
post-accession election on a platform reinstating and defending the country’s traditional values, 
while Slovakia’s left/extreme-right coalition successfully played up perceptions of unfair 
treatment by the EU and of unjustified privileging of the country’s minorities. Euroskepticism 
grew in the Czech Republic, and rising energy insecurity led to repeated questioning of the 
obligation to close down Soviet-built nuclear power plants in Lithuania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria. 
In all these cases, elements of discourse that were downplayed in order to demonstrate 
commitment to EU membership provided opportunities for domestic political actors seeking to 
move from opposition into government.  
To discuss the coalition building in the wake of accession would amount to too great a 
digression from the present focus on international norms. The key implication of this trend to 
revisit highly sensitive and strategically suppressed issues concerns the argument about societies’ 
capacity to question the legitimacy of imposed norms. The close link between the enlargement 
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project as a whole and the particular normative changes was initially viewed as a unique asset 
and the lynchpin of conditionality but it represented also the agenda’s main weakness. It will be 
the goal here to show that this dynamic unfolded most clearly in the dense institutional context of 
EU accession but is by no means applicable to it alone. This applies with considerable urgency to 
recent efforts to cluster international norms, for instance in the realm of climate change and 
environmental protection, or to subsume some under others, as has been the case with the 
development agenda and the human rights discourse.  
In the interest of conceptual clarity I will devote chapter 2 to outlining a framework that 
allows for a productive classification of previously undifferentiated norm cases. The resulting 
typology of international norms will then serve as a useful tool for establishing parallels between 
European and globally present norms. Before we can explore this link between the two arenas, 
however, a note on case comparability is in order. One might argue that there is probably  a 
reason why norms like anti-corruption, human rights, nuclear safety, foot binding, environmental 
protection or ethnic minority rights do not usually figure as cases in a single research study – 
they are simply too different. The issue areas they concern have little in common. The degree of 
transnational and NGO involvement differentiates them further. Some have been part of the 
international discourse for almost a century, others are relatively new, and yet others have by 
now met their normative objectives and lost their relevance. I agree with these objections 
completely. 
 In fact, the main argument presented in this dissertation builds on these differences and 
expresses strong reservations about the ease with which we have been referring to many of these 
norms as international, without further distinction. Unless we examine specific attributes of each 
norm – the specific evolutionary stage it happens to be in and the resulting appeal that it has (or 
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can have) on either governments or societies – we will not be able to shed any light on the 
processes that underlie successful or failed attempts at international norm proliferation. The 
differences between individual norms therefore matter a great deal.  
It would not be very parsimonious, however, to create a separate category for each of 
these norms and study its unique evolution over time and space. For this reason, this dissertation 
will attempt to develop a shared set of attributes that all norms, whether European or global, can 
be examined for. These attributes take into consideration the specific content of each norm but 
only as it is reflected in the effect that the norm has on the behavior of states on the one hand and 
societies on the other. As a result, we can classify multiple norms into a limited number of 
categories, while uncovering a pattern of differences between them. The emergent framework, in 
turn, allows us to anticipate main hurdles in the promotion of these norms and provide answers 
to why some of them succeed, while others do not, and how this can change over time. 
In empirical terms, we could study the degree of norms’ institutionalization, local 
specificity, or origin to show whether it is surprising that human rights have met with global 
resonance while the ban against smoking at bus stops has not. In a slight variation of this 
comparative exercise, it might be instructive to take a snapshot of an international norm as it was 
defined at an early stage of its evolution and juxtapose it with a more recent version of the norm. 
For example, women’s rights underwent enormous and not necessarily linear transformation over 
the course of the twentieth century.
29
 While the norm would likely be seen as specific to only a 
few countries in 1918, the picture looks very different in the present era of United Nations 
conferences and programs advancing women’s status internationally. Ultimately, differences in 
content or in age, should not stand in the way of comparing various norms we refer to as 
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international. This more critical and discerning perspective does not mix apples and oranges. 
Instead, it is bound to improve our understanding of the world of norms. The framework that my 
dissertation provides allows us to sort these seemingly irreconcilable disparities productively and 
open an intriguing path in the international norms research agenda. 
 
What is New?  
 
 To demonstrate that taking a second look at the processes surrounding the proliferation of 
international norms does not amount to a futile opening of a can of worms, this section will focus 
on some important issues that the new approach allows us to address. They could be subsumed 
under a heading of “agency in norm proliferation.” Summarizing the project’s key contributions I 
will comment on the dynamics that turn norm proliferation into norm promotion, the policy 
strategies employed in this effort, and the lessons to be learned from recent norm promotion in 
Europe. 
First, by bringing the process, not just the outcome of norm proliferation to the forefront 
of our inquiry we can assess the implications of the power asymmetry between norm receiving 
and norm promoting countries. It may be tempting to fall into a pattern of searching for the 
“right” and the “wrong” side of an imaginary fence when describing the peer pressure and 
material incentives intended to alter the behavior of norm-violating states. However, having 
learned the lessons from episodes of cultural imperialism in the past, we should be cautious in 
establishing which norms warrant international promotion and which do not. Furthermore, the 
recent instances of democracy promotion in the Middle East, as well as on the periphery of post-
communist Europe show that norm promoting actors must be prepared to encounter opposition. 
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Interpreting such resistance through the international norm lens can inform the strategies that 
norm-promoting actors adopt, as well as how we study their actions.  
Compliance with external norms proves extremely complicated once we recognize that it 
involves not only governments but also their respective societies. Furthermore, diverse 
populations are not equally supportive of all norms. The recipients of norm-proliferation efforts 
need not always see the resulting reforms as positive change.  For example, advocates of Muslim 
women’s right to shed their burqas were surprised to find that many French or Turkish women 
see the veil as means of individual and cultural expression and not something they would want to 
reject outright.
30
 Reasoned opposition to well-intentioned external pressure for change is not rare 
and establishing a shared set of criteria on which we could judge certain normative shifts as 
“desirable,” without falling prey to paternalism, is as complicated as the spread of the norms 
themselves. In other words, mere presence of a norm in international discourse and practice tells 
us little about its meaning to concrete societies. The intensity with which norms have straddled 
national and cultural boundaries in recent years demands that we improve both theories and 
policies addressing norm-based change in international politics. 
  The second and related example of the need to understand the complexities of norm 
promotion is the extensive use of a policy instrument popular with international organizations: 
political conditionality. Intergovernmental and supranational institutions have become highly 
influential and increasingly pro-active in the past decades.
31
 This trend has translated into 
growing pressure for adoption of best practices, setting of benchmarks, and propagation of 
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unified solutions to ostensibly similar problems.
32
 Conditionality has been defended as the 
perfect tool for this purpose. Material or political incentives in the form of financial assistance, 
market access, or exclusive membership are offered in exchange for costly economic and 
political reforms. However, while seemingly straightforward, these reforms usually amount to 
compliance with preset standards and norms of behavior, many of which are foreign to the 
economies and societies they target.
33
  
The international organization most criticized for its application of conditional lending 
without much regard for the political and social cost of the required reforms has been the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
34
 Advocates of the fund’s mission have argued that 
accusations of inflexibility in IMF strategies in face of local variation are not justified, 
suggesting that policy preferences of the main contributors to the fund influence its approach to 
individual countries.
35
 This, however, is not the type of adjustment that we have in mind when 
considering the normative shifts that some of these reforms require. IMF failure to modify 
lending arrangements to fit changing local circumstances inspired calls for separating its role as 
an international creditor from that of advisor for coping with globalization processes.
36
 
Application of conditionality without considering the effect of international norms domestically 
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and the interaction of local and global normative structures has met with failure. Worst damage 
occurred in the most vulnerable places, Africa among them. In Ngaire Woods’ summary of the 
situation 
both the Fund and the [World] Bank published evaluations as to why their loans, 
advice, and conditionality seem to have failed on the continent… The advice they 
offered to governments was not always right. Politics within borrowing countries 
and a lack of sympathetic interlocutors and propitious political institutions, made 
their jobs difficult.
37
 
 
Templates used by the financial organizations made life easier for their risk-averse staff but 
resulted in poor performance of their lending and development programs and arguably hurt those 
they were supposed to help.  
The implications of this example for the use of conditionality as a policy tool are two-
fold. First, disregard for local variation in receptiveness to particular economic and political 
solutions threatens not only their successful application but also the credibility of the institution 
promoting such change. Second, failure to consider the social impact of the changes mandated by 
international organizations threatens the sustainability of any progress accomplished. Despite 
these pressing lessons, the long-term impact that conditional arrangements can have on target 
societies has been understudied, especially from the perspective of normative change.
38
 This 
dissertation promises to provide some answers to these questions, while examining the impact of 
EU membership conditionality in Eastern Europe. 
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The final key contribution of this project amounts to a better understanding of the EU 
accession process and an outline of mistakes to be avoided in future rounds of enlargement. The 
insights to be gleaned from the experience of the newest EU members do not end there, though. 
Juxtaposing their pre-accession situation with that of current candidate countries is no doubt 
productive. But a more detailed account of the post-accession effects of membership 
conditionality promises to shed light on the nature of political processes inside the European 
Union, not just at its doorstep. So far, little effort has been made to explain the differential 
impact that EU membership conditionality has had across issue areas in candidate countries. 
Responding to the silence on this topic, I propose a closer examination of the norms transferred 
to Eastern Europe. The comparative approach selected for this study examines the effects that 
two norms, minority rights and nuclear safety, had in Slovakia and Lithuania (adding Czech 
Republic to the cases with regard to the latter norm). The resulting balance between theory-
building and empirical testing that guides this project promises to provide a more accurate 
assessment of conditionality as a policy tool wielded by the European Union, and international 
organizations more generally.
39
 
The European Union represents an increasingly complex set of institutions ordering a 
growing array of competences and it has had a demonstrable and significant impact on domestic 
policies in the member states. Describing this system of governance will allow us to explore the 
structural basis for policy formation. Yet, the structural effects that EU’s institutions have on the 
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content and reach of policies applied in Europe leave plenty of room for various actors involved 
in this policy-making process. The theoretical portions of this dissertation will outline how the 
nature of the issue area that individual policies belong to shapes the specific strategies that actors 
active in any such space adopt. In order to systematize the discussion of this variation across 
issue areas, I will present a typology of norms valid in the European Union and underlying the 
policies the community seeks to advance.  
More generally, this project seeks to show that norms do not just spread but more often 
than not they are actively promoted (and opposed) by various sets of actors. The resulting 
dynamic generates roles for governments, domestic interest groups, the non-governmental sector, 
as well as societies at both the grass roots and macro level. In order to map this process most 
accurately, I suggest that we sort through the complex interactions between these actors 
depending on the type of the norm in question. Because of the important role that norms play in 
legitimating specific policy solutions this effort reaches far beyond theoretical fine tuning and it 
can also have a significant impact on how we determine policy success both in the domestic 
realm and internationally.  
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Methods and Chapter Preview 
 
The core research task of this dissertation is to 1./ develop a typology of international  
norms and subsequently to 2./ test hypotheses about the variously successful spreading of these 
norms by studying typical cases from each category. The first task is defined by the inclusion of 
a societal dimension in studying international norms. The purpose of introducing this dimension 
is to show how norm types vary along a continuum that replaces the previous binary 
differentiation between norms that are international and those that are not. In other words, we 
can examine norms for the degree to which they are, or can become universally applicable. The 
resulting classification facilitates the study of norm effect on states on the one hand and on 
societies on the other, generating insights about diverse obstacles to norm proliferation at each 
level. In simplest terms, the causal arrows connect norm type to norm success.  
Using an inductive approach to theory building, Chapter 2 is devoted to the study of 
human rights and anti-corruption as Weberian ideal norm types that delimit the extremes of the 
continuum between international norms. The former is taken to represent norms that are easily 
acceptable to both governments and societies, the latter exemplifies norms that are embraced 
only reluctantly by both.  Thus, a controlled paired comparison of these two crucial cases will 
dominate the discussion in the following chapter. 
Once the dimensions of the analytic space for studying international norms are specified, 
this project will continue with a more detailed study of norm examples that have encountered 
difficulties in the course of their reception by either target governments or societies. Turning our 
attention to the dense policy space present in the European Union, the empirical chapters will 
focus on placing minority rights and nuclear safety in the proposed typology on norms, as well as 
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track their entry into candidate countries during EU’s Eastern enlargement. Each of the two 
norms is associated with one cell in the proposed typology – they vary on key characteristics that 
determine their classification in the framework. As the classificatory chapter preceding the dual 
empirical study will show, minority rights can be expected to encounter most difficulty at the 
societal level, while nuclear safety should present the greatest challenge to economically and 
state-security conscious governments.  
These divergent sets of hypotheses will be tested in the two empirical chapters that draw 
heavily on field research conducted in Eastern Europe and Brussels between summer 2008 and 
spring 2009. The variation in the focus of the chapters, one on societal processing of a norm 
(chapter 4 studying minority rights) and one on the governmental reactions to normative change 
(chapter 6 on nuclear safety), is also reflected in the methods used to study each norm.  
In the case of minority rights, the key variable of interest is societal discourse on this 
topic. Unfortunately, public opinion survey data provides only a partial answer to this question. 
Similarly, qualitative analysis of press coverage of the minority rights debate need not fully 
capture the distribution and unique links between individual opinion stances. Therefore, I 
decided on a methodological approach that can be used in combination with these usual research 
strategies, while providing some key additional insights. I developed a Q-methodology study 
containing statements about minority rights, extracted from press coverage, public documents 
and key speeches by public officials. The main objective is to uncover groups of statements that 
tend to cluster together, representing the discursive positions that define a society’s attitude 
towards minorities. Unique to each society, the results provided by this methodology can 
nevertheless be compared across countries, to establish the degree of similarity between the local 
minority rights discourse and that streaming from Brussels. My study compares the Lithuanian 
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experience of limited tensions between minority and majority populations, and Slovakia’s 
struggle with minority integration throughout the country’s recent history. The factor analytic 
approach complemented by findings from in-depth field interviews provides a well-rounded 
picture of the reception minority rights standards received in Eastern Europe. At the same time, 
and without compromising on statistical rigor, it maintains the focus on social processing of the 
norm. 
On the opposite side of the spectrum, nuclear safety features as an example of a norm that 
broader publics often know little about but generally endorse, especially against the background 
of the Chernobyl nuclear accident that lingers in Eastern European memory and more recent 
events still unfolding in Japan. Governments, on the other hand face serious constraints, most 
notably those related to energy security in Russia’s immediate neighborhood. In addition, they 
face the pressure international agreements to curb carbon emissions and EU-wide commitments 
to abide by these rules. Finally, governments are also subject to lobbying by domestic energy-
producing firms demanding a favorable regulatory environment. As a result, their openness to 
raising safety standards and closing down nuclear plants often lags behind that of the general 
public. To test the hypotheses about governmental behavior regarding the adoption of the nuclear 
safety norm, I will focus on studying official documents from the period surrounding EU 
accession. Using computer assisted text analysis to detect variation in emphasis that the EU and 
individual member states use when justifying their decisions on nuclear safety issues can provide 
us with answers to questions about the spread of this type of norms. The picture will be made 
more complete by combining these findings with interview responses from key policy makers in 
the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Slovakia, as well as EU officials overseeing nuclear power 
plant decommissioning on behalf of the European Commission. I obtained these during the 
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country visits in 2008-09. The three cases were selected based on their nuclear plant 
decommissioning history that, between the three of them, covers the full range of variation on 
the subject. 
The methodological tools employed in each portion of this dissertation correspond with 
its theoretical objectives and mirror the empirical realities that surround the international 
promotion of norms. I hope to show that studying the societal dimension of this process is both 
valid and necessary, and that innovative methods can help us address this issue comprehensively. 
At the same time, acknowledging the role played by governments in promoting and facilitating 
the adoption of norms is essential for the completeness of the final account. The methodological 
choices in this dissertation reflect that fact.  
This chapter has introduced the case for disaggregating the effect that international norms 
have on states by differentiating between the motivations of governments and societies. Both 
these actors play an important role in determining the success of a norm. Chapter 2 will be 
devoted to defining both sides of the norm-proliferation process further. Focusing on the 
questions raised in this introduction the next chapter will open by describing the presence of 
norms in the global arena and linking these observations to the core question addressed by this 
project: why some (seemingly) international norms spread more easily than others. In chapter 3, I 
will develop the framework by further specifying the individual norm types and matching them 
with their empirical referents, minority rights and nuclear safety. Subsequently, Chapters 4 and 6 
will be devoted to an empirical exploration of the dynamics surrounding the entry of the EU-
endorsed version of the two norms to Eastern Europe. The main objective of the chapters 
focusing on minority rights and nuclear safety is to uncover the sources of the reluctance with 
which the two norms were received. Chapter 5 uses the findings on the minority rights to further 
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analyze in detail the effect of EU’s institutional structures on policy development on the one 
hand, and the strategies that norm promoters choose in advocating the desired change of policy 
on the other hand. In a similar focus on norm-evolution dynamics, chapter 7 will highlight the 
effect of security crises on norm penetration and redefinition by governments, but also societies. 
Together, chapter 5 and chapter 7 are intended to uncover the conditions that trigger norm 
evolution, or, in terms of the present typology, their movement between cells along the two key 
dimensions. The conclusion will consider questions of power in shaping apparent universality of 
some norms and its impact on possible imbalances in norm demand and supply. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 30  
CHAPTER 2: NOT ALL NORMS ARE UNIVERSAL – A TYPOLOGY OF 
INTERNATIONAL NORMS 
 
Success is not always easy to determine. Yet, even in the fluid environment surrounding 
international norms we know we found a clear indicator of triumph, when a norm takes the shape 
of a dominant frame that can subsume other norms. In recent years, the human rights norm has 
reached this status with its growing role in justifying the battle against underdevelopment in 
world’s poorest regions.40 Human-rights became a guiding principle in shaping the development 
agenda, which by now encompasses a wide range of priorities, and among them the battle against 
corruption. The priorities enshrined by Millennium Development Goals (MDG) represent the 
most prominent example of drawing deliberate links between human rights and anti-corruption 
norms. In this context, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon recently cited corruption as “an 
obstacle to the achievement of development and human rights goals.”41 The emerging consensus 
in the development community is that human rights discourse offers “a powerful resistance to 
violation of various rights and the problem of corruption can be addressed by framing it [as] a 
human rights violation.”42 This chapter will be devoted to studying the norm hierarchy that is 
implicit in the framing of anti-corruption efforts as a part of the human rights agenda. I will focus 
on uncovering the reasons behind the variation between the two norms’ respective success to 
develop a revised theory of international norms. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was approved with 48 votes to none by the 
UN general assembly in 1948. This document now belongs to customary international law, and it 
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 "Human Rights in Development,"  http://www.unhchr.ch/development/. 
41
 "Corruption Impedes Development and Human Rights, Ban Says on International Day," UN News Centre, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=29229&Cr=Financial+Crisis&Cr1. 
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 C. Raj Kumar cited in Thusitha Pilapitiya, "The Impact of Corruption on the Human Rights Base Approach to 
Development," (Oslo: United Nations Development Program, Oslo Governance Centre, 2004), 10. In an even more 
explicit statement of the position the 11
th
 Anti-Corruption Conference that took place in 2003 in Seoul called for 
designating large-scale corruption a crime against humanity, as for many around the world it falls into the same 
category as torture, genocide and other crimes against humanity that rob humans of human dignity. 
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was followed by a set of covenants that embedded its message in international legal practice and 
gradually expanded the human rights agenda.
43
  In 1993, 171 states approved the action 
programme from the World Human Rights Conference in Vienna and so reaffirmed their 
commitment to the Declaration.
44
 As the human rights regime grew in strength, there was also a 
rise in the moral awareness among the global public on this issue
45
 and the norm, while often 
violated, has become firmly established internationally.
46
  
In the case of the anti-corruption norm, by contrast, progress has been much more 
difficult to ascertain and even international conventions specifying what constitutes corrupt 
behavior are not unanimous. The main existing legal instruments designed to combat corruption 
at the global level were developed under the auspices of the OECD
47
 and the United Nations.
48
 
The two differ in their specificity in defining the phenomenon of corruption. This difference is 
largely underpinned by the diversity among their respective member states and the resulting 
likelihood of them sharing the views about what actions should be classified as corrupt. The 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), wider in its geographical coverage, 
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 International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (1966), International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966), 
Convention Against Torture (1984). 
44
 "Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action," United Nations General Assembly. 
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 Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, eds., Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press,1999), 2. 
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"The Force of Prescriptions," International Organization 38, no. 4 (1984): 686. 
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 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 2003. Under the convention, corruption is understood as “The 
promise, offering or giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself 
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entered into force in 2005 upon ratification by 30 member states. However, only 140 members of 
the United Nations signed the convention and the ratification record is lagging further behind the 
signatures, with only 111 states having done so as of May 2009. Moreover, a number of these 
countries filed reservations exempting them from the legal obligations and constraints following 
from the Convention or its parts. The difference in success between human rights and anti-
corruption, I will argue, derives from varying acceptability of the two norms worldwide.
49
 More 
importantly, I will offer the analytical vocabulary needed to describe such variation. 
This study uses human rights and anti-corruption as cases possessing characteristics that 
can help us uncover the effect of specific norm attributes on the ease with which a given norm 
spreads internationally.
50
 Following the convention of employing different cases to develop a 
theory, and yet other ones to test it,
51
 this chapter will refer to the global human rights and anti-
corruption norms. It would be difficult to argue that human rights or anti-corruption norms as 
applied internationally are completely unrelated to their European versions. However, the density 
of policy contestation and the reasons employed in justifying the norm (or even the extent to 
which this is necessary), clearly distinguish the two arenas. In the international context, which I 
use to develop the present theory, the norms exist in a “thinner” version and tracing their 
proliferation amounts to examining the “most difficult” scenario.52  
There are numerous characteristics that establish the comparability of human rights and 
anti-corruption: their extensive and continuously growing international presence, the richness of 
                                                 
49
 At the same time, the acceptability is not identical with “on-the-ground” performance and it is this tension that 
leaves room for strategic action in norm promotion, which will be explored in the later chapters. 
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 I will treat the human rights and anti-corruption norms as heuristic cases. Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory 
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(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003)., especially Chapter 3. 
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the discourse surrounding these norms, NGO and governmental involvement in advocating them, 
or concrete measures taken to adopt or refuse them. Furthermore, documents developed under 
the auspices of the United Nations played an important role in introducing the two norms to the 
realm of international law.
53
 Yet, precisely because human rights and anti-corruption have so 
much in common, the first part of this chapter will be devoted to gaining theoretical leverage by 
studying the variables on which the two norms differ. Human rights have enjoyed support from 
governments, as the brief survey of international conventions illustrated. The norm has also been 
reinforced by societies, whenever popular movements, in alliance with international actors 
successfully pressured political elites for change. The norm against corruption, on the other hand, 
has met with only lukewarm support from most governments. Moreover, societies do not seem 
quite prepared to eschew corrupt practices either.  
This variation between the two norms can be explored productively by identifying those 
attributes of these norms that either promote or hinder their proliferation. Therefore, this chapter 
will describe human rights and anti-corruption as approximating ideal types, each characterizing 
a distinct norm category. I propose that we divide international norms into universal and what I 
will refer to as particular norms. Particular norms originate in individual societies and are 
merely “passing through” the international realm, aiming to spark change in other societies. 
Upon entering the new contexts they acquire a unique meaning.
54
 The ability to successfully 
promote these norms can be seen as a credible measure of power in international politics – the 
power to mold the international environment to one’s image. Yet, whether the original promoters 
of these norms are governments, international organizations or NGOs, these context-specific 
                                                 
53
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norms are likely to encounter pre-existing local conventions that can weaken or directly oppose 
their adoption. If a norm cannot subsume these norms and its redefinition is necessary, we are 
dealing with a particular international norm.  
Sean Chabot offers one example of such an attempted norm transfer in his revision of the 
received knowledge about international norm diffusion. He describes the efforts by civil rights 
activists in the United States between the 1940s and 1960s to transplant Gandhi’s model of non-
violent mass-scale direct action to the American context. The new norm of civil protest 
enshrined “a code of discipline, organizational guidelines, and practical steps”55 but its 
introduction to the United States suffered from “hyper-difference” between the needs of the 
target society and the norm’s specific origin within the confines of Indian culture.56 The norm 
had to be stripped of its unique links to the Indian socio-economic divides that it was originally 
addressing before it could become transferable as a remedy to racial inequality in the United 
States. Once this occurred, the norm generated new meanings and its adoption anchored it in the 
new local context specific to that country. Chabot calls this process norm relocation. Within the 
present framework, however, the dynamic points to a lack of a broad overlap between the 
(unrevised) norm’s effects in diverse societies. It is this overlap that would be necessary for us to 
call the norm truly international at the time of adoption. Thus, the Gandhian repertoire represents 
an example of a particular nom. This norm type delimits one end of the dimension for studying 
international norms introduced by this project.  
I refer to the second norm type, occupying the opposite side of the continuum, as 
universal. This is the category with which most scholars tend to equate all “international norms.” 
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These norms are relatively entrenched outside of specific domestic contexts – they do not 
characterize the views or policies of just one state or region. Admittedly, universal norms spread 
alongside particular ones. Sometimes they are used as framing tools for improving the adoption 
chances of their more context-specific counterparts, as in the match up of human rights and anti-
corruption. It is also conceivable that particular norms become universal over time, which is 
likely to be the outcome of deliberate actions on the part of norm promoters.
57
 Acknowledging 
the range of variation that spreads from particular to universal norms is not only empirically 
accurate but also theoretically fruitful. 
The primary benefit of drawing this distinction is that it allows us to focus not only on the 
effect that each norm has had on states, but also on the process of normative exchange between 
and across societies. The mistake of most previous norm scholarship has been to treat all 
international norms as if they were universal, or close to achieving this status, without further 
scrutiny. Analyzing international norms more carefully and paying specific attention to the 
particular norms, can answer some important questions, including why some norms travel more 
easily between some societies than between others.
58
 In order to accomplish this task, I adopt the 
method of process tracing as laid out by George and Bennett, with one important qualification in 
mind. While still treating a case as “an instance in a class of events,”59 the present study looks for 
cases among individual norms, not historical episodes.
60
 The evolution of an international norm, 
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and even more so the conditions surrounding its (non)acceptance by individual governments and 
societies, represent the core subject of inquiry here.  
 
Telling Particular and Universal Norms Apart 
 
Asking carefully formulated questions about the possible sources of the divergence 
between human rights and anti-corruption can lead to a better understanding of the complexities 
of the norm proliferation process and generate empirically testable hypotheses. More 
importantly, this exercise will also produce a norm-neutral decision guide that can be applied to 
the study of norms other than human rights and anti-corruption. The benefit of reproducibility of 
inquiry that such a set of criteria for identifying a norm as particular or universal enables is 
evident. I have identified five such criteria: the foundations of a norm, the context surrounding 
its proliferation, its degree of institutionalization, the role of material realities in getting the norm 
to stick, and finally the strategies employed by actors involved in advancing the principles 
enshrined by the norm. These norm attributes are related and inform one another but they can be 
used as separate indictors in the proposed classification 
 
The Foundations of a Norm 
 
 In looking for factors that can help us classify a norm as particular or universal, we must 
first answer the question about the origin and evolution of norms. How easily will states be able 
to implement internationally “endorsed” policies depends on the degree of corresponding support 
for these in the underlying domestic discourse. A norm can be seen as imposed when its 
introduction to a society is the result of international pressure, in the absence of home-grown 
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demands for such a norm. In the case of non-imposition, a society participates in the creation of 
the norm, rather than merely receiving it, and so endows it with legitimacy. Various actions can 
qualify as participation in the norm creation process and they can involve both state and non-
state actors. However, the main effect is that the domestic discourse concerning the norm 1) 
translates (more or less directly) into the final version of the norm, and 2) evolves along with the 
norm. Should this process fail, the norm as an imposed product of other collectivities’ 
deliberations will be reinterpreted by the norm-receiving society, if not outright rejected. This 
can alter the content and meaning of the initial norm to more closely resemble / fit into the 
society’s domestic discursive context.61 Thus, the empirically observable question to be asked in 
determining the origin of a given norm is whether we can identify a single state or a group of 
states as the authors and main promoters of the norm. Does the foundation on which the norm 
rests have roots in more than one society? 
Human rights meet the strictest criteria for worldwide acceptability, if not acceptance, 
leaving little room for culture-specific “explanation”62 by defenders of practices such as torture, 
foot binding, or genital cutting. As many have acknowledged, the origin of human rights in the 
West is a historical fact.
63
 The applicability of these rights, however, is independent of their 
geographic birthplace
64
 and their international relevance reaches well beyond its initial 
boundaries. Put simply, we should not ask where the norm came from but whether 
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internationally established human rights make sense elsewhere than in the West.
65
 As a result, 
the relevant norm origin is that of the standards on which the validity of a norm is judged. Even 
if the trajectories taken to reach these standards may vary across cultures, they nevertheless 
produce a relatively coherent norm, whose explanation and justification allows for variation in 
cultural practices, but follows roughly the same line separating the right from the wrong. Without 
reverting to essentialist views of human nature, we can see our human experience as broadly 
comparable, whether one was born in Iran or Denmark. In recognition of this principle the first 
article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights begins by stating that “[a]ll human beings 
are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and 
should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” Confirming the straightforwardness of 
its message, the Declaration’s third article continues, “[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and 
security of person.”66   
The foundations of a norm that establish it as universal do not come without controversy. 
The greatest recent challenge to the universality of human rights came precisely down the “norm 
origin” path, in the form of the “Asian values” debate.67 This challenge presented a different 
perspective of rights that human beings were entitled to. The emphasis on a collective, rather 
than individual formulation of these rights in Asian societies, and the focus on duties, rather than 
entitlements pushed some civil and political rights to the background and privileged social and 
economic development. However, the divide between the “Western” and “Asian” approaches to 
human right rights has since been uncovered as ambivalent, contingent, and resting on false 
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dichotomies.
68
 Responding by taking the position of “weak cultural relativism,” authors that 
defend the universality of human rights show how the norm’s international recognition still 
leaves plenty of room for living out traditional values.
69
 In simplest terms, the universality of 
human rights claims does not require uniformity in their fulfillment.
70
 As William Talbott 
skillfully illustrated using the example of prescriptions existing in most societies for providing 
care to the elderly, “there are various equally good systems of norms governing [such] care.”71 
Along with this room for diversity, widespread applicability of human rights does not 
guarantee the norm’s success in all societies, nor does it preclude its evolution. Instead, the 
resistance to Western domination of the human rights agenda has ultimately led to an expansion 
of the human rights category and elicited calls for a prioritization of these rights. The guiding 
principle here was not the canon of Western liberalism but the real impact that their violation has 
on the lives of oppressed groups (and individuals).
72
 The similarity of our human experience 
affects the likelihood with which we will be able to perceive the human rights and related norms 
as legitimate. This makes a unique source of support for the norm nearly impossible to identify 
and is sufficient to classify human rights as a universal norm under the present framework.  
Human rights differ from anti-corruption in the duration of their presence in international 
law and discourse and this has arguably affected the range of opportunities for diverse societies 
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to internalize the norm and contribute to its development.
73
 Yet, the temporal dimension aside, 
the ease with which we can identify the intellectual, economic and social origin of anti-
corruption is much greater than in the case of human rights. The “international” norm banning 
corrupt practices is deeply rooted in the liberal economic principles espoused by advanced 
industrial countries. Consequently, it is not surprising that these countries were able to reach a 
more comprehensive consensus under the OECD institutional umbrella. This concentrated 
foundation for the norm also serves as a source of leverage by the developed countries over the 
recipients of their aid, whenever the suspicion arises about the economy-stifling effect of corrupt 
exchanges. The objectives of curbing corruption, therefore, can be acceptable to a society only to 
the extent that the liberal principles of open market economy and the accompanying institutions 
are so.
74
 The difficulties that government representatives have had in agreeing on a single 
definition of corruption for the United Nation Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) hints at 
a society-specific understanding of the phenomenon. With respect to its origin, the anti-
corruption norm therefore has to be described as particular. Demonstrably, the distinction 
between norms based on the circumstances and actors surrounding their inception is linked to the 
likelihood of convergence on a coherent international version of the norm. Thus, norm origin 
understood as the justifications available for its legitimacy, should be included among the factors 
determining the success or failure of a norm’s proliferation. 
 
Context Surrounding a Norm Violation 
                                                 
73
 The present approach does not deny the role of norm age in facilitating their promotion. But this variable need not 
unnecessarily obstruct norm comparisons. By focusing on the attributes that reflect norm age without necessarily 
being identical with this variable we can study their independent influence on norm success. 
74
 Dangerously, however, Bukovansky is correct to warn us that “pitching the anti-corruption discourse as a 
diagnosis for underdevelopment also absolves those living in liberal capitalist states from scrutinizing their own 
polities in terms of a discourse of corruption.” Bukovansky, "The Hollowness of Anti-Corruption Discourse." 
   
 
 41  
 
The particular/universal distinction centers around the content of norms we know as 
international. This project introduces the societal dimension in addition to the usual focus on 
official governmental policies because it promises to capture the dynamics that surround the 
living-out of the norm in everyday behavior of individuals affected by it. In this context, the 
moment of a norm’s violation becomes highly important for differentiating between norms. For a 
norm to be classified as universal, its violation has to be recognizable as one by both parties 
involved, i.e. the victim and the violator. For instance, bribing a police officer need not be an 
unacceptable transgression in all parts of the world. In addition, the power asymmetry between 
the participants in that exchange, conditioned by collective expectations about such situations, 
affects the victim’s and the violator’s willingness to follow through with the “corrupt” 
transaction. The problem for norm applicability arises when participants in that exchange do not 
see it as deviant or undesirable in any way. This has negative consequences for any measures 
aimed at eliminating corruption from political and economic life. The expected behavior is 
determined by the particular social and perhaps economic context in which the two actors 
operate and need not be viewed as transgressing against a norm by the perpetrator, and not even 
by the victim.  
The anti-corruption norm as embodied by international agreements on the subject, 
redefines the relationship between the victim and the violator – without the norm, in fact, the two 
sides of the exchange could not be so labeled. Where the norm had not been formally introduced, 
its violators cannot be held accountable. In other words, for anti-corruption to be effective there 
has to be a consensus on what constitutes corruption.  However, as Bukovansky points out, 
distinguishing between a gift and a bribe requires thick cultural knowledge of the particular 
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society in question.
75
 Moreover, certain pre-defined principles regarding the desirability of equal 
access to the political process and non-discrimination in interactions with state institutions are 
necessary for specifying any behavior as a norm violation. At this point, the authenticity of the 
underlying norms presupposed under the heading of liberal rationalism becomes crucial. If such 
principles do not exist in a society, or are not perceived as legitimate, the reach of the anti-
corruption norm, which depends on them for validity, is minimal. 
This situation is very different from, for example, the expectation that all drivers remain 
on the correct side of the road so as not to endanger others. Once we recognize that all 
participants in road traffic are equally vulnerable to injury, a person violating this rule can 
conceivably be aware of the danger she is posing to others.
76
 The driver’s seeing her actions as a 
norm violation is not dependent on the introduction of an isolated set of values and principles to 
her. The wrong-doing stems from the fact that both she and her potential victims are human. 
Protection from bodily harm could thus be classified as a principle comprehensible to all, 
regardless of the social milieu they happen to live in. 
 In order to use this criterion to empirically distinguish between particular and universal 
norms we have to ask whether a norm, upon entering a society, introduces accountability where 
it had not existed before. By disregarding human rights, violators may be inflicting harm on their 
victims, but their actions cannot be justified even in the eyes of the perpetrator, once (even if just 
theoretically) their shared identity as humans is recognized.
77
 In other words, the violator, being 
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equally susceptible to pain or humiliation, can feasibly understand her actions as wrong, without 
having been introduced to a human rights covenant. In sum, existing patterns of social interaction 
do not necessarily change once we formally introduce human rights as a social and legal norm. 
This kind of shift, by contrast, is apparent in the case of  (anti-)corruption. 
This context-centered criterion for identifying particular and universal norms is closely 
linked to the specificity of norm origin discussed above. The two are not identical, however, as 
the ability to comprehend certain actions as a norm violation derives directly from the content of 
the norm. It highlights the fact that the specific function that a norm was designed to fulfill in 
one context may not transfer easily to another. In sum, whenever a norm introduces 
accountability where it did not previously exist, as the anti-corruption norm often does, it falls 
into the particular category.  
 
Institutionalization of a Norm 
 
The third criterion for assessing the particular/universal nature of a norm centers on the 
degree to which this norm depends on the new institutional structures designed to elicit 
compliance. The main question is whether the norm has enjoyed a sufficient degree of legitimacy 
prior to institutional changes implementing its validity, or if the institutions were intended to 
create such legitimacy, and are thus vulnerable as targets of the discursive questioning directed 
at the “new” norm. Do the justifications for following the norm aim to draw a line behind the 
pre-adoption past? What is the risk that the receiving society will reject the internally imposed 
framing of the norm in question?
78
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The case of human rights proliferation following the Helsinki conference in 1975 can 
serve as a suitable example of norm legitimacy being succeeded by institution building, in order 
to constrain both state and non-state actors into compliance with a widely established norm. 
Daniel Thomas traced the process of shaming the Soviet-bloc governments into living up to the 
promises made at Helsinki.
79
 The governments which had originally signed on to the human 
rights agenda for instrumental reasons were trapped in their rhetoric and pressured by peer states 
and domestic activists into compliance. Their failure to comply put the legitimacy of the entire 
Soviet regime into question, but more importantly for the present project, the affected societies 
considered themselves authors of the norm that was about to enter their lives as a desirable 
constraint directed at their respective governments. This was in no small part the result of the 
underground dissident movement, which also produced legitimate leaders when the time was 
ripe for a changeover. Therefore, following the fall of authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe, 
there were few obstacles to the implementation of the human rights agenda, as the legitimating 
momentum in support of the norm was already present.
80
 
The anti-corruption norm presents us, again, with a different story. Miller, Grødeland and 
Koshechkina’s survey of four Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Slovakia, 
and Ukraine) represents a precious collection of data on corruption, perceptions of the 
phenomenon, and experiences of interaction between citizens and “street-level” officials. Their 
data on the citizen-perceived causes of bribery in the Slovak case, for instance, shows that 30 
percent believe the main reason is that “officials are greedy,” only 19 percent think it is because 
the government does not pay the officials enough, and 50 percent see the main cause in people’s 
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desperate desire to “buy favors.”81 Ironically, market forces are allowed to operate at the expense 
of transparency and access to state institutions or services nominally free, and unless a credible 
institution is introduced to deal with this situation, the societal beliefs about corruption are 
unlikely to change. Studies of corruption as a collective behavior support this observation.
82
 Still, 
the institutional environment is closely linked to citizen preparedness to comply with requests for 
bribes, as 61 percent believe that officials are more willing to take or request gifts because 
people do not know where to make a complaint.
83
 In an effort to comply with the anti-corruption 
norm, a government should thus alter the institutions that were previously conducive to 
intransparent transactions. One thing remains clear – in the case of anti-corruption efforts, the 
norm follows the institutions enforcing it, rather than vice versa. 
Even if such measures succeed, the more difficult part of the reform effort would be 
changing the understanding of many such exchanges as non-corrupt. According to a World 
Bank/USAID study of the reasons for offering a side payment in healthcare in Slovakia, these 
include a desire to improve the quality of services (35%), to express thankful appreciation (33 
%), to be favored or speed things up (11%), or merely to comply because “it is a habit, it is 
common” (10%).84 As long as these are the main motivations for corruption, reflective of a “gift-
giving culture,”85 the new institutions can be seen as going against the tide of widespread 
attitudes towards corruption. Especially the declared desire to express thankfulness and comply 
with existing local practices in such situations is reflective of existing social conventions that 
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erode the applicability of the newly introduced norm against corruption. Not only does this data 
illustrate that the Slovak society is not prepared to draw a line behind a corruption-filled past, it 
is not clear what the defining features of that past would be. 
By contrast, the desire to draw a decisive line behind the communist past in Eastern 
Europe was most pronounced when it came to the oppressive nature of the old regime and its 
human rights deficit. It is not a coincidence that the moral and eventually also political leaders of 
the “Velvet Revolution” came from among dissidents, who organized themselves in support of 
the Helsinki human rights promise. The desirability of the human rights guarantees materialized 
in the creation of the domestic and international institutions charged with monitoring the 
upholding of this norm. Questioning the legitimacy of these institutions would amount to a return 
to a past that had been rejected, which provides an additional reason for classifying the human 
rights norm as universal. 
 
Relevance of Local Material Realities 
 
Next, to classify a norm as particular or universal we must also examine the main sources 
of opposition that it encounters in the course of attempted proliferation. What are the policy steps 
necessary for the normative change to occur? Is the norm a technical rule or is it a social practice 
that is deeply rooted in material circumstances determining the logic behind it? Some clues on 
this point have already been offered in the sections dealing with the origin and 
institutionalization of norms, but we must still ask: why would a state’s adoption of a norm pose 
legitimacy / implementation problems domestically? To answer this question, we have to look 
past the governments as single-voice representatives at the international level.  
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Although the state has a role to play in setting the terms of the identity discourse, its 
actions cannot be too far removed from the society’s existing collective identity.86 These tensions 
are best illustrated by examples of clashes on food safety and sanitary norms briefly mentioned 
in the introductory chapter. If the EU were to regulate production of traditionally unpasteurized 
cheese in Poland or Romania, Slovak sour cabbage, or Hungarian sausages it would enter the 
territory of pragmatic social norms that had developed from once-relevant concerns about 
nutrition that were most salient in pre-supermarket days but nevertheless linger in societal 
consciousness to this day. Abandoning traditional staples in the interest of seemingly arbitrary 
standards would require a thorough reconsideration of affected societies’ diet – a change on the 
most fundamental “material” level. Although often less dramatic, many norms require that a 
deeply rooted practice be replaced by new patterns of behavior. The deeper the roots reach, the 
more difficult it will be to replace a pre-existing norm with a transplant.  
In addition, the material reality and its interpretations should be seen as a range of 
possibility, which can be expanded (though not indefinitely), if the correct argument is made. 
The story, then, is one of “tolerable divergence” between the material world and the socially 
conditioned interpretations of it.
87
 As Wade Jacoby puts it in connection to his discussion of 
policy emulation by elites in EU and NATO candidate countries, the key balance lies between 
promoting institutions that are “foreign” enough to promote real change and yet not so foreign as 
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to be unacceptable.
88
 The degree to which the advocacy of international norms represents a 
malleable issue will affect the room for strategic decisions by actors involved in promoting a 
given norm. This aspect of international norm proliferation will be taken up in the next sub-
section. As far as the relevance of local realities is concerned, it is important to consider the 
available perceptions of a norm and whether the issue can be framed in a way that resonates with 
the already existing social conventions.
89
 
Human rights approximate more closely a norm that can be accepted by target societies, 
once the hurdle of government cooperation is overcome. It is not coincidental that this norm and 
especially the element prohibiting bodily harm, dominates the agenda of internationally active 
advocacy networks.
90
 Human rights norm’s characteristic as a universal criterion of basic 
justice
91
 elicits societal consent with its main premise. This consent, sometimes silent, becomes 
particularly apparent in situations when oppressive regimes are overthrown and the first calls for 
justice entail accountability for past human rights violations, as has been the case in post-
communist Europe, post-apartheid South Africa and even post-genocide Rwanda.  
If a norm does not coincide sufficiently with a pre-existing set of rules and identities, the 
claim to membership in the international society defined by that norm will remain internally 
unsupported and any continuation of the (illegitimate) status quo will depend on intimidation and 
/ or blind conformity. Domestic transformation of that norm represents another alternative. This 
has been the case with anti-corruption, when even government cooperation does not guarantee a 
lower occurrence of corrupt behavior. The collective action problem that characterizes most 
attempts at eliminating corruption resembles the main difficulty with eradication of foot binding 
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as a practice in China, in that an individual’s behavior depends on the decisions she expects 
others to take. One key difference, however, lies in the lack of recourse to an overarching and 
widely applicable principle, such as an appeal to protecting individual autonomy.
92
 This 
distinguishes the corruption challenge from human rights violations in traditional / patriarchal 
societies. As a result, individual expectations about the behavior of others prove very hard to 
change. Even centrally implemented measures for combating corruption, which, ironically, often 
rely on decentralization of political and economic power, translate into tangible change only with 
difficulty.  
 
Strategies Surrounding Norm Promotion 
 
The question of local realities varying across contexts also translates into the strategies 
adopted by actors, most frequently non-governmental organizations, involved in promoting any 
given norm internationally. If there is a detectable difference in the nature of norms we call 
international, we should also be able to observe a difference in approaches devised for 
encouraging and monitoring compliance with these. Continuing the line of argument presented in 
the previous section about material realities influencing the acceptability of a norm, we should 
expect to see norm-promoters responding to any potential reluctance on the part of norm-
recipients by altering their approaches accordingly. On this measure, the contrast between human 
rights and anti-corruption is particularly stark. 
The decades following the establishment of basic human rights standards under the 
auspices of the UN have seen a growth in the activity of non-governmental organization such as 
Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch that have acted as a “conscience” for the human 
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rights regime.
93
 Amnesty International (AI) gained its prominence among defenders of human 
rights by focusing on the fates of individuals whose rights were being violated, which firmly 
linked their efforts to the political realities they sought to alter. In addition to proving strategic in 
gaining widespread support for their activities,
94
 the approach also highlighted the unique nature 
of human rights as a norm that derives its appeal from the comprehensibility of human suffering 
to people around the world. Paradoxically, then, the relatively narrow focus on the stories of 
oppressed individuals
95
 secured the broadest appeal of human rights advocacy. Similarly, the 
carefully selected cases from across world’s regions precluded accusations of ideological tainting 
of AI work but at the same time documented the relevance of the human rights agenda across 
diverse contexts. Today, AI along with a few other leading human rights organizations defines 
what constitutes a human rights violation.
96
  
The impact of the norm’s content on proliferation efforts does not stop with steering the 
specific campaign approaches chosen by human rights advocacy groups. Their internal 
organizational structures are also telling in this regard. AI’s international secretariat, not the 
country offices, is responsible for the majority of the organization's research and also leads their 
campaigning work.
97
 A similar internal hierarchy has developed among other members of the 
human rights advocacy network, including for example Human Rights Watch.  
This approach to managing AI’s and HRW’s international activities is in sharp contrast 
with the internal organization of the anti-corruption network led by Transparency International.
98
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TI’s international secretariat in Berlin, Germany, plays an important role in global efforts to 
develop and improve international anti-corruption conventions, and representing the network in 
interaction with other institutions. It also provides some (mostly methodological) resources to the 
regional offices. But it is the national chapters that carry out the bulk of the research and policy 
work on the ground: 
 
National chapters are the core of the TI movement. It is their work – offering local 
rootedness, creating synergy and dynamism for TI as a whole, and allowing 
innovation – that enables TI to advocate and achieve on a number of fronts.99 
 
The organization’s strategies are formulated bottom-up, reflecting the diversity of local 
challenges for anti-corruption.
100
 Each national chapter considers carefully what corruption 
means in the local context and what the best strategies for its elimination are. Throughout the 
existence of this organization, the bottom-up approach has been preferred and encouraged by 
Transparency International. Its success illustrates the context-specific nature of corruption and by 
extension of the anti-corruption measures designed to combat it.  
Though indirect, this last criterion for distinguishing between universal and particular 
norms is telling about the practical implications of this variable.
101
 To the extent that the 
universal norms resonate most loudly with the world public, it would appear to be a desirable 
strategy to frame as universal norms that emerged in a particular context.
102
 As Mary Kaldor put 
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it, the “advantage of the human rights discourse is its globalist character and its emphasis on the 
individual.”103 However, she questions whether projects that graft other norms onto the human 
rights agenda can become universalist in practice, “even if they always appear to make 
universalist claims.”104 This is the reason why I transfer the insights learned through the global-
arena comparison of human rights and anti-corruption to the European context, where the norm-
promotion actors face additional incentives (and resources) for such universalizing efforts in the 
form of their interaction with European Union’s institutions. The final section of this chapter will 
provide the links necessary to make this transition to the European policy space. Table 2.1 below 
concludes the international-level comparison of human rights and anti-corruption and 
summarizes the five criteria for distinguishing between universal and particular norms. 
Cumulatively the indicators define the newly proposed variable of norm content. 
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Table 2.1.  Particular and Universal “International” Norms as Concepts 
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Combining the Two Dimensions to Classify International Norms 
 
With the growing authority of international organizations and reach of transnational 
movements, new norms have appeared that governments endorse and actively promote, in spite 
of societal resistance. If we concede that most governments are accountable to domestic 
pressures, government-led norm promotion raises one important question. Why would elites 
want to pursue policies that are bound to encounter intra-state opposition? The simplest 
explanation is that governments prioritize foreign policy objectives in exchange for political or 
economic gains that benefit the country as a whole, even if they reshuffle the distribution of 
winners and losers internally. Compliance with reform demands from the World Bank and the 
IMF presented as the conditions for obtaining valuable financial or developmental aid fall into 
this category. Matters are not always this straightforward, however. As has been the case with 
Eastern European accession to NATO and the EU, societies and governments often agree on the 
desirability of normative change in principle but disagree on the means of attaining this 
overarching objective.  
The effect of membership in an exclusive community of states is at the heart of this 
problem. Governments bearing the broad mandate from their constituents initiate norm-derived 
changes to demonstrate that they are worthy of the organization they seek to join. The more 
exclusive the membership, the more desirable the international status it bestows. Arguably, the 
adoption of specific norms and the changes that they introduce to target states tests the 
commitment to become an EU or NATO member. The membership in these organizations is 
defined, or constituted by the norms they promote. In John Ruggie’s phrasing, these norms 
“define the set of practices that make up a particular class of consciously organized social 
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activity [e.g. membership] and specify what counts as that activity.”105 Without the norms, there 
would be little meaning to NATO and EU membership. Since the norms define the identity of 
states, they have a constitutive effect on both candidates and members – they create them and 
give weight to the differences between them.  
Yet, since only states can benefit from the status that norm compliance grants them 
internationally, their commitment to overseeing normative change at home does not immediately 
elicit appropriate behavior of individual citizens. From the latter’s perspective, the more specific 
normative prescriptions become, the more difficult it is to link these to the original desire for 
joining the EU or NATO. In the case of East European candidate countries, support for 
democracy, human rights, and even market reforms was widespread and corresponded well with 
the goals of transitioning away from their communist past. Unfortunately, vagueness with which 
these conditions of membership were stipulated sometimes led to surprises. En route to 
accession, Latvians had to revisit their citizenship policies and Slovaks had to make up with 
Hungarians and the Roma. To prepare for joining the common market, the tradition of small-
scale farming was threatened in Poland and the primary source of electricity (a nuclear power 
plant) had to be shut down in Lithuania. “Returning to Europe” was suddenly proving more 
costly than the candidate populations had envisioned. In such instances, the compliance pull had 
to come from above and societies suddenly became the obstacles to normative change, rather 
than its enthusiastic supporters. The constitutive effect that some norms have on states therefore 
leaves potential disagreements between government elites and the society at grass roots level 
outside of the analytic reach provided by the existing theories about international norms.  
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Regulative norms, which are commonly contrasted with the constitutive ones, are not 
immune to misalignment of positions taken by the governments and societies either. These 
norms “influence policy choices through processes of coercion, inducement, and legitimation”106 
and can be understood as mutually agreed-upon rules of behavior underpinned by instrumental 
reasoning. Paralleling the differential effect of constitutive norms on governments and societies, 
regulative norms also leave a stronger imprint on the cost-benefit aware government elites. 
Societies tend to experience these pressures mediated by domestic policy, which is shaped by 
government elites. These elites, in turn, come to power through some form of domestic selection 
process, in democracies an election. One might therefore be surprised to find any discrepancy in 
positions between governments and societies when it comes to regulative norms. Yet, such 
disagreement does exist in relation to environmental regulations, especially their well-developed 
EU version. These rules enjoy implicit and commonly voiced support from sizable segments of 
the broad public.
107
 Simultaneously, they face resistance, or limited endorsement from 
governments.
108
 On the public reaction side, the dominant argument mirrors the not-in-my-back-
yard principle and a deeply anchored tradition of environmental awareness. Governments, by 
contrast, remain conscious of long-term economic costs of curbing greenhouse emissions or fish 
stock preservation measures. As a result, they are reluctant to give in to societal pressure on such 
matters. Nevertheless, societies play a considerable role in shaping the success of international 
norms and they need not always take the same positions as their governments. In addition to 
reflecting the empirical reality of norm proliferation more accurately, answers to questions about 
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the degree to which norms are “international” fuel the need for separating the effect that norms 
have on governments and societies. The former operate as the formal actors in the international 
realm and the latter as carriers of the norms’ legitimacy and sustained validity. Consent at both 
the government and societal level is necessary for successful promotion of any norms, but 
neither is sufficient without the other. 
Our current conceptual toolkit is inadequate for exploring this societal dimension. This 
omission highlights the relevance of this project’s focus on the domestic processing of 
international norms. Effectively, the emphasis in this chapter on the variables differentiating 
between particular and universal norms supplements the research exploring the “usual” 
constitutive/regulative continuum in studying international norms. To do this successfully, we 
have to keep the processes of norm implementation (i.e. the transposition of its constraints into 
policy and legislation) and norm internalization (i.e. their acceptance by the affected societies 
resulting in behavioral change of individuals and collectivities) analytically separate.  
Sometimes it may be difficult to tell whether a norm spreads easily due to support from 
governments or from societies. If it meets with considerable success, it likely enjoys the 
endorsement from both. Scandinavian success in including women at all levels of political and 
economic life is well known. Yet, we would be hard-pressed to determine whether this outcome 
ensued from progressive policy measures that facilitated female inclusion in the legislature and 
government, or if this inclusiveness derives mainly from the receptive attitude of the 
Scandinavian societies. The two go hand in hand and are difficult to disentangle. By the same 
token, the cause of a norm’s failing performance may be obscured by the combination of a 
superficial government response that is unlikely to alter actor behavior considerably and 
indifference from the societies affected by the norm. Gender selective abortion in India or China, 
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for instance, constitutes a violation of the gender equality norm that is fuelled both by societal 
attitudes and overly lenient government approach on the matter. Despite these empirical 
difficulties, separating the behavior of states from that of societies can contribute to a better 
understanding of cases where the government and the people are not equally enthusiastic about 
the change stemming from newly adopted norms.
109
   
Human rights and anti-corruption both contain a regulative element. However, to the 
extent that grave human rights violations now warrant international (military) intervention,
110
 the 
norm is also constitutive of order in the international realm (complementing the state sovereignty 
norm, for instance). No such quality can currently be uncovered in the case of anti-corruption. 
The latter norm primarily represents a set of rules with intended causal effects, which enable the 
smooth running of the neo-liberal economic order without necessarily constituting it. However, 
the classification of the human rights norm as universal-constitutive and of anti-corruption as 
particular-regulative does not yet allow for a satisfying differentiation between the impact that 
these attributes have on the success of a norm. In the case of these two norms, governmental 
response mirrors that of societies. As a result, it is not immediately clear how much of the 
variation in norm success is caused by the particular-universal divide or by the constitutive-
regulative difference between the two norms.  
Anti-corruption and human rights norms are viewed as ideal types here in that the 
respective positions taken by governments and societies reinforce each other. For the majority of 
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international norms, however, the waters are much muddier. Only the exploration of the 
remaining two cells in the typology, where the two key dimensions influence norm success in 
opposite directions, can fully uncover the relative weight of the processes at work in norm 
proliferation.
111
 Reflecting this in our analytical models can contribute to a better understanding 
of the in-between cases where states and societies are not equally enthusiastic about the change 
stemming from newly adopted norms. 
 
Figure 2.1  Norm Types and Expected Outcomes  
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Figure 2.1 above summarizes the theoretical framework to be developed in the remainder 
of this dissertation. It captures the difference in the dynamics surrounding the acceptance of a 
norm by governments and societies. As such, the framework offers testable hypotheses about the 
individual norm types, evolution of norms and their past or potential shifts across cells, and also 
the strategies chosen by relevant actors interested in facilitating such movement. This careful 
exploration of the relative weight attributed to each of the two dimensions, as well as the 
interactions between them, will lead us to explain the range of outcomes associated with 
international norm promotion. Why do some norms meet with considerable (high) success in 
their proliferation (the universal-constitutive cell), while others score low on this measure (the 
particular-regulative cell)? What are the sources of mixed (medium) proliferation success? Will 
the likelihood of cross-national convergence in norm-derived practices depend on a shift in the 
positions of governments or societies?
112
 
 I have referred to the two dimensions differentiating between international norms as 
designating a continuum. Much like we need to pay attention to subtle gradation between norms 
across cells, we have to acknowledge the differentiation between norm cases within these cells. 
Allowing for variation between sub-approaches to individual norms, is only one analytical step 
removed from recognizing the international world of norms as inherently fluid and malleable. 
Especially if we consider that grouping demands for normative change into broad-sweeping 
packages has been a strategy that NGO, IGO, or governmental actors adopt to highlight the 
relevance of the issues at stake. Over time, however, it is not immediately clear which elements 
of the rich discourse surrounding those norms they have in mind. When discussing corruption, do 
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they mean bribery, extortion, petty corruption, state capture, or the gift-giving culture present in 
many societies? Which of these “vices” should be met by which policy remedies and what will 
be the norm-based justifications used in promoting them? These are relevant questions that hint 
at the reasons behind the often clouded definition of the anti-corruption norm itself. Calling 
attention to such intra-cell, intra-norm variation represents an important corollary to the main 
claims deriving from the norm taxonomy proposed here. It is essential for the present inquiry 
about the relative appeal of norms. It highlights the interaction between relevant norm-promotion 
discourses and the broader international context. 
 Linking this logic to norm-promotion strategies, the reasons for differentiating not just 
between norm types but also among the individual claims that make up a “single” norm are 
three-fold. First, keeping our eyes open for different norm components allows us to connect 
arguments about norm proliferation with accounts of soft law transformations into (quasi) hard 
law.
113
 In other words, if norm promoters stress the aspects of a norm that are most readily 
transferable to new contexts, it may establish initially shallow roots that eventually grow stronger 
and permit the gradual “enculturation” demanded by socialization approaches to international 
norm diffusion.
114
  
There is, however, a flip side to this implicit hierarchy between individual normative 
claims, and also the second reason for avoiding reducing norms to a convenient label. It is 
possible for actors to hijack otherwise accepted and well-positioned norms to align them with 
their narrowly defined interests and consequently increase international skepticism, starting a 
slippery slope of exceptions. This kind of scenario unfolded when the United States and British 
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governments used human rights arguments to (partly) justify the attack on Iraq in 2003,
115
 only 
to be followed by doubts about their commitment to that norm when evidence about the use of 
torture as an interrogation technique and mistreatment of prisoners surfaced, undermining the 
human-rights agenda as a whole.  
Finally, and relatedly, the success of one aspect of a norm may result in false hopes for its 
other components and result in conflicting messages that ultimately do not permit targeted 
approaches to individual norm-promotion challenges. For instance, where institutional reforms 
designed to alter incentive structures and curb extortion as one form of corrupt behavior have 
been relatively effective,
116
 measures to reduce the potential for state capture by domestic and 
international actors remain elusive.
117
 And if we accept that corruption as a social phenomenon is 
subject to threshold-linked patterns of behavior,
118
 reducing it partly or only in a limited area 
may do little for eradicating such practices from political and economic competition worldwide. 
Even worse, success in defining corruption as problematic in specific issue areas may lead to its 
overall perception as a more widespread practice than it may have been previously, encouraging 
further violations of the newly-present norm. 
In sum, sensitivity to individual components of norms which may otherwise seem 
homogenous is essential for tracing the reasons behind their relative success. The approach 
presented here highlights the contrast in the ability to internalize or formally adopt a norm by 
societies and governments, respectively. The continuum-based perspective is useful in providing 
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a better understanding of the underlying norm contestation and, ultimately, the expected 
likelihood of their international proliferation.  
 
Looking ahead 
 
So far, the approach to developing this theory has been inductive, using in-depth 
exploration of carefully selected norms.
119
 The goal has been to specify further the two key 
independent variables (norm content and norm effect) and identify the mechanisms through 
which they produce divergent outcomes. Yet, the picture becomes more interesting, and telling, 
when governments and their constituencies diverge in their reactions to a norm. The purpose of 
the differentiation between the incentives faced by states and their respective societies is to 
uncover the limitations of the conditionality asymmetries. These governed the adoption of acquis 
communautaire
120
 by prospective members and affected the success of norm internalization (as 
opposed to implementation), following the entry of post-communist societies into the EU. 
We are led to think by most existing accounts on the subject that governments are the 
main transgressors against many widely held principles. These violator states are pressured into 
compliance by their peers, as well as by international and transnational organizations in alliance 
with domestic forces. That was the model used to describe the rise of the human rights norm to 
prominence and it also applies to the women’s rights advocacy, anti-personnel landmine ban, as 
well as a multitude of environmental causes. In principle, the accounts of international norm 
proliferation characterized by bottom-up activism are not surprising. It is common for societies 
to impress their will onto their respective governments – in democracies this occurs with every 
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referendum or regular election. Non-democratic regimes encounter this pressure as well, even 
though for change to transpire more force may be required.
121
  
The variety of protest forms notwithstanding, past research emphasizes the role of 
societies in facilitating the spread of good
122
 international norms and the above examples all 
illustrate this point equally well. The targets of these internationally encouraged societal 
upheavals are almost exclusively their respective governments. Popular discontent is equated 
with “setting things right.” It is as if societal support is always there and endorsement from 
governments is all that is missing – even the most impenetrable of human rights violating 
regimes, many of them in the Soviet camp, were turned around once the governments gave in. 
But evidence is accumulating that this picture is hugely one-sided and dangerously incomplete. 
Once the government is not the main opponent of norm change, the boomerang effect is no 
longer operational,
123
 necessitating the revised theoretical approach presented here. 
My framework deliberately refers to norm change, rather than “progress.” Local rejection 
of some purportedly international norms need not amount to having joined the “wrong” side of 
the battle. Instead, such behavior points to the limits of these particular norms in reaching a 
universal status. Thus, the normative statement of this project, if there must be one, should not be 
seen as the quest for conformity of international norms with an a priori desirable model. On the 
contrary, by categorizing international norms based on their disparate effect on governments and 
societies, my approach calls for recognizing the lack of similarity between different norms and 
the consequences this has for their relative success. The comparison of human rights and anti-
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corruption is rooted in both structural and interaction-based realities surrounding the norms’ 
proliferation. In the deductive test of the proposed typological theory that is to follow, norms are 
examined strictly for the observable variation in their reception by societies and governments, 
i.e. norm type. I desist from making any value judgments regarding the inherent desirability of 
their promotion.  
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CHAPTER 3: MINORITY RIGHTS AND NUCLEAR SAFETY CLASSIFIED 
  
In its key contribution, this project differentiates between norms based on their content, 
or their acceptability to individual societies (not to be equated with acceptance). I label the two 
norm types occupying the opposite extremes of this continuum particular and universal. Norm 
effect and norm content have been arranged in a two-dimensional space and a norm’s location in 
this space determines the ease with which it will be implemented by governments and 
internalized by societies. The classification along each axis represents the next step in defining 
minority rights and nuclear safety. As a reminder, the five indicators used to determine the 
particular/universal qualities of norms examined in the previous chapter include 1./ norm origin, 
2./ the context surrounding norm violation, 3./ norm institutionalization, as well as the extent to 
which 4./ local material realities matter and 5./ promoter strategies vary. Once we determine how 
the minority rights and nuclear safety norms score on these five “measures,” we can better 
anticipate the sources of opposition to each of them and tailor our empirical inquiry accordingly.  
 
Finding a Place for Minority Rights 
 
Sometimes more useful than the answers my interviewees provided during my fieldwork 
were the questions they asked. Lýdia Gabčová of the Open Society Institute in Slovakia hardly 
let us settle over coffee when she asked “so, how do they think about minority rights in 
Brussels?”124 Her curiosity matched the questions about Eastern European attitudes on minority 
rights European Parliament officials asked from their end of the mediated exchange. Despite a 
dense network of interactions stimulated by pre-accession demands, the talking past each other 
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has continued. In addition to uncovering the disconnect in framing minority rights between the 
two sides of the (former) EU border, we need to explain the mixed success with which the norm 
met in the new member states. I argue that the two are related. A study of country cases can 
provide insights about the government and societal responsiveness to external pressure, as well 
as the role of pre-existing normative structures in facilitating or impeding norm change. The first 
step, however, must be to define the minority rights norm by examining the attributes that make 
it either particular or universal and regulative or constitutive under the present framework. 
 
Particular or Universal? 
 
In post-communist Europe the approaches to integrating minorities vary from country to 
country and are weighed down by historical experiences that divided or brought together the 
different ethnic groupings over time. It is not uncommon for minorities to have once 
dominated
125
 the present majority populations, as in the Baltic region or in successor states to 
Austria-Hungary. This history taints each minority-majority dyad in a unique way and results in 
considerable variance in the treatment of minorities even within countries, much less between 
them. Referring to an East-European approach to minority rights therefore amounts to taking a 
major analytical shortcut that brushes over important differences. Conversely, alluding to a 
unified take on minority integration that is shared by the West European democracies represents 
a similar transgression against empirical accuracy. Policies targeting indigenous minorities and 
immigrant populations have been developed independently by each old EU member and the only 
overlapping feature is the generally low priority attributed to this problem in established 
democracies. Will Kymlicka therefore rightfully warns against focusing on “how well… the 
policies of East-Central European countries regarding ethnic relations conform to well-defined 
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and long-standing Western principles, for there are no such principles.”126 This artificial 
separation between old and new European democracies when it comes to their treatment of 
minorities has been criticized along with the less context-specific but nevertheless misleading 
distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism.
127
 Yet, while there seems to be no single 
minority rights norm in Europe, its various versions usually have not travelled far from the 
context in which they were created. This makes their respective origin relatively easy to identify. 
To some extent, this is the case even with components of the currently most prominent 
instrument for addressing minority rights in Europe, the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities.  
The Convention was developed under the umbrella of the Council of Europe in part to 
unify the multitude of existing approaches and to set some basic standards on the treatment of 
minorities. Indeed, the document contains numerous guidelines in this regard but it also betrays 
the lowest-common-denominator approach that often burdens international agreements. What is 
conspicuously lacking, for example, is a decisive stance on which groups constitute a national 
minority. The Convention simply assumes the existence of these minorities and grants all 
individuals the right to claim membership in such groups. It remains silent, however, on the 
specific attributes that objectively make a group a national minority, which would also require all 
Council of Europe members to recognize and protect such collectivities. In the language of the 
document’s drafters, the Framework Convention leaves states “a measure of discretion in 
implementation of the objectives…thus enabling them to take particular circumstances into 
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account.”128 The Convention’s interpretation-friendly phrasing and sensitivity to member state 
concerns certainly has its upsides in terms of flexibility. It is precisely this flexibility, however, 
that provides crucial hints about the “particular” quality of the minority rights norm as embodied 
by the Framework Convention. A version of the norm that would be far removed from local 
specificities and could take on a truly international status is thus still in the distant future. 
Despite these underlying ambiguities, both the Council of Europe and the EU 
enlargement officials have had to make a decision regarding the specific constraints imposed by 
the norm. Unable to arrive at an agreement in defining national minorities, the Convention’s aim 
turned to specifying the relationship between the state and members of minorities. These include 
regionally concentrated nationalities with a kin state across the border, ethno-religious 
communities sharing a strong identity but not necessarily the same territory, or populations that 
find themselves stateless as a result of recent ethnic conflict and territorial reshuffling.
129
 And the 
list could go on. One way to reconcile the needs of such diverse groups is to cease viewing them 
as groups and instead focus on the individuals that make them up. As a result, the language of the 
Framework Convention refers exclusively to “persons belonging to national minorities” and the 
rights the document bestows are seen as individual rights.
130
 This approach is anchored in anti-
discrimination measures more generally. Even though the Framework Convention itself is not 
judicially enforceable, its focus on individual rights parallels existing anti-discrimination 
legislation valid in the European Union.
131
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Members of all minorities can no doubt benefit from being individually guaranteed the 
rights following from their membership in a group. The individual-oriented rights derive directly 
from the integrationist approach to multiculturalism, prevalent in Western European 
democracies. If we are willing to take this more general perspective on the model of rights 
contained in the Framework Convention, we can recognize the degree to which the approach 
would seem narrow to EU candidate states (and especially their respective minorities). While 
providing an improvement, the Framework Convention is not exhaustive in the solutions it 
offers, as it disregards the desire of some minorities to enjoy their rights as groups. Such claims 
center around issues of education and collective cultural expression, implying that the private 
identities of minority members extend into the public life of these groups. Paradoxically because 
the Convention seeks to blur the differences between minorities, the individual-rights-only 
approach does not satisfy the needs of historic minorities, most of them in Eastern Europe.
132
 
This is yet another reason for us to refer to the Council of Europe / EU consensus on the minority 
question as non-universal. 
The second measure of whether minority rights should be classified as a particular or a 
universal norm concerns the context surrounding the norm’s violation (hypothetical or real). The 
key here is whether the verdict that certain minority protection standards are being violated is 
imposed externally or whether the violation is immediately apparent to those involved. One way 
of approaching this question, as I argued previously, is to determine whether and how the norm 
alters the patterns of interaction between groups or introduces new sources of accountability. The 
majority population and minorities have often co-existed in the same territory, which need not 
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have been the same state, for decades, even centuries. Friendly and open interaction between 
such groups exists but is by no means the rule and the nature of interethnic relations will vary 
over time or across levels of governance (depending on how high the stakes are). To the extent 
that the particular/universal dimension concerns primarily the behavior of societies, everyday 
attitudes towards minorities should be our focus.  
For societies with a history of ethnic tensions, lapses in minority integration might be 
perceived simply as “the way things are” at home. Discriminatory behavior on the part of the 
majority is a serious problem but it is often deepened and perpetuated by complacency on the 
part of the minority. According to a survey conducted by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency 
(FRA) in early 2009,
133
 one of the most commonly listed reasons why a high number (66% to 
92%)
134
 of Roma do not report experiences of discrimination to authorities was that they find 
such events “too trivial and not worth reporting – it’s normal and happens all the time.”135 
Increasing affected groups’ awareness of minority rights represents a major avenue for 
questioning discriminatory behavior by the majority and provides minorities with the tools to 
combat such attitudes. By the same token, the apparent unwillingness on the part of minorities to 
take up these new opportunities can be used to assess the intrusiveness with which the new norm 
enters established interethnic relations. As the above survey suggest, Roma in Europe do not 
seem prepared to challenge the status quo.
136
 Aggravating the situation further, self-identification 
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of Roma populations as belonging to the nominal nationality (e.g. Romanian, Bulgarian or 
Hungarian) in Eastern Europe has been a persistent problem for estimating the ethnicity’s 
population size.
137
  
Despite the introduction of the inclusive and individual-rights focused norm to the new 
EU member states, there has been little desire to revise the designation of victims and violators 
and both parties are at fault. At its heart, the minority rights norm defines discrimination and 
identifies certain groups as the victims and others as the violators. However, the minority 
members’ reluctance or inability to claim the benefits the norm offers is telling about the 
ambiguity with which minority rights guarantees enter many societies. The right to have one’s 
name spelled in the minority language represents one example of opening up room for cultural 
identification. If the equal status of minorities in a country is already acceptable and the norm 
does not introduce new definitions of victim and violator, members of minorities should not be 
afraid to change their name to the original spelling. In Slovakia, however, ethnic Hungarians 
often perceive the new option as opening up room for discrimination. Women belonging to the 
Hungarian minority were reluctant to drop the “ova” suffix that according to Slovak grammar 
designates female gender.
138
 
The difficulties in breaking the vicious circle of minority exclusion are apparent also in 
the results from a recent Eurobarometer survey asking about discrimination perceptions in the 
EU. The findings uncovered a significant difference of 10 percentage points between the old and 
new member states. Only 11 percent of Eastern Europeans reported that they have personally 
experienced racial or ethnic discrimination, compared to 21 percent in the pre-enlargement EU 
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members.
139
 However, these numbers hardly mean that less discrimination takes place in the new 
member states. Instead, what the survey measures more closely is the degree of familiarity with 
the notion of discrimination and the ability to identify its occurrence, which presupposes 
acceptance of the minority rights norm. The Eastern European responses to the question more 
likely reveal mere indifference to discrimination, rather than its absence.
140
 This interpretation is 
consistent with the results of another part of the same survey that inquired about the EU-
sponsored year of equal opportunities (2007).  Citizens in the old EU member states were 
slightly more aware of the initiative (38%) than the respondents from countries that joined the 
community most recently (32%).
141
 In a more specific measure of awareness about minority 
rights issues, the FRA survey uncovered that most Roma in Eastern Europe believed 
discrimination in the workplace was not punishable by law.
142
 From this survey evidence it is 
unclear that the call for equality expressed in the minority rights norm revises either the 
majority’s behavior towards minorities, or the minorities’ preparedness to take up the 
opportunities provided by the new norm. The measures for accountability prescribed by the 
incoming norm are entirely new to the host society. As a result, the minimal standards that the 
international measures on this issue introduce do not appear sufficient to revise the long-
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established patterns of social interaction. Locally valid conceptions of what minorities are 
entitled to and at which point their rights are violated pose too strong a counter-challenge to the 
Council of Europe promoted minority rights norm. Thus, on this measure we again have to note 
its quality as particular.  
The third criterion for determining the particular/universal status of a norm focuses on the 
degree and kind of institutionalization that the incoming norm has encountered. The empirically 
testable question that was associated with this measure of norm “universality” asks whether the 
justifications for following the norm aim to draw a line behind the past. The more reframing and 
localizing adjustment is necessary, the further away the norm moves from deserving universal 
status.  
Although the theoretical framework guiding this project uses the term universal with the 
intention of ultimately applying the typology to the global context, the empirical test in this 
chapter limits the application of the “universal” criterion to the EU policy arena, more 
specifically the case of the 2004 enlargement. Both in terms of changing policies and the 
discourse surrounding them, the moment of joining the Union should represent a natural divider 
between the pre- and post-adoption stages. If minority rights were to parallel the performance of 
the human rights norm on this measure and qualify as a universal norm, there would have to be a 
decisive divide between the situation before and after accession.
143
  
The reality of introducing new minority rights standards to candidate countries has been 
very different, however. First, despite the fact that minority rights, as formulated by the Council 
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of Europe and adopted by the EU, were at the heart of the membership conditionality 
arrangement, discernible double standards soon plagued the process. As late as six months before 
its scheduled entry into the EU, Latvia had not ratified the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of Minorities
144
 and it continued to drag its feet in streamlining the citizenship-
granting policies. Although at odds with strict calls for implementing the Framework Convention 
by high EU officials,
145
 Latvian failure to do so did not obstruct the country’s membership in the 
EU. The Commissioner responsible for enlargement affirmed the Union’s commitment to 
admitting Latvia and said that while the EU was “ready to back any initiatives intended to 
improve the situation of the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia,” the issue would not affect the 
progression of talks leading up to accession.
146
 In addition to undermining the commitment to the 
principles of conditionality, this move effectively blurred the separating line between the pre- 
and post-accession period, intended to symbolize irreversible acceptance of minority 
protection.
147
 As a complaint from a Council of Europe representative suggests, the hope that an 
alliance with the EU would strengthen the norm dissolved quickly. The evaluation of candidate 
progress in integrating and protecting their minorities “degenerated into political bargaining”148 
and made the success of the norm less than automatic. Instead of benefiting from already existing 
support for the institutional changes that the minority rights norm brought to candidate countries, 
it had to struggle for legitimacy. This became particularly notable in moments of political crisis, 
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such as those accompanying the briefly violent anti-reform protest by Slovakia’s Roma 
population in 2004. The implicit rejection of the externally imposed institutional solutions 
focusing on altered incentive sttructures resulted in a challenge of the norm (that mandated social 
inclusion of minorities) itself, which effectively revealed its “particularity.” 
The absence of a clean slate regarding minority rights in candidate countries is not the 
only obstacle to our designating the norm as a Europe-wide principle with regard to the break-
with-the past criterion. The double-standard thinking and willingness to settle for less than the 
minimum requirements that marked the evaluation of prospective members was detectable also 
in the old member states.
149
 This raises serious questions about the universal applicability of the 
minority rights norm in Europe. Unlike the case of human rights in the course of fulfilling the 
1975 Helsinki promise, EU enlargement and the normative change it brought did not allow 
candidate states to point to existing EU members with approval, nor did it generate a strong 
desire to follow in old members’ footsteps. As members of the NGO community monitoring the 
process correctly pointed out, candidate states were urged to adopt the Framework Convention, 
even though some old EU members had not done so either.
150
 Greece, France, Belgium, 
Portugal, Luxembourg and even the Netherlands and Sweden were repeatedly called upon by the 
European Parliament to ratify the Framework Convention in the period leading up to EU 
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enlargement.
151
 In other words, the line between the past without a Framework Convention and 
the future in which its principles would be accepted kept shifting, depending on which EU 
institution you asked and which country you were speaking off. This scenario is at odds with the 
criterion required for a norm’s universal (in this case Europe-wide) applicability. The degree of 
minority rights institutionalization thus leads us to describe the norm as particular, again. 
 Fourth, we have to determine the role that local material realities play in facilitating or 
impeding the adoption of the norm. The understanding of “material realities” in this context has 
to be rather broad. It is not sufficient to focus merely on the relative socio-economic status of 
various ethnic groups.
152
 We also need to pay attention to the political-economic pathways and 
historical turning points that led to the status quo. The inter-ethnic experience in each country is 
different and this variation matters a great deal in the process of creating and promoting a unified 
minority rights norm. The norm shows signs of inadequacy in dealing with the complex set of 
issues that make up minority politics in Europe. My project is not indifferent to the path 
dependencies leading to the status quo of minority rights. The case study comparison of 
Lithuania and Slovakia that will be taken up in the latter half of this chapter will explore the 
structural and historical determinants of ethnic relations more closely. More immediately, an 
illustration of the variation between local contexts and the degree to which they matter in 
determining the norm’s success can help our effort to classify minority rights in the proposed 
framework.  
The thick volume on ethnic conflict by Donald Horowitz originally published before the 
break-up of Soviet-era federations does not contain many references to Eastern Europe. 
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Nevertheless, his broader statement about minority-majority tensions is telling. In the discussion 
of solutions to ethnic hostility he warns against a priori prescriptions that do not match the 
unique needs of each divided society.
153
 The lesson applies to new sites of ethnic strife as well. 
For instance, whereas democratization in Spain opened up the opportunity for granting regional 
autonomy rights to Catalans, Basques, and Galicians, the question of self-governance poses a 
much greater challenge in post-communist Eastern Europe. Insecurities about newly acquired 
statehood overwhelmed Latvia, Estonia or Slovakia, and the claims of their regionally 
concentrated minorities with ties to unpopular kin states across the border acquired the 
significance of threats to state sovereignty. Such historically driven arguments about national 
security are not rare in Eastern Europe. A long-standing pattern of protecting different minorities 
differently further aggravates the situation.
154
 What worked in one context need not apply to 
another, and the same holds true for transferability of lessons within the post-communist region.  
The evidence regarding high and growing variation in local attitudes towards minorities 
comes from two directions. First, we only need to look at the increased ethnic diversity that 
characterizes post-enlargement European Union to determine that simple solutions of the past 
will not do.
155
 An additional hint about the norm’s particularity with regard to local constraints 
comes from the difficulties that the drafters of the Council of Europe Framework Convention 
encountered in arriving at a shared definition of “national minority.” The widespread 
disagreement resulted in substantial leeway for states to formulate such definitions on their own. 
The treaty has been viewed negatively for failing to set a unified and strict-enough approach to 
minority rights. As a trade-off for vagueness, it allows for individualized approaches to mirror 
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the unique challenges in each context. However, the more specific these solutions become the 
more difficult it is to apply them elsewhere. Structural obstacles to inter-ethnic accommodation 
are what Horowitz had in mind when he criticized “stroke-of-the-pen and crack-of-the-whip 
measures” imposed from above as ineffective and potentially counterproductive.156 The material 
challenges offer additional evidence in favor of classifying minority rights as a particular norm. 
The fifth and final attribute of a norm that can help us discern whether it should be 
labeled particular or universal focuses on actors most directly involved in advancing the 
acceptance of the norm across Europe. The NGO community has been keeping a close eye on the 
progress in implementing the changes necessary to improve the status of national and ethnic 
minorities in Eastern Europe. The official monitoring process accompanying Council of 
Europe’s Framework convention was paralleled also by a set of shadow reports by local Helsinki 
organization and other national-level NGOs involved in promoting the rights of minorities. 
These reports supplement the state-reporting mechanism, which often fails to incorporate 
meaningful participation from the non-governmental sector. The main objective of NGOs issuing 
the shadow reports is to track the practical aspects of compliance (or lack thereof) with the 
Framework Convention.
157
 In other words, whereas the governments generally “specialize” in 
easier-to-come-by formal adoption of laws regulating minority rights, non-governmental 
organizations focus on the presence or absence of real changes in the treatment of minorities. In 
their collective declaration, NGOs monitoring state compliance with the principles stated in the 
Framework Convention have complained about the lack of resources that curtails the scope of 
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their activity, which perhaps explains the absence of an organized EU-wide network of NGOs.
158
 
Even though the monitoring process is anchored by references to the Framework Convention, the 
document’s vague language and country-specific challenges prevent minority rights activists 
from abandoning their country-specific focus. 
However, the line of sight among minority-rights advocates is often even narrower than 
the corresponding state boundaries. Frequently, these activist organizations further limit their 
attention to individual minority communities, even though the demands the different groups 
make overlap and room for cooperation or coordination exists. This likely stems from the desire 
to preserve a distinct sense of identity vis-à-vis other ethnic groups, as much as the majority. 
Given such priorities, EU-funded projects have faltered whenever the need arose to look beyond 
localized activity and the resulting limited capacity has stood in the way of successful absorption 
of PHARE and structural funding.
159
 The dynamic is further fuelled by state-driven attempts at 
minority integration modeled on Western approaches that are not sufficiently sensitive to the 
needs of diverse cultural and ethnic groups. In the Czech Republic, the emphasis was placed on 
small projects consistent with the objectives of strengthening civil society capacity and 
democracy, which is a separate goal from advancing the social inclusion of minorities.
160
 
Striking the balance between integration that is not assimilation and identity-building that is not 
state subversion remains one of the most difficult challenges faced by NGOs in Eastern Europe. 
These key non-state actors describe the protection of minority rights in as “both a history and a 
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process.”161 As long as the country- and minority-specific approach dominates NGO practice, 
however, we have to refer to the minority rights norm as particular. 
 
Constitutive or Regulative? 
 
Having made the non-universal conclusion on all counts regarding norm content, which 
measures the transferability of minority rights standards, we must not forget to locate the norm 
along the second dimension that delimits the analytical space explored by this dissertation. 
Existing international relations literature has addressed the difference between constitutive and 
regulative norms in considerable detail.
162
 The distinction has played a significant role in 
outlining the interest-shaping role that certain international norms have in affecting state 
behavior.
163
 This brings us back to the original separation of motivations on the part of 
governments, as opposed to societies. I have argued that these two halves of the norm 
proliferation process need to be studied separately, while keeping a close eye on the ways in 
which they interact.  
 The process of EU enlargement combined two very separate elements. First, there was 
the strong urge on the part of the candidates to belong to a community of democracy-respecting 
and respectable states. The old member states received these aspirations with some 
apprehensiveness and sense of responsibility and before long they began to set the entry 
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standards higher than ever before.
164
 The desirability of EU membership rested to a large degree 
on the difficulty of getting in. Beyond tangible material gains, the symbolic value of having 
drawn a line behind the communist past
165
 and “returned to Europe” was at stake for the 
candidate countries.
166
 This created an unprecedented dynamic of rhetorical exchanges and 
principled commitments by leaders of states on both sides of EU’s border.167 The justifications 
for reform became just as important as change itself. Fuelling this dynamic, enlargement officials 
in Brussels spun the increasingly intricate web of standards that the candidates raced to meet in 
order to prove their adherence to the newly salient EU values. Guarding the principles of 
democracy, rule of law, and human rights ranked extremely high in this ordering of priorities and 
accompanied the process from its earliest stage and throughout the pre-accession monitoring. 
Respectful treatment of minorities soon became the litmus test for the determination to live up to 
the promises made in EU’s waiting room. The European Commission (EC)  thus took the 
opportunity to increase the pressure when one candidate country failed to pass this simple test. 
Referring to a controversial language law and pointing to the dissonance between the 
rhetoric of Slovak leadership and actual minority policies in place, the EC opinion released in 
1997 complained: 
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Slovakia has not yet passed comprehensive legislation on [the use of minority 
languages in official communication] and has gone back on the commitments it 
gave earlier… This ambiguous situation is further aggravated by certain 
government decisions concerning the Hungarian minority, such as reductions in 
subsidies granted to Hungarian cultural associations and cessation of bilingual 
school reports in Hungarian schools (a teacher not respecting this rule can be 
dismissed).
168
  
 
The opinion was followed by a series of “last warnings” and eventually led to a withdrawal of 
Slovakia’s EU candidate status. Monitoring the respect for rights of Eastern Europe’s national 
minorities represented uncharted territory for EU’s old member states, who had not encountered 
the problem on a large scale before. Nevertheless, the minority rights norm, as adopted from the 
documents developed by the Council of Europe, came to define EU membership for the 
candidates. To the extent that it changed their behavior, affected the justifications used to 
legitimize their actions, and generated domestic debate on the issue, it had a constitutive effect 
on these states.
169
  
 
Defining the Nuclear Safety Norm 
 
To the average EU citizen, the notion of nuclear safety is likely to come as something 
desirable, but relatively vague. She might associate it with an inkling about how having too 
many X-ray exams per year may harm her health, a distant memory of the Chernobyl accident 
that briefly changed how she shopped for groceries, and perhaps a recent news story about events 
at Fukushima or about the dangers of radioactive material landing in the hands of terrorists. The 
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scientific detail behind how radiation harms humans, how much is too much, or how it might 
escape a normally functioning nuclear power plant will probably remain beyond her grasp. She is 
also likely to be unfamiliar with the economics of operating and closing down a power plant or 
the comparative cost of nuclear-generated electricity, relative to other sources. Yet, in the end, 
she will feel very strongly about demanding the highest levels of safety for all nuclear 
installations in her vicinity.  
In 2010, over half of Europeans (51%) thought that the risks posed by nuclear power 
were greater than the advantages it brings.
170
 The same Eurobarometer survey revealed that most 
Europeans consider the risks of nuclear power underestimated.
171
 Meanwhile, 68% of them 
recognize the value of nuclear energy in making the EU less dependent on fuel imports, 51% 
agree that it helps secure more competitive and more stable energy prices and 46% see it as a 
positive contribution in the fight against climate change.
172
 In other words, while considerably 
uneasy about the existence of nuclear power plants in their wider neighborhood,
173
 Europeans 
seem generally aware of the reasons for not being able to quite do away with this energy source 
in the near future. When most of them view nuclear power as a necessary evil or a reluctantly 
swallowed risk, it should not surprise us that they are “extremely conscious of the importance of 
safety and protection, as far as nuclear energy is concerned.”174 Along with that sentiment come 
calls for a strict regulation of the nuclear sector and endorsement of all measures enhancing the 
safety of all nuclear sites. This, again, is entirely separate from actual knowledge about what it 
takes to physically make a nuclear plant safer or how much the necessary upgrades would cost. 
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As far as the average EU citizen is concerned, those details are for regulating agencies, plant 
operators, and governments to work out.  
Ultimately, this gap between ideals and practicalities of nuclear safety is where the room 
for divergence in preferences and priorities between societies and their governments opens up, 
instantaneously transforming the nuclear safety norm into a compelling case for testing theories 
about international norm proliferation within the framework proposed here. The tension between 
governments and their respective publics becomes even more interesting when we consider that 
82% of Europeans would like to see nuclear safety regulated at the EU level,
175
 in addition to 
employing existing domestic agencies for this task. This dual pressure has the potential to 
crystallize the responses by governments and help us uncover the connection between the 
specific attributes of the nuclear safety norm and the likelihood of its success in individual 
member states.  
 
Particular or Universal? 
 
 The process of defining the nuclear safety norm goes hand in hand with uncovering the 
norm’s origin. Perhaps the key aspect that distinguishes nuclear safety from the minority rights 
norm examined previously concerns the target of the norm – the safety that is at stake involves 
the operation of pieces of machinery, which, however complex, remain indifferent to the current 
regulatory standards. A nuclear accident is equally undesirable across reactors, plants, and 
countries. This is perhaps the reason why it has been possible to develop strict standards at the 
international level, under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). At 
this level, other norms often get only tentative measures gesturing in the direction of compliance 
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hardly matching in strength the legally mandated rigorous review process instituted by the IAEA. 
The primary instrument presently regulating all planned, existing, and decommissioned nuclear 
sites is the Convention on Nuclear Safety and all countries with nuclear installations in their 
territory are subject to the its provisions.
176
 The objectives of the Convention are: 
i. to achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety worldwide through the 
enhancement of national measures and international co-operation 
including, where appropriate, safety-related technical co-operation;  
ii. to establish and maintain effective defences in nuclear installations against 
potential radiological hazards in order to protect individuals, society and 
the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation from such 
installations;  
iii. to prevent accidents with radiological consequences and to mitigate such 
consequences should they occur.
177
  
In part due to the broad formulation of these priorities, it is impossible to identify any one 
state or group of states as having formulated these minimum safety rules. Much of this obscurity 
regarding the source of the norm stems from the intensity of the shared experience with the near-
miss incident at Three Mile Island (TMI) and the nuclear disaster in Chernobyl. The explosion of 
the latter plant’s reactor spewed radioactivity across state borders and delivered a lesson in safety 
to all parts of Europe and beyond. Reflecting the universality of the experience, the widespread 
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effects of the disaster were cited as the main motive for drafting the IAEA Convention.
178
 Even, 
prior to the G7 calls for coordinated efforts at maximizing nuclear safety, a 1989 EC 
communication stated that  “'the conclusions reached after the TMI accident, which were 
recently confirmed through the analysis of the Chernobyl accident, show that ‘no matter how 
well a reactor is designed and operated, a severe accident can never be totally ruled out’.”179 
More currently, the natural disaster in Japan that led to a failure of the reactor cooling systems at 
the Fukushima plant highlighted the industry’s vulnerability to factors beyond its control. In 
other words, there is no such thing as resting assured when it comes to nuclear reactors and a 
periodic review under the framework of the Convention is only our best attempt at preventing 
future accidents.  
The explicit references to the 1986 catastrophe did not cease with the drafting and 
ratification of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, however. The theme continues to permeate 
both international documents and EU legislation on nuclear safety.
180
 An illustrative exchange on 
proposed draft Council Regulation establishing an Instrument for Nuclear Safety reveals a push 
by the European Parliament to keep the memory and lessons of the accident alive. 
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Text proposed by the Council: 
 
Amendment by the Parliament:
181
 
The Chernobyl accident in 1986 
highlighted the global importance of 
nuclear safety. 
The Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 
1986, which was the worst ever in 
terms of the number of its victims and 
the tragic health consequences for 
both those exposed at the time of the 
accident and the generations to come, 
highlighted the dramatic global 
economic, environmental, social and 
health consequences of such a 
disaster.
182
 
 
 
Documenting the wide impact that the Chernobyl disaster had on understanding criteria 
for nuclear safety, however, delivers only half of the picture regarding the identifiability of the 
origin of that norm. The extensive overlap in the definition of the norm at the international, 
regional, and national level suggests that individual societies have not sought to compete with 
the global standards. Unlike the case of anti-corruption, the formulations of the nuclear safety 
norm do not get narrower and more country-specific as we climb down the international ladder. 
The wording of the nuclear safety Directive agreed upon by EU member states closely mirrors 
the priorities stated by the IAEA:  
 
‘nuclear safety’ means the achievement of proper operating conditions, prevention 
of accidents and mitigation of accident consequences, resulting in protection of 
workers and the general public from dangers arising from ionizing radiation from 
nuclear installations;
183
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And the overlap between the IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety and EU legislation does not 
end there. The Directive explicitly stipulates that the safety review be carried out in conjunction 
with the IAEA instrument.
184
 
Following the adoption of the Directive by the Council, there was some debate regarding 
the utility and added value of the new piece of legislation, given that it does not present the 
member states with more strict safety standards.
185
 The EU Council chose to pursue this effort 
despite these objections because the Directive now ensures legal enforceability of nuclear safety 
principles that were legally binding but primarily incentive based under the IAEA umbrella. The 
main change in the treatment of nuclear safety challenges thus goes in the direction of legal 
ramifications of the norm, rather than substantive revisions to the norm itself at the EU level. At 
the same time, the preparedness of member states with nuclear installations on their territory to 
accept the Directive implies that they were committed to following the relevant safety 
regulations anyway. 
The omnipresent references to the salient turning point on safety presented by the 
Chernobyl disaster and the near-uniform approach in securing the respect for ever-evolving 
safety criteria suggest that the origin of the nuclear safety norm is not tied to any individual 
country or region. The principles of the IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety have been accepted 
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practically without reservation by all member states operating civilian nuclear installations.
186
 
The theoretical portion of this dissertation presents the extent to which shared experiences 
facilitate widespread comprehension and appeal of a norm as the key indicator of the norm’s 
universal status. With regard to norm origin, therefore, there is ample evidence to suggest that 
nuclear safety does, in fact, fall in this category. 
 The second measure of norm content concerns the context surrounding the norm’s 
violation. Specifically, we need to ask whether the introduction of the norm alters any patterns of 
interaction between individuals and thus re-designates the groups they belong to. If this is not the 
case, and the norm merely (re)formulates an already accepted understanding of what constitutes 
a violation of the principles that it seeks to defend, we can refer to the norm as universal. There 
are a number of indicators suggesting that nuclear safety should be classified in this category and 
they all relate to the fact that all humans are equally vulnerable to radiation. This premise makes 
it very difficult to argue that the norm realigns the balance between violators and victims. In fact, 
all humans are potential victims of a radiological emergency and the nuclear safety norm thus 
merely codifies a reality that is easily comprehensible to all affected. 
Numerous efforts to coordinate national accident-prevention measures and facilitate early 
response cooperation have been launched with the understanding that a nuclear accident will 
harm everyone it reaches, irrespective of state borders.
187
 This will be the case whether or not 
unified measures enforcing the nuclear safety norm are in place. Yet, if the goal is to prevent 
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such accidents altogether and mitigate their consequences, should they occur, a set of basic 
standards can go a long way in providing the practical implementation of the norm-driven 
demand that everyone be safe from nuclear radiation. The oldest among the calls for such 
standards is the EURATOM treaty, whose Article 30 mandates “the protection of the health of 
workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionizing radiations.”188 On the 
most recent end of EU-wide measures on nuclear safety, the Council Directive on Nuclear Safety 
relates such standards to the need for active cooperation, especially in anticipation of the Eastern 
European candidates joining the Union and adding their Soviet-made reactors to the mix. This 
reasoning parallels the solidarity expressed in the financial and expert support offered to 
candidate countries in order to facilitate the closure of most risky reactors:  
 
In order to avoid risks to human health and to the environment it is necessary to 
guarantee, at Community level, that financial resources will be available for the 
completion of decommissioning work in conformity with safety standards.
 189
 
 
 The emphasis on nuclear safety as the key to protecting the general population from the 
risks associated with nuclear installations gains an additional dimension if we consider the long-
term impact of the nuclear waste that is generated in the course of a nuclear plant’s lifetime. The 
European public is acutely aware of this pressing problem, listing it as the main reason for any 
opposition to nuclear power generation.
190
 The urgency in addressing this issue is communicated 
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accurately by the explanatory memorandum offered along with the 2003 proposal for a nuclear 
waste directive: 
 
Further delays in decisions on the development of repositories for the disposal of 
radioactive waste cannot be justified. On the contrary, there is a sound basis on 
ethical, environmental and nuclear safety grounds for the rapid development of 
these facilities. Any delays that could be interpreted as passing on to future 
generations the responsibility for disposing of our wastes should be avoided, 
especially since such delays, particularly in the case of the more hazardous 
wastes, may also increase the potential risk of accidents and terrorist attacks.
191
 
 
In processing the nuclear safety norm at both the European and member-state level the tendency 
is not to search for exceptions that would exempt norm violations from being punished and 
prevented. On the contrary, the nuclear safety norm is used to extend the applicable protection to 
future generations, in addition to keeping current risk to European population at a minimum. It 
can therefore rightly be described as universal, not in the least because its applicability reaches 
so far into the future.  
 The above illustration of the broad commitment to safety by both governments and 
European institutions, along with the still unresolved question regarding long-term disposal of 
radioactive waste, might lead to the conclusion that the only way to operate nuclear power plants 
safely is to do away with them altogether. Some member states, as well as numerous advocacy 
groups and a considerable fraction of the European public do, in fact, take this position. 
However, a simultaneous commitment to curbing greenhouse emissions and apprehension about 
excessive dependence on foreign fuel imports makes the phasing out of nuclear power 
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increasingly impracticable. The answer that regulatory agencies have come up with, short of 
closing down all nuclear installations, has been to accurately assess the risk associated with their 
operation and develop safety measures that bring it down to a minimum. This has been the main 
practical shift in both operating and regulating nuclear power plants since the Chernobyl disaster 
and has come to be referred to as the ALARA rule. In implementing Article 6 of the Convention:  
 
Each Member State shall ensure that, in the context of optimisation, all exposures 
shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being 
taken into account.
192
 
 
This stipulation may be interpreted as opening up a can of worms, in that it allows 
economic and social factors to interfere with nuclear safety, possibly compromising it. In 
general, this has not been the case and the ALARA principle continues to define safety as the 
core priority. Although seemingly vague in their formulation, the objectives of the IAEA 
Convention on Nuclear Safety cited above are associated with a detailed process of technology 
audits and organizational reviews intended to make existing nuclear installations as safe as 
possible. Or, in the language of the convention:  
 
All reasonably practicable improvements are made as a matter of urgency to 
upgrade the safety of the nuclear installation. If such upgrading cannot be 
achieved, plans should be implemented to shut down the nuclear installation as 
soon as practically possible.
193
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In other words, sometimes the necessary safety may come at too high a price and in such 
instances the political support for a plant’s operation has to give way to economic imperatives. 
As far as the ALARA principle goes, safety is not part of the trade-off, confirming our 
classification of the norm as universal. 
 Besides providing the notion of nuclear safety with a degree of tangibility, the ALARA 
principle also offers a suitable transition to the discussion of the third measure on which we can 
classify a norm as universal or particular. Namely, is the norm considered legitimate prior to 
entering a new context, or does it have to defend its validity in competition with locally 
established norms? When the G7 Munich summit determined in 1992 that an entire generation of 
nuclear reactors operating in Eastern Europe had to be decommissioned, it effectively brought to 
the fore the delicate balance between nuclear safety and the cost-efficiency of maintaining it. 
Arguably, an external standard was being imposed on plant operators who ran sites with no 
containment shield separating the reactors from the outside environment. Although the reactors 
themselves were functioning properly according to their design, in light of the Chernobyl 
accident the design itself was no longer suitable. Did the G7 introduce a standard that was 
foreign to Eastern Europeans and as such had the potential to be deemed illegitimate? Or were 
more complex dynamics under way and the requested closure of the plant could, in fact, be 
accepted by the affected governments and societies?  
In the early 1990s, the memory of the Chernobyl disaster was still very fresh and there 
was no shortage of anti-nuclear sentiment among Eastern European citizens. Most notoriously, 
Lithuania, hurt by the need to close down the Chernobyl-type plants more than any other 
country, had seen the anti-nuclear and more broadly environmental movement play a significant 
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role in earning its independence from the Soviet Union.
194
 Thus, rather than drawing a sharp line 
behind the past of runaway nuclear risks, the proposal to close down the Ignalina plant had the 
potential to hit a sensitive nerve with the Lithuanian public. As chapter 7 will illustrate further, 
however, a more complex set of factors influenced those societal attitudes further down the road. 
At the time the decision to close down Lithuania’s plant was taken, the nuclear safety norm in its 
(re)formulation from Munich had the door open.  
 In line the with the ALARA principle, the question of operating costs and upgrade 
expenses became highly salient in the wake of the G7 Munich meeting, especially to 
governments negatively affected by the summit’s declaration. The reduced energy demand 
associated with post- communist transition offered only partial and temporary relief for the cuts 
in energy production that would accompany the closure on the non-compliant plants. The nuclear 
safety norm, revised in response to the failures that led to the Chernobyl accident, reflected 
principles that these governments subscribed to, as far as wanting to prevent a similar 
catastrophe from occurring in the future. The updating of nuclear safety standards did not come 
merely at the whim of the G7 governments but coincided with the revised consensus regarding 
intolerable risk associated with nuclear installations.  
Yet, as “reasonable” levels of safety had increased dramatically, so did the costs of 
maintaining and/or upgrading an exceptionally risky plant. Eastern European governments, 
responsible for guaranteeing nuclear safety on the one hand and stable energy supply to their 
economies on the other, would have been faced with an insurmountable dilemma, had they not 
received support in the form of decommissioning assistance. The nuclear sector in the West has 
been sensitive to the possibility that a “further major incident involving a nuclear power plant in 
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an Eastern country would undermine the nuclear power sector in EU Member States” and 
encouraged expert and financial assistance to support the necessary retro-fitting and/or 
decommissioning projects in candidate countries and former Soviet Union.
195
 With this aid, the 
closure of the newly unsafe plants was no longer the sole burden of the countries in whose 
territory they were located. Although there was still little enthusiasm regarding the 
decommissioning effort, abandoning the plants was generally consistent with the broader 
objective of European integration and even presented the concerned governments with an 
opportunity to demonstrate their commitment on this front. Given that there was no competing 
norm that Eastern Europeans could deploy in opposition to the nuclear safety norm, reaffirmed in 
the course of EU enlargement, any legitimacy-related tensions were reduced to a minimum and 
allow us to classify the norm as universal in the present framework.   
The fourth aspect of norm content that determines the universal or particular nature of an 
international norm concerns the degree of variation in local approaches to its implementation. 
More specifically, are these circumscribed by domestic material conditions or do the standards 
associated with the norm flow directly from the international agreements that codify them? 
Where does the pressure to enact the norm in daily practice concentrate? The answers to these 
questions are relatively straightforward in the context of nuclear safety given the highly technical 
nature of the issues that it governs. Public knowledge about the details of nuclear reactor science 
aside, individual societies can contribute little to the enhancement of nuclear power plants in 
their vicinity. Any grass-roots efforts can only point to suspected violations of the norm or 
persistent intransparency that prevents reliable assessment of the safety situation. The targets of 
such bottom up measures are centralized agencies associated with the government or the 
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independent nuclear safety regulators, suggesting that their activities are key to proper 
implementation of the norm. More importantly, however, to the extent that the anti-nuclear 
protests take place, they indicate public support for all measures enhancing nuclear safety. This 
is also repeatedly demonstrated in public opinion surveys on the subject. Thus, the local material 
realities do not seem to generate an alternative understanding of nuclear safety that would 
interfere with its widespread implementation. 
The empirical indicator focusing on the centralized process of norm adoption is a reliable 
measure of whether a norm is particular to one society or if it possesses more universal qualities. 
With respect to the nuclear safety norm, however, the issue of centralization has a flip side as 
well, especially if we consider that the central planning in formerly communist countries 
interfered with the development of independent regulatory authorities.
196
 The hierarchies that 
were in place at the time of Chernobyl obstructed effective dissemination of information about 
events that both preceded and followed the accident. Instead, the question of centralization 
should be equated with norm enforcement that is even-handed, technically strong, and well-
resourced, in order to perform the functions guaranteeing safe operation of nuclear installations 
adequately. It is the uniformity in the nature of the norm across implementation contexts that 
distinguishes a universal norm from its particular counterparts.  
Enhancing regulatory regimes was one of the urgent actions identified at the G7 summit 
as necessary for avoiding future accidents.
197
 In addition, a minimum legal framework 
guaranteeing the independence of nuclear safety regulators along with sufficient staffing and 
budgetary provisions were cited as the conditions of making any grant assistance flowing to 
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Eastern Europe meaningful.
198
 By late 1990s, some progress had been noted on this front when a 
Commission communication on the status of nuclear safety in the post-communist region 
recognized “a general acceptance of the need for independent regulation of safety and in the 
longer term this is a development potentially much more far-reaching than any individual 
success in reforming procedures.”199 
The implementation of the nuclear safety rules does not mean that all procedures have to 
be identical across countries.
200
 The content of the norm is unaffected by minor variations in 
organizational structures, as long as the principle of independence is maintained and 
coordination between national-level agencies possible.
201
 The regulatory, technological, 
engineering and industrial environment may vary from country to country.
202
 Yet, member states 
responsible for setting safety standards and licensing nuclear installations “share the collective 
responsibility towards all European citizens for ensuring nuclear safety.”203 Reflecting this 
obligation, the final wording of the Council Directive on Nuclear Safety incorporated the 
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amendment made by the European Parliament regarding non-interference in regulatory activities 
from interested parties. 
 
Member States shall ensure that the competent regulatory authority is functionally 
separate from any other body or organisation concerned with the promotion, or 
utilisation of nuclear energy, including electricity production, in order to ensure 
effective independence from undue influence in its regulatory decision making.
204
 
 
Without calling the process of nuclear safety norm implementation centralized, it can 
nevertheless be described as concentrated, with the dual objective of independence and 
coordination. Both these factors were found to be missing prior to the Chernobyl disaster and the 
attempts to remedy this failure have guided subsequent steps in nuclear safety standards 
development and promotion. One additional consequence follows from the limited 
differentiation between countries when it comes to nuclear safety regulation. Since the plant 
regulation and licensing occurs according to well-specified standards and procedures, it also 
leaves little room for crafting of locally-anchored counterarguments to the globally accepted 
norm. In other words, the assessment of safety is reactor-specific not country-specific. The 
concrete safety problems with individual plants, therefore, can be evaluated on grounds that are 
relatively isolated from the local context and although the consequences of reactor closure affect 
each country differently, the principle underlying such a decision is acceptable to all. This, along 
with the generally valid practice of regulator independence, provides sufficient reasons for 
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characterizing the nuclear safety norm as universal according to the local-constraints criterion, 
too. 
 The final attribute that can help us establish whether a norm should be described as 
particular or universal follows from the strategies adopted by non-governmental organizations 
involved in the promotion of that norm. The examination of this issue with regard to the nuclear 
safety norm is complicated by the fact that the most prominent groups involved in promoting 
nuclear safety equate the solution with abandonment of nuclear power altogether. As such, their 
activities do not mirror the content of the norm exactly. They can, however, be interpreted as the 
strictest application of the probabilistic and deterministic measures for assessing the risk 
associated with nuclear power generation. In other words, the criteria for judging nuclear power, 
from the perspective of safety, are not significantly different; it is just that the threshold at which 
they find the risks intolerable is much lower. This preserves the option for the researcher to 
examine their mission and strategies as defending the nuclear safety norm, even though they 
themselves regard their work as anti-nuclear.  
Let us consider two groups represented most prominently at both the European and the 
national levels: Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. Following the original classificatory 
framework outlined in previous chapters, the core empirical questions that we need to answer is 
the degree to which the NGOs involved in anti-nuclear campaigns are attuned to local 
particularities or whether they can share their strategies across different contexts easily. A 
simultaneous look at the activities by Greenpeace International, Greenpeace Europe and the 
national branches of this organization reveals a considerable overlap in both the stated mission 
with regard to nuclear energy and the activities chosen to advance it. The primary focus is on 
preventing a relapse into complacency on the part of governments and the public with regard to 
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the risks of nuclear power generation, especially as the memory of the Chernobyl disaster wanes 
and energy security pressures mount: 
It seems that global governments are suffering from mass amnesia and are doing a 
good job of spreading it around. The reality of nuclear power is no different now 
than it was in the 20th Century - it is inherently dangerous… Safe reactors are a 
myth. An accident can occur in any nuclear reactor, causing the release of large 
quantities of deadly radiation into the environment… In addition to the risk of 
accident, nuclear plants are highly vulnerable to deliberate acts of sabotage and 
terrorist attack.
205
 
This mission is echoed in the activities of both national and regional Greenpeace offices, each of 
them targeting their “corresponding” authority – either national governments206 or European 
institutions (the Commission and the Parliament, especially).
207
 Similar “division of labor” 
accompanies activities by Friends of the Earth.
208
 There is a pattern of concentrating efforts on 
appeals to legislative changes and long-term policy building, which distinguishes the nuclear 
safety issue from other areas of concern to these environmental organizations. Whereas 
agricultural erosion prevention, recycling education, food safety, or landfill-related protests are 
best carried out at the grass-roots level, the anti-nuclear mission is achieved through lobbying of 
governments, along with more general education of the public. 
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Nor are these activities, ranging in creativity and riskiness from colorful street marches
209
 
to scaling of NPP cooling towers,
210
 carried out in isolation from the mission of other 
organizations with a similar goal. Friends of the Earth – Europe actively builds networks with 
other organizations committed to promoting transparency in presenting the risks associated with 
nuclear power generation.
211
 There appears to be little concern with regard to “staying on 
message” and the activities of one organization seem to reinforce those of its network partners. 
The consensus derives from the principles of vulnerability to radiation, past disastrous accidents, 
and perceived intransparency of the nuclear sector and its regulation – all of these providing the 
rationale also for the nuclear safety norm more broadly. In other words, the content of the norm 
itself allows environmental organizations concerned with the impact of nuclear risks to focus not 
on painstakingly translating some obscure message to societies and governments but taking 
direct action and seeking tangible change. In this way, the universal quality of the nuclear safety 
norm facilitates their work and assures certain level or resonance among the public, which, as the 
Eurobarometer surveys document, continues to view nuclear power with unease and skepticism.  
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Constitutive or Regulative? 
 
 Characterizing a norm as constitutive requires that it provide normative content to a 
collective identity, allowing other actors to recognize this identity.
212
 The process of EU 
enlargement offered numerous opportunities for viewing the normative changes introduced to 
candidate countries as defining moments for the idea of EU membership. Was nuclear safety one 
of the norms that were presented as constitutive of the new European identity? Evidence laid out 
in the previous section suggests that the norm evolved at best in parallel with international 
standards on the subject. In fact, its EU version often lagged behind the IAEA measures, as a 
consequence of the lacking consensus among EU member states regarding nuclear operations. 
The distribution of competences concerning the norm’s enforcement among European 
institutions was also less than clear until very recently. Most direct clues regarding the effect that 
the nuclear safety norm was expected to have on states can be gleaned from the accession 
negotiations and the rationale behind the decommissioning of certain reactors mandated by the 
relevant protocols accompanying the Accession Treaty.
213
  
 The divisions and competence feuds between the Commission and the member states 
have obscured the norm’s evolutions to a degree. Efforts to present nuclear safety norm in 
Europe-wide terms have been only partly successful, most notably in connection to the funding 
available to governments faced with mandatory decommissioning or safety upgrades of their 
plants. Some of the funding has been offered in solidarity with these EU members-to-be, who 
found themselves without sufficient decommissioning reserves for NPPs built under central 
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planning systems or by the Soviet Union (this issue was most pressing in the case in 
Lithuania).
214
 At the same time, however, the expectation was that the funding was meant to at 
most supplement the finances raised by the affected governments themselves.
215
 Or, as a 1993 
EC Communication put it: “guided by the principle of help for self-help.”216 Moreover, for the 
definition of nuclear safety as a constitutive or a regulative norm it matters that funding was also 
made available for safety upgrades and on-site projects outside the EU. In Russia and other post-
Soviet Republics the principle of solidarity gave way to imperatives of necessity. That necessity, 
in turn, followed from the technical safety standards developed under the auspices of the IAEA. 
Finally, the projects funded by the EU were viewed as contributing to a greater body of 
knowledge regarding reactor safety, making the financing beneficial not only to the recipients, 
but to “all involved parties for the purpose of improving safety at other installations.”217  
The references justifying the closure of the reactors most frequently include the 1992 G7 
summit in Munich.
218
 The conclusions of that meeting were presented as a standard independent 
of the process of accession, which the enlargement officials were merely overseeing, not 
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creating. In other words, formal association of the nuclear safety norm with the EU-wide agenda 
followed the membership talks with East European candidates, instead of influencing them 
directly. Furthermore, the competence of the European Commission in the field of nuclear safety 
was disputed until a favorable 2002 ruling by the European Court of Justice granted community 
jurisdiction in this area under the EURATOM treaty. Up to that point, member states claimed 
exclusive control of nuclear safety questions (as distinct from radiation protection) and the 
revised declaration of competences was not deposited with the IAEA directorate until 11 May 
2004. The continued contestation regarding the level of control that member states were willing 
to give up on nuclear safety regulation is illustrated by the rejection of an Annex to the Council 
Directive on Nuclear Safety proposed by the European Parliament. This expansion of the 
Directive would have added some distinguishing content to the new legislation, had its call for a 
“defense-in-depth” principle been accepted.219 As a result, and despite the legislative nature of 
the progress towards EU-level control of nuclear safety, the community-wide participation in the 
Convention review cycles parallels the periodic reviews submitted by individual member states, 
rather than replacing them. We must also note that countries outside of the European Union are 
subject to the IAEA standards and complying with them, making any arguments about the 
exclusive European content of the nuclear safety norm even less plausible. 
Thus, nuclear safety does not possess the characteristics expected of a norm that defines a 
narrower state identity, which would be recognizable by those inside and outside the implied 
society of states. A widely expected explanation of the legislative boom within the EU prior to 
its Eastern enlargement as an effort to secure the principles enshrining a collective identity, as 
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was the case with the race equality directive, does not apply to the failed effort to conclude the 
nuclear safety directive before the new members entered the Union. This qualifies as a missing 
piece of evidence in favor of the norm’s constitutive nature. Before finally settling for a 
classification of the norm as regulative, however, we can further examine the way it operates and 
influences state behavior to establish a more positive account of its regulative qualities.  
Primarily, we need to focus on the measures of nuclear safety that determine whether or 
not NPPs within a government’s jurisdiction comply with the norm’s provisions. Implementation 
of the IAEA Convention combines the use of deterministic and probabilistic approaches to safety 
evaluation,
220
 which provide a standardized approach towards assessing the performance and 
relative risk levels of individual reactors. The joint reliance on probabilistic and deterministic 
measures came in response to the failures diagnosed as leading to the Chernobyl disaster. This 
process of risk assessment generates the technical operating specifications, which “define the 
technical rules to be complied with during different stages of normal operation of the plant.”221 
Along these lines, the widely applied ALARA principle complements design-based risk 
prevention to uncover safety deficiencies and provide corresponding corrective measures that are 
up-to-date with current best practices and most recent research findings. In other words, 
compliance with the nuclear safety norm amounts to compliance with these narrowly defined and 
periodically updated safety guidelines.  
At its core, the nuclear safety norm is highly technical and although association between 
the principles it encompasses and a unique definition of EU membership is not inconceivable 
(judging from a variety of environmental norms now seen as such), it has not been developed 
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thus far. In its effect on member states, as well as those outside the Union, the purpose of nuclear 
safety is to regulate the operation of nuclear installations and provide guidance for independent 
authorities in supervising this process. The final conclusion regarding the norm’s classification 
therefore has to place it on the regulative end of the spectrum. With this categorization comes the 
expectation that the primary source of opposition to the norm will come from governments, and 
more specifically, their agencies responsible for balancing the expected benefits of nuclear 
power against the cost of generating it safely and cheaply. This is consistent with the 
observations made in connection to the availability of external funding for expensive safety 
upgrades and irreversible shut-downs that were mandated in the course of the EU enlargement – 
without these funds the obstacles faced by the affected governments with regard to energy policy 
would have been insurmountable. Given the close relation between technical compliance and 
financial benefits of the enlargement process, however, the EU was able to induce cooperation 
from candidate countries most dramatically affected by the post-Chernobyl norm. One question 
that remains concerns the possibility of a shift towards a more identity-based understanding of 
nuclear safety that may ultimately lead to an improved process of consensus building inside EU’s 
institutions, potentially expanding the maneuvering space for a future common energy policy.  
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Thinking out of the Box 
 
Now that minority rights and nuclear safety have been neatly tucked away in their 
respective boxes, it is time to point out the limits of the individual cells. This dissertation seeks 
to define and highlight the differences between particular and universal norms – the five-item 
checklist for detecting a norm’s attributes was formulated in the preceding chapter and applied in 
the current one. These criteria for studying norms, however, intentionally refrain from using 
norms’ real-life success as an indicator of where in the typology they should fall. Instead, norm 
success represents the dependent variable and the analytical space mapped in figure 3.1 is 
intended to help us make inferences about the main source of opposition that a norm will 
encounter.  
 
Figure 3.1  Minority Rights, Nuclear Safety and Expected Outcomes  
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Minority rights do not benefit from easy comprehensibility across borders because the 
principles they enshrine derive from highly contextualized patterns of interaction between 
diverse social groups. Things get lost in translation. Attempts at promoting the norm 
internationally are likely to run into societal opposition, stemming from the unfamiliarity with 
the original intent of the norm, which was tailored to govern interethnic relations elsewhere. The 
support of governments is critical for adoption and enforcement of norms. Yet, without their 
internalization, or every-day living-out of the norms by affected societies, the behavioral change 
required to call their promotion a success will be minimal. Only constitutive/universal norms can 
travel, although this is not to say that they always will. The purpose of this project is to raise our 
awareness of the potential obstacles in norm proliferation and to sort them theoretically. Whether 
the political arrangements at the domestic and international level permit a shift of the particular 
minority rights norm into the universal cell remains an empirical question (see chapter 5).  
The nuclear safety is located in the universal half of the proposed typology already but 
the anticipated difficulties in securing government enforcement of the norm can hamper its broad 
success. In practical terms, this need not be a problem. Even if governments are not bound by 
membership in an identity-based grouping in connection to the nuclear safety norm, as long as 
they follow it as a technical rule (or a regulative norm) no damage is done. Should they violate 
the norm, justified anger on the part of their respective societies, as well as that of peer states and 
international organizations who may issue sanctions to punish the violation, would likely steer 
them into the “safe” camp. This may be why we rarely see government officials argue for cutting 
corners on NPP safety. Under the framework proposed here, however, it is possible to imagine a 
shift away from the universal formulation of the nuclear safety norm that captures also public 
support for doing so. What would be such conditions, how can the argument be made plausible, 
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and what implications does this have for nuclear safety internationally? As chapter 7 studying the 
effects of energy crises will show, these questions are not merely hypothetical and our ability to 
answer them under the present framework is valuable analytically, but also in policy terms. 
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CHAPTER 4: MINORITY RIGHTS 
 
The vigor with which EU’s enlargement officials took up the question of minority rights 
prior to the 2004 expansion might lead us to believe that there was a widespread agreement about 
the most desirable means of handling this sensitive issue. Although the Copenhagen accession 
criteria of 1993 contained only general references to principles of democracy and human rights 
protection, external pressure on ethnically divided candidate countries was growing 
continuously.
222
 European Union joined forces with regional watchdog organizations, the 
Council of Europe and the OSCE most prominently, and integration of minorities became an 
inherent part of the resulting conditionality arrangements. The ready-made solutions for minority 
inclusion that streamed to Eastern Europe from old EU member states seemed to encounter little 
questioning. In reality, the consensus did not reach too far beyond a vague wish not to repeat the 
tragedies caused by untamed ethnic tensions in the Balkans of the 1990s. Old and prospective 
EU members did see eye to eye on that but not much more. 
 The historically rooted complexity of ethnic relations in Eastern Europe found no match 
in the West and the claims made by minorities, as well as reactions by majority populations in 
the post-communist region, repeatedly surprised officials in Brussels. The routine of talking past 
each other began in the pre-accession period and as soon as representatives from the new 
member states took their seats in Brussels, the issue of misaligned perceptions of minority 
tensions entered the European Parliament (EP). The diverse vantage points from which East and 
West European EP representatives viewed the discussion has complicated the search for paths to 
non-discrimination and minority inclusion. The main divide emerged between EU’s focus on 
individual rights and the Eastern European minorities’ need to have their collective right to a 
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distinct culture and identity protected. Partly to address this rift, the European Parliament created 
an intergroup on minorities. This move reflected the desire to unite the diverse positions on 
minorities. Unfortunately, the legal foundation on which EU’s institutions stand seemed unable 
to accommodate the collective rights language and the divide separating the two perspectives 
remained. The intergroup’s initial anti-discrimination effort focused on immigrant populations 
and was led by a British MEP,
223
 Claude Moraes. From the opposite side, this narrow approach 
was countered by unceasing demands from MEPs defending the interests of the Hungarian 
minority across Eastern Europe. This brought the question of a new set of minorities – the 
national ones – to the agenda. As a result, the minority rights claims originating in new EU 
member states now sit rather uncomfortably next to the original calls for non-discrimination. 
They parallel each other, rather than being integrated into a unified approach.
224
 The frustration 
with the lack of overlap between East and West European perspectives on minority rights is 
expressed well in the question I was asked by an exasperated, high-ranking official I interviewed 
at EP’s secretariat: “What exactly is it that the Eastern European minorities want that our 
existing models of inclusion are unable to offer them?”225  
 The clumsy handling of minority rights on the part of the European Union had yet 
another dimension. Prior to the EU’s 2004 enlargement, the European Parliament and the 
European Commission intended to spread democracy and stability to the post-communist region. 
But old EU members had not encountered many of the challenges present in the East European 
context and so they turned to other competent organizations for support. In the case of ethnic 
minority rights, the institution with the most developed toolkit to address the issue was the 
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Council of Europe.
226
 Its expertise in addressing minority rights questions and the treaty-based 
instruments that it was continuously developing on the subject matched the objectives of EU’s 
membership conditionality well. Thus, when the need came to specify the accession 
requirements to candidate countries facing ethnic tensions, the European Commission turned to 
its Strasbourg-based partner organization for guidance.  
The seemingly sound “outsourcing” approach had one important flaw, however. Attuned 
to existing challenges, the Council of Europe approached the definition of minority rights 
standards with caution and pointed to lacking compliance in prospective and old EU member 
states alike. However, the European Commission chose to disregard these nuances and used its 
dominant position in the accession process to present these standards as a ready-made and non-
negotiable solution to the candidates. In other words, EU’s officials assumed that the norms 
advanced by the Council of Europe were readily acceptable to all target societies, despite the 
near-absence of feedback from the affected ethnic groups (minority and majority).
227
 Meanwhile, 
even five years after the 1998 ratification of the Framework Convention on National Minorities, 
its creators at the Council of Europe referred to making the prescriptions “really universal and 
really binding for all member states” as something yet to be achieved.228 
 The divisions inside EU institutions regarding the approach to establishing valid minority 
protection guarantees, combined with the rushed adoption of external standards as a benchmark 
of improvement, have not helped in moving the issue forward. EU member states, however, do 
not have the luxury of postponing the response to increasing diversity of European societies. 
                                                 
226
 Council of Europe, established in 1949, is an institution completely separate from the European Union. It 
operates from Strasbourg and has 47 member states, which is nearly double the membership of the EU. Most 
prominently it has been active in the realm of human rights, democratic standards, social cohesion, and education. 
Some of its programs are organized as a joint effort with the EU. 
227
 The trend has continued into more recent communications with new candidates Snježana Bokulić and Galina 
Kostadinova, "Pushing for Change? South East Europe's Minorities in the EU Progress Reports," (London: Minority 
Rights Group International, 2008). 
228
 Cilevičs, "The Framework Convention within the Context of the Council of Europe," 32. 
   
 
 114  
Following the recent enlargement, ten percent of EU’s population claims the status of a 
minority.
229
 This includes immigrant populations, as well as ethnic and national groups. The 
proportion of the former is greater in the old member states, while the latter are more numerous 
in the East. Yet, the present distribution of minorities is likely to change over time and open 
dialogue at all levels, including the EU-wide arena, will be necessary. As the new members 
develop economically they will become attractive to migrant workers. Meanwhile, existing 
ethnic groupings in the West may gain inspiration from their East European counterparts to 
become more vocal at the EU level and add their grievances to the mix of minority challenges. 
Understanding the current split between the old and new member states, therefore, amounts to 
gaining knowledge about the multifarious sources of inter-group tensions that will likely 
populate European politics in the near future.  
This chapter will focus on analyzing minority rights in detail, outlining the various 
versions of this norm and their interaction in the EU policy space. It draws on fieldwork 
conducted in Slovakia and Lithuania to test the hypotheses that follow from the norm’s location 
in the typology. Before I delve into the presentation of the two cases, one final note is necessary. 
I will refer to the EU version of the minority rights norm as a benchmark for assessing the 
measures adopted by Slovakia and Lithuania. Although this dissertation takes the position that 
the Western solutions were not always adequate for the challenges faced by Eastern European 
minorities, the EU institutional and policy space has nevertheless represented a significant 
constraint on the behavior of both states and non-state actors. However imperfect, the accession 
standards became a measure of success in the realm of minority inclusion - by seeking to join the 
EU, candidates deferred to the West European understanding of the norm and the broader goal of 
wanting to “return to Europe” made this imperative. Up to the point of entry, meeting EU 
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requirements was the only game in town. Centering the analysis around the membership 
aspirations also offers a unified language that allows us to analyze the diverse experiences from 
Slovakia and Lithuania, side by side.
230
  
 Slovakia was the most notorious laggard in securing improvements in the status of its 
minorities prior to EU accession.
231
 Lithuania, by contrast, fared much better in securing rights 
guarantees for its minorities and it earned praise for doing so. As early as 1997, Vilnius hosted a 
Council of Europe conference on the minority question, as the Eastern European capital with the 
most impressive record on this front. In the same round of review in which Slovakia was openly 
scorned for its anti-minority policies, Lithuania’s minority rights protection situation was 
described as “favorable.”232 This verdict was echoed by subsequent reports: “the two main 
minority communities in Lithuania (Polish and Russian) have well established rights (schools, 
language, etc.).”233 While subject to regular scrutiny by EU’s enlargement officials, the country 
was not exposed to direct pressure to revisit its earlier solutions to the minority question. Instead, 
it served as a positive example for many countries in the region.
234
 The variation in the 
performance of the two countries represents the core puzzle tackled by this chapter. It is even 
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more striking, if we consider the similarity between the two cases on variables known to affect 
the likelihood of interethnic tensions and the quality of responses to these.  
First, Slovakia and Lithuania are both small post-communist states that had recently 
gained independence from federations in which their membership had been less than voluntary. 
In addition, their minority demographics are roughly similar, in that the largest majority 
comprises around 10% of total population (Poles in Lithuania and Hungarians in Slovakia), with 
another slightly smaller, but sizeable, minority also vying for recognition and inclusion (Russian-
speakers and the Roma, respectively).
235
 The structural constraints on options available to 
remedy the minority-majority tensions are thus comparable and also represent the main reason 
for not including the other Baltic States in the comparison.
236
 Finally, foreign policy objectives 
of both countries during the post-communist period have been dominated by the desire to join 
the European Union, in large part to assert their “European” identity. This similarity on measures 
seen as determining positive minority-majority interaction in existing literature, makes the 
differential performance of Lithuania and Slovakia in meeting the minority protection standards 
that much more surprising. The comparison therefore promises to uncover the source of the 
difference between the two cases and shed light on obstacles to the proliferation of the minority 
rights norm. 
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Methodology 
 
Building on the classification of the minority rights norm as particular and constitutive, 
the next step is to examine societal responses to changing minority rights standards for clues 
about the varying success of the norm. Based on its position in the typology, we should expect 
the societal attitudes to be the main determinant of norm success. In other words, if opposition to 
the minority rights norm arises, it is likely to occur at the level of everyday social interactions 
rather than through lacking official steps in updating relevant legislation. This nature of the norm 
magnifies the importance of expectations about the behavior of others when formulating one’s 
attitude towards minorities. As a result, the methodological focus needs to be on uncovering 
collectively held beliefs about minority rights.  
I employ Q-methodology, which combines the benefits of survey techniques and 
statistical factor analysis, but also leaves enough room for the interpretive element needed to 
properly analyze political discourse.
237
 It delimits the realm of the possible and so circumscribes 
the qualitative assessment of the two cases. The overall purpose of this approach is to examine 
the full range of opinions about minority rights (not just the most prevalent few), in order to 
evaluate the likelihood of improvement in the status of minorities, as well as to explain the 
absence of such change. In studies using this methodology, participants arrange statements in a 
quasi-normal distribution and because there are limited slots for each extreme position (see 
Figure 4.1), their responses to individual survey items are interdependent. This procedure gives 
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the respondent to “construct a picture of his or her own viewpoint and to interpret each statement 
in his or her own way.”238 This interpretation translates into the final arrangement, a Q-sort, that 
relates all statements to one another. Individual-level data offered by traditional surveys is not 
sufficient to capture the full context surrounding inter-ethnic relations and using Q-method we 
can glean additional insights from an assessment of discursive positions about the situation of 
minorities in a given society.
239
 
I spent several weeks in the Slovak national library reading through articles and books 
that were identified by a comprehensive search of the library’s database on the subject. The time 
period I focused on was between 1998, when the electoral shift away from outright nationalist 
and authoritarian tendencies took place, up to 2008. In Lithuania, I hired a research assistant to 
conduct an identical search of all relevant media from the post-independence period (1991 
onward). The selection of print media included dailies and other periodicals from across the 
political spectrum, publications issued by ethnic minority organizations, as well as regular 
reports by think-tanks and research centers studying minority rights. Relevant academic journals, 
official state documents (e.g. the Constitution) and parliamentary declarations were also 
included. This process of reading through hundreds of articles yielded 107 unique statements in 
Slovakia, 114 in Lithuania. These statements were subsequently coded according to the matrix 
employed by Dryzek and Holmes,
240
 combining key elements of political discourse and the types 
of claims made in arguments. The following table shows the final statement counts in each cell 
for Slovakia and Lithuania. 
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Table 4.1 Statement coding matrix 
 
T
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 Discourse element 
Ontology Agency Motives Relationships 
 SK LT SK LT SK LT SK LT 
Definitive 4 6 5 4 3 4 6 7 
Designative 6 14 5 6 8 8 10 15 
Evaluative 12 7 4 6 6 9 7 8 
Advocative 5 4 7 2 7 8 12 6 
 
 
After classifying the extracted statements into the sixteen cells, I selected three from each 
category to be included in the Slovak study (for a total of 48). In response to participant feedback 
about the level of difficulty associated with the study I reduced the size of the statement sample 
to 33 in Lithuania.
241
 While I originally intended to perform this selection at random, closer 
examination of the statements revealed, that it is, in fact, desirable to strive for a deliberately 
balanced sample that would enhance the diversity of discourse to be explored by this 
methodology. I sought this balance with respect to the following statement attributes: group 
rights vs. individual rights claims; concern with specific vs. all minorities; claims by supporters 
vs. claims by opponents of expanded rights from minorities / source type. The outcome of this 
procedure was the q-sample, which I subsequently presented to subjects for sorting.  
A diverse group of subjects (46 in Slovakia, 42 in Lithuania) arranged the statements 
along a scale from strongest agreement to strongest disagreement. The intensiveness of Q 
methodology means that it always works with a relatively small number of subjects. Forty is the 
rule of thumb used and any responses beyond that number “would yield little additional 
information, unless the additional individuals were of a kind not already represented or intimated 
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in the original forty.”242 These principles of subject selection also related to the kind of 
inferences that we are able to draw from the uncovered results. Whereas R methodologies would 
commonly seek to extrapolate claims about the society as a whole with regard to the individual 
statements, Q methodology focuses on the comprehensiveness of coverage in mapping the 
discourse uncovered through correlation of subject responses. Thus, “if a discourse exists within 
a society, we are likely to find it among our subjects, given the degree to which we a careful to 
include very different kinds of people in our analysis.”243 Confidence in individual observations 
is therefore a core aspect of Q analysis and also something that distinguishes it from large-n 
studies. 
Factor analysis is the main statistical procedure employed in processing the data.
244
 
Crucially, however, the (Q-method) design of this study permits that each respondent’s “sort” be 
taken as a whole in calculating relevant correlations. Consequently, the results hold information 
about comprehensive discursive positions, rather than responses to individual statements, 
balancing the qualitative depth and statistical rigor necessary to study the question of minority 
rights discourse accurately. 
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Figure 4.1 Grid for statement sorting used in the Slovak study
245
 
 
Disagree   Neutral   Agree 
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
             
             
             
             
             
             
 
 
The two Q-methodology studies that I carried out in Slovakia and Lithuania in the course 
of the 2008-09 academic year were internet-based,
246
 but they also contained a “paper-and-
pencil” element, not to exclude subjects without computer skills / internet access. This group 
included unemployed people and social housing residents, as well as pensioners. Incorporating 
their opinions upheld the diversity requirement concerning respondent background. The 
remaining subjects were recruited online. This approach permitted including subjects from all 
regions of Slovakia and Lithuania, without requiring my presence in these locations. The 
internet-based tool used to collect this data employs FlashQ freeware. It replicates the hard-copy 
card sorting originally used for this method and effectively makes the task easier and less time 
consuming for participants. It associates their responses with demographic information about 
them, without revealing their identity, which is important given the sensitive nature of this topic 
(thus making the internet-based approach preferable to in-person sorting). In addition to 
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recording the final Q-sorts from respondents, the program also records how much time they 
spent on individual parts of the survey, and it provides room for spontaneous responses about the 
content of the study.  
Mapping the political discourse on the subject of minority rights, these studies thus 
augment the process tracing in the paired comparison of poorly performing Slovakia and highly 
inclusive Lithuania. The important premise underlying this two-pronged study and the methods 
chosen to carry it out is that the EU demanded change in ethnic minority policy is possible but 
not automatic.
247
 Because of its particular nature, the minority rights norm need not, in fact 
cannot, be framed and lived-out in the same way across societies. With this in mind, we should 
expect to find that especially in the poorly performing countries the existing version of the norm 
will differ from that already present in the EU.
248
  
Of course, there are some trade-offs associated with employing Q-methodology. The 
main benefit lies in uncovering and mapping the discourse of minority rights, while satisfying 
requirements of statistical validity. This is possible because the entire methodology taps directly 
the unique elements of society-specific attitudes toward minorities and their rights. There are no 
a priori restrictions on the content of the study or its results.
249
 A wide range of statements is 
extracted from the existing debate on the subject, while participant responses to these are 
recorded and analyzed with minimal intervention from the researcher. The resulting outline of 
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the discursive positions represents a highly accurate assessment of the different opinion clusters 
on minority rights and offers a key building block in crafting explanations for the cross-country 
variation regarding the treatment of ethnic and national minorities. The specificity of the study is 
of high empirical value but requires that we be extra cautious in making comparisons between 
cases. Because separate study instruments were developed for Slovakia and Lithuania, there are 
limits to generalizing the observations from one case onto another. For this reason, I present the 
two studies separately and their comparison will be constrained to the discussion of broader 
patterns in minority rights discourse, without undue reliance on the details idiosyncratic to each 
country. Having said that, the limits to generalizability are tolerable, if the objective extends 
beyond case comparisons and concentrates on the operation of international norms at the 
domestic level. The emphasis of the present project is on testing the hypothesis that a norm, 
which is at once particular and constitutive, will face opposition at the societal level. As a result, 
the present study lends itself well for drawing conclusions on this count.  
Finally, a more traditional paired comparison of Slovakia and Lithuania that relies 
heavily on field interviews and research conducted in the two countries will complement the Q-
methodology approach.
250
 The insights gained from conversations with government officials, 
representatives from the NGO sector, as well as members of the relevant minorities will allow 
for a more accurate interpretation of the Q-methodology results from each country.
251
 To assure 
the accuracy of responses in the Q-methodology studies, they were administered in Slovak in 
Slovakia and in Lithuanian in Lithuania, so facilitating the incorporation of existing statements 
about minorities in their original (i.e. not translated) formulations. I used Slovak to conduct the 
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in-person interviews in Slovakia; in Lithuania I trained and worked with a research assistant who 
assisted me in processing Lithuanian-language sources. I was able to use English to a 
considerable extent in conversations with scholars, NGO representatives and government 
officials there. In interviews with members of the Russian and Polish minorities I used their 
respective languages.  
 
The Word on the Street: Minority Rights in Slovakia and Lithuania 
 
As Heather Grabbe put it in 2003, a year before the new members joined the EU, 
“unquestionably the European Union also affects cognitive-normative structures in [Central and 
Eastern Europe]… but there is still very little convincing empirical work on which to draw in the 
case of the candidate countries.”252 It is partly in response to this call that I present the detailed 
study of minority rights in the period surrounding Eastern European accession to the EU. Most of 
the work studying the spread of norms at the international level, including democracy promotion 
in post-communist societies, has relied on diffusion-based models to explain institutional change 
(or lack thereof).
253
 However, studies employing diffusion as the main explanatory mechanism 
are better at addressing similarity than difference.
254
 The present argument, illustrated by the 
empirical evidence from Slovakia and Lithuania, abandons the assumption that such norm-
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related change always derives from ideational alignment between geographically proximate 
societies.
255
 Instead, the approach adopted here offers tools for studying the variation in 
receptiveness to international norms that stems from a dissonance between governmental 
objectives and societal inclinations. 
 
Slovakia 
 
 Few countries in East-Central Europe boast a path to democracy and EU membership as 
convoluted and full of surprising turns as does Slovakia. In the mid-1990s, the surprises lay in 
the country’s divergence from its Czech sibling and the apparent resistance to Western pressures 
for reform. In the early 2000s, Slovakia’s quick reversal of course and apparent catching up on 
the other EU candidates was equally unexpected. Finally, the re-entry of populist and nationalist 
forces into government in 2006 cast a shadow over previously exalted achievements.  
Much ink has been spilled on Prime Minister Mečiar’s transgressions in the realm of 
institutional accountability and arrogation of power prior to 1998.
256
 The greatest deficiencies in 
minority politics during this period concentrated on the most numerous ethnic Hungarians. 
“Memories” of ten centuries of Slovak servitude under Hungarian rule were deliberately 
harnessed by nationalistically inclined parties, Mečiar’s HZDS and its coalition partner the 
Slovak National Party (SNS), as they buttressed their agenda of shady privatization, redirection 
of foreign policy eastward, and neglect of economic reform, with nationalist rhetoric.
257
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 Initially, the Mečiar government made superficial attempts to comply with international 
instruments on minority rights, “pledging” to take Western concerns into account,258 and signing 
the Council of Europe Framework Convention in 1995. The implementation, however, was 
deferred to some uncertain point in the distant future, a problem further aggravated by other 
damaging moves on the minority issue. Especially the language laws devised by the parliament 
dominated by HZDS and the SNS (balanced only by an incoherent opposition of squabbling 
small parties and HZDS dissenters), produced a number of controversies. The main outcome was 
the exclusion of Slovakia from the first round of EU entrants and by 1998 the time was ripe for a 
reassessment of priorities by Slovak electorate and political elites alike.  
Following a 1998 electoral victory, the pro-reform coalition led by prime minister 
Dzurinda’s SDK party259 reversed course and quickly earned a reintroduction to the line-up of 
EU candidates based on economic criteria. It seemed that the political situation improved rapidly 
as well, leading some to list Slovakia as the clearest example of the effective working of EU 
conditionality.
260
 Cautious praise on the minority-rights legislative steps began to appear in 
European Commission’s Regular Reports, with the one from 1999 concluding that “thanks to the 
changes introduced since September 1998 Slovakia now fulfils the Copenhagen political 
criteria.”261  
 Yet, despite the visible success on the political criterion, much business remained 
unfinished and the most recent report by the Council of Europe specifies the challenge: 
                                                                                                                                                             
non-state-forming minorities, opening up the possibility of define Slovak citizenship on two levels, the lower one 
occupied by minority citizens. Since ethnic minorities make up 18-23% of the Slovak population, the concern about 
the implied exclusion from civil rights was a serious one. The range stems from an attempted adjustment for the 
members of the Roma minority, who list their nationality as Slovak, despite belonging to this minority ethnicity. See 
for example "Agenda 2000 - Opinion on Slovakia." 
258
 Samson, "Slovakia: Misreading the Western Message." 
259
 Strengthened through reelection /2002/ and transformation into Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – SDKU 
260
 Rupnik, "Eastern Europe: The International Context." 
261
 "Regular Report: Slovakia,"  (European Commission, 1999). 
   
 
 127  
 
While the adoption of the Anti-discrimination Act in 2004 significantly 
strengthened the existing legal framework, an important provision allowing the 
introduction of positive measures to address disadvantages linked to racial or 
ethnic origin has not entered into force due to the fact that the Constitutional 
Court, in its decision of October 2005, found the said provision 
unconstitutional.
262
 
 
This legal provision would have incorporated the possibility of affirmative action 
consistent with the relevant EU directives and the failure to introduce this measure was further 
criticized by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights.
263
 Abandoned by the 
second Dzurinda government,
264
 the outstanding legislative tasks were even less likely to be 
taken up by its successors. The EC assessments failed to take into consideration the dampening 
effect that the elimination of pressure following Slovakia’s entry in to the Union would have on 
the country’s responsiveness to external calls for minority inclusion. 
 The first election following EU accession (in June 2006) brought victory to the leftist 
populist party (SMER) led by Robert Fico, who was already known for his displeasure with 
Slovakia’s joining the EU “with naked bottoms” – a phrase that was boldly illustrated on the 
party’s promotional billboards. Refusing to be associated with the outgoing pro-reform parties, 
SMER joined an awkward coalition with two partners from the mildly-to-extremely nationalist 
camp, both of whom held a big share of responsibility for Slovakia’s initial rejection from the 
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line-up of candidates in 1997.
265
 The notoriously controversial nationalistic and xenophobic 
exclamations by the leader of the Slovak National Party (SNS), Ján Slota, took the place of 
concerted efforts to improve the situation of ethnic minorities.
266
 Combined with a leadership 
change in the ranks of the Hungarian party in Slovakia that saw moderate politicians replaced 
with those more willing to exchange punches with Mr. Slota, the Slovak nationalist remarks have 
contributed to the deterioration in the political climate surrounding the majority-minority 
interaction. Other concurrent developments aggravated this discursive shift away from 
unconditional guarantees of ethnic minority rights. An ongoing controversy concerning a highly 
politicized case of a purportedly ethnically motivated assault on a Hungarian university student 
in 2006 shed further doubt on the priority that the new government was attributing to 
guaranteeing minority rights. Accompanied by much confusion and emerging evidence that the 
investigation of the incident was plagued with procedural mistakes, the case had divided the 
Slovak society. To little surprise of some, “it reopened a poorly-healed rift…and once again cast 
the country’s ethnic relations in a bad light.”267  
Beyond rhetoric, the failure to implement laws that were drafted in a promise to the EU 
enlargement officials was indicative of a decreasing commitment to minority rights guarantees. 
The SNS-appointed ministers introduced measures that arguably privileged the Slovak majority 
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over minorities. The Ministry of the Environment, for instance, tabled a 2006 decree that sent 
bonus funding to areas exposed to “colder winters,” which happen to cluster in the north of the 
country, populated by the Slovak majority. The Ministry of Regional Development can be held 
accountable for the lacking infrastructure, primarily in the form of major highways, in the 
southern parts of Slovakia. Contrary to claims by Prime Minister Fico, the recent presence of 
nationalists in the Slovak executive has not been without a footprint on minority-majority 
relations – a footprint that goes beyond mere legitimation of the anti-minority discourse and 
antagonizing remarks by nationalist party elites.  
 In terms of the minority rights norm, formal adherence to international conventions is 
more solid than the recent domestic political developments might suggest. Slovakia has both 
signed and ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. The 
Ministry has engaged in the painstaking effort of providing materials for the Convention’s 
monitoring and has played a significant role in toning down the increasingly common 
altercations between Slovak and Hungarian politicians.
268
 As far as official positions go, the 
minority rights question has been awarded a high priority in the distinct effort to align Slovakia’s 
policy with the EU-preferred framing of the topic as a civil society strengthening project. For 
example, the Director of the Slovak Government’s Human Rights and Minorities office 
decisively rejected any references to minority rights as a concept applying to collectivities, rather 
than individuals.
269
 Arguably, then, Slovak government officials have learned from the minority-
neglecting fiasco of mid-1990s. As far as the country’s foreign policy goes, compliance with 
international agreements is closely linked to the image that Slovakia would like to project 
outward – the image of a tolerant and inclusive democracy worthy of EU membership. The 
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constitutive effect of minority rights has been at work. There is little in the country’s foreign 
policy and official governmental positions that would explain the at best halting progress on 
minority integration 
 The only way to account for the discrepancy between foreign and domestic policy is to 
recognize two separate minority strategies pursued by Slovak political leadership. One directed 
outward, one targeting the Slovak electorate. In order to shed some light on this schizophrenic 
process of policy creation this chapter sets out to analyze the existing discourse on the subject of 
minority rights protection. If governments are able to say one thing and do another it means that 
they have a receptive audience at home that is willing to tolerate such ambiguity. Instead of 
relying on ex post facto electoral results to estimate the nature of this support, q-methodology 
offers a much more direct look at where the Slovak society as a whole stands on minority rights. 
At this point it may be fitting to emphasize that the purpose of this study (and the one from 
Lithuania) is to provide a snapshot of the discourse on minority rights. The version of the 
discourse in late 2008 and early 2009 may reflect accumulated positions from the preceding 
period that continue to be legitimate. In its present design, however, the study does not explicitly 
trace the development of the discourse over time. To extend the study’s reach to the period 
between 1998 and 2008, it is necessary to combine it with the findings from a survey of Slovak 
press from these years as well as interviews with key actors involved in advancing the position of 
minorities in the country. The final part of this chapter will be devoted to drawing these links. 
The study of responses from a highly diverse group of participants
270
 uncovered three 
distinct clusters of opinion that comprise separate discursive positions. I labeled them 1./ 
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informed pragmatism, 2./ intolerant nationalism, and 3./ moderately tolerant indifference.
271
 I 
present all three factors by means of a self-contained characterization of the discursive position 
that each of them represents. I also list the full range of statements that statistically
272
 distinguish 
each composite factor. Collectively, they should present a plausible story for the convoluted path 
to minority inclusion that Slovakia took in the past two decades and so provide evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that a particular/constitutive norm’s performance depends primarily on 
the societal receptiveness to the changes it brings forth. 
 
Informed Pragmatism 
 
This discursive position reflects a high level of awareness about the tenets of a tolerant 
society and inclusive democracy (2, 28, 10). It shows disagreement with the traditional 
nationalist talking points, such as defending the sanctity of the Slovak language or blaming 
Hungarians for stirring up trouble (1, 5, 35, 14). The minority rights issue is a very real one 
(45) and it is undesirable to make statements likely to ignite ethnic tensions (38, 14). 
Informed pragmatism recognizes the enormity of the minority inclusion task ahead (18, 47, 
16) but insists that change is necessary and concerns everyone in Slovakia (36, 32). There 
is some hesitation regarding the compromises that will be necessary (7) but informed 
pragmatism is nevertheless sensitive to the nuances in addressing minority problems and 
open to concessions where it favors practicable solutions (19, 11). The pragmatic attitude 
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continues into preferred approaches that call for domestic responsibility without looking 
for help abroad (40, 26). 
 
Table 4.2 Factor A – Informed Pragmatism273 
 
No. Statement Rank 
2 Every civil society has to enable the members of its national minorities to exercise 
their rights. 
6* 
28 Even the highest political representatives in Slovakia do not avoid racist discourse; 
representatives of some political parties deliberately employ it to increase their 
popularity among voters. 
5* 
18 Upholding and protection of human rights and basic freedoms, including those of 
persons that belong to national minorities, are not a topic for a few days or weeks. It is 
a long-lasting theme that concerns us all. 
5* 
19 We have to differentiate among the Roma, who are not a homogenous group but an 
internally divided one. 
4* 
47 The solution to the difficult situation of many Roma in Slovakia remains one of the 
most significant challenges faced by our society, especially if it is to claim the values 
of a democracy. 
3* 
36 Discrimination is part of everyday life in all of Slovakia. People often consider 
discrimination part of their life and are indifferent to it. 
2* 
11 It is necessary to enable the development of a minority and its members in a way that 
allows it to choose its own path. Of course, while maintaining state sovereignty and in 
compliance with the law. 
2* 
16 A deep ideological and cultural separation exists between a Roma village and a non-
Roma town. Meanwhile, there are many who do not see a problem with this. 
1 
10 In a united Europe, the leadership in our country has to provide the citizens with 
guarantees of their social rights, as they belong to basic human rights, whether we like 
it or not. 
1* 
20 It is not a problem in a democratic state for members of a minority to be able to gather 
and live out their national identity, nurture their traditions and folklore, should they 
have it. 
0* 
37 With regard to the Roma issue is important to note that we are talking about people 
who are several times more disadvantaged than others, they are very poor, 
unemployed, they live in typical locations with poor infrastructure and so on. 
0* 
39 It is unacceptable for uneducated children who do not speak the state language to 
leave our schools. 
0* 
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4 An emphasis on multiculturalism ought to be the primary goal of Slovak legislators 
and the executive. 
0* 
27 The space for the rights of national minorities has been gradually shrinking in 
Slovakia. 
-1* 
7 In regions where the majority of the populations is of Hungarian nationality, this 
minority ought to have greater possibilities to develop is native language in the sphere 
of education and culture. 
-1* 
40 Prior to Slovakia’s entry into the European Union the politicians were a lot more 
interested in the concerns of minorities. 
-1 
26 If the Roma and Non-Roma really wanted change, it would have happened already. -2* 
1 Slovaks have the right to protect their language – without it they would lose their 
statehood. 
-2* 
5 The government of the Slovak Republic is the government of a sovereign country. We 
simply cannot permit that the highest representatives of other countries, especially 
Hungary, behave in Southern Slovakia, as if they were in Northern Hungary. 
-3 
35 Until all residents of Slovakia accept Slovakia as their homeland there will be no 
peace in Slovakia. 
-3* 
46 Slovakia provides above-standard care to its minorities. -4* 
41 Slovak political parties treat the issue of national minorities with care, they do not 
extract political capital from opportunistic references to this topic and so contribute to 
maintaining fair civil relations in the Slovak Republic. 
-4* 
38 The Hungarian side is more responsible for the worsening of relations between 
Slovaks and Hungarians. 
-4 
32 Problems stemming from discrimination and racism are faced solely by the Roma 
minority. 
-5* 
45 Minority politics is damaging, this nation has to unite, not “minoritize” itself. Are we 
going to have national minorities, minorities based on orientation[sic], religious, 
social… what is it good for? 
-5* 
14 Hungarians disrupt relations all over central Europe. -6* 
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Intolerant Nationalism 
 
This discursive position values sovereignty of the Slovak nation and underscores this with 
the inviolability of the Slovak language, to the point of defensiveness against any outside 
intrusion (5, 44). This verges on belligerent attitudes towards minorities and their allies 
(14, 38, 11). Intolerant nationalism is not open to any concessions that would privilege the 
minorities (34, 7). The Roma situation appears hopeless and not worth much effort to 
control / repair the damage done (42, 12). Minorities have rights (2) but these should not 
receive any priority over the rights of non-minorities. This version of nationalism does not 
see much value in differentiating between minorities or among citizens of Slovakia more 
generally (24, 27, 44). There are no deficiencies in the treatment of minorities (46, 36), nor 
are there many concessions to be offered on this front (11, 34). There are hints of illiberal 
inclinations that round off the intolerant quality in this discursive position (10, 22). 
 
Table 4.3  Factor B – Intolerant Nationalism274 
 
No. Statement Rank 
5 The government of the Slovak Republic is the government of a sovereign country. 
We simply cannot permit that the highest representatives of other countries, 
especially Hungary, behave in Southern Slovakia, as if they were in Northern 
Hungary. 
5* 
46 Slovakia provides above-standard care to its minorities. 4* 
2 Every civil society has to enable the members of its national minorities to exercise 
their rights. 
2* 
14 Hungarians disrupt relations all over central Europe. 2* 
24 The quality of life of the minorities goes hand in hand with the quality of life of all 
citizens. 
1* 
38 The Hungarian side is more responsible for the worsening of relations between 
Slovaks and Hungarians. 
1* 
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16 A deep ideological and cultural separation exists between a Roma village and a non-
Roma town. Meanwhile, there are many who do not see a problem with this. 
0 
35 Until all residents of Slovakia accept Slovakia as their homeland there will be no 
peace in Slovakia. 
0* 
19 We have to differentiate among the Roma, who are not a homogenous group but an 
internally divided one. 
0* 
17 The Roma problem has seemingly three ends – whichever your grab, the prospects 
are unclear. Some say that we must begin with education, others see the solution in 
offering employment to the Roma and a third group advocates improved living 
conditions. They are all interconnected, though. 
0* 
11 It is necessary to enable the development of a minority and its members in a way 
that allows it to choose its own path. Of course, while maintaining state sovereignty 
and in compliance with the law. 
-1 
33 Documents, which after the Second World War limited the civil and property rights 
of the Hungarian and German minority in Slovakia are irrevocable. 
-1* 
10 In a united Europe, the leadership in our country has to provide the citizens with 
guarantees of their social rights, as they belong to basic human rights, whether we 
like it or not. 
-1* 
34 In order to secure practical equality of opportunity and preserve the principle of 
equal treatment, special equalizing measures that will eliminate  the disadvantages 
stemming from racial or ethnic origin may be taken. 
-1* 
42 By elevating it to the status of a nationality and codifying its language, we 
contribute to strengthening the identity awareness of the Roma minority, their pride 
and initiative but we will also obtain their respect for the majority nation. 
-2* 
12 We may not allow that the causes of the present state of marginalized communities 
be reduced only to the nationality level, as this effectively amounts to transferring 
the responsibility for this situation to the Roma themselves. 
-2* 
22 Attributing racial background to social backwardness is one of basic expressions of 
racism. 
-3* 
36 Discrimination is part of everyday life in all of Slovakia. People often consider 
discrimination part of their life and are indifferent to it. 
-3* 
40 Prior to Slovakia’s entry into the European Union the politicians were a lot more 
interested in the concerns of minorities. 
-4 
41 Slovak political parties treat the issue of national minorities with care, they do not 
extract political capital from opportunistic references to this topic and so contribute 
to maintaining fair civil relations in the Slovak Republic. 
-4* 
7 In regions where the majority of the populations is of Hungarian nationality, this 
minority ought to have greater possibilities to develop is native language in the 
sphere of education and culture. 
-5* 
27 The space for the rights of national minorities has been gradually shrinking in 
Slovakia. 
-5* 
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44 The demands of national minorities are much more important than any other 
challenges currently faced by Slovakia. 
-6* 
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Moderately Tolerant Indifference 
 
The overall attitude within this discursive position is conflict averse, relatively tolerant and 
accepting of differences (25, 30, 48). Minorities alone should not be blamed for the 
situation (38, 14). Low-tension policy solutions are preferred (16, 43) and neither the 
minority, nor the majority should be asked to sacrifice much (5, 35). However, there are 
also limits to the concessions that should be granted to minorities – minorities should not 
be given a blank check in developing their culture (11, 2, 7). This hesitation is coupled 
with a lack of awareness of the complexity associated with the current situation of 
minorities in Slovakia (36, 19). The neutral attitude on statements about the 
contentiousness of Slovak minority politics and the extent to which the situation of 
minorities is a society-wide problem betrays a low level of interest in politics in general 
(29, 41). 
 
Table 4.4 Factor C – Moderately Tolerant Indifference275 
 
No. Statement Rank 
25 Whereas the Hungarian minority is a part of the political and economic life with an 
important positive influence on the state’s internal and external orientation, the Roma 
minority is unable to solve its problems without the help of the state and its solidarity. 
5* 
43 Covering our eyes before the problems of Roma communities that need targeted help 
probably is not the path leading to an improvement of the situation. 
5* 
30 Although a certain degree of distrust exists between Slovaks and Hungarians, both 
nationalities are used to living side by side. 
4* 
48 It is important to deepen the principle of equality among citizens regardless of nationality, 
the specific attributes of national groups, or their needs. 
4* 
10 In a united Europe, the leadership in our country has to provide the citizens with 
guarantees of their social rights, as they belong to basic human rights, whether we like it 
or not. 
3* 
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29 So far, minority politics is not recognized as everyone’s problem. 0 
23 By recognizing the “Roma problem” we automatically deny the constitutionally anchored 
equality of all national minorities residing here, because no Hungarian, Ukrainian or other 
minority “problems” exist. 
0* 
41 Slovak political parties treat the issue of national minorities with care, they do not extract 
political capital from opportunistic references to this topic and so contribute to 
maintaining fair civil relations in the Slovak Republic. 
0* 
16 A deep ideological and cultural separation exists between a Roma village and a non-
Roma town. Meanwhile, there are many who do not see a problem with this. 
-1* 
2 Every civil society has to enable the members of its national minorities to exercise their 
rights. 
-1* 
19 We have to differentiate among the Roma, who are not a homogenous group but an 
internally divided one. 
-1* 
11 It is necessary to enable the development of a minority and its members in a way that 
allows it to choose its own path. Of course, while maintaining state sovereignty and in 
compliance with the law. 
-1 
31 Majority intolerance of the Roma minority is bound to continue for many more years in 
Slovakia. 
-2* 
5 The government of the Slovak Republic is the government of a sovereign country. We 
simply cannot permit that the highest representatives of other countries, especially 
Hungary, behave in Southern Slovakia, as if they were in Northern Hungary. 
-2 
40 Prior to Slovakia’s entry into the European Union the politicians were a lot more 
interested in the concerns of minorities. 
-2 
46 Slovakia provides above-standard care to its minorities. -3* 
35 Until all residents of Slovakia accept Slovakia as their homeland there will be no peace in 
Slovakia. 
-3* 
27 The space for the rights of national minorities has been gradually shrinking in Slovakia. -3* 
7 In regions where the majority of the populations is of Hungarian nationality, this minority 
ought to have greater possibilities to develop is native language in the sphere of education 
and culture. 
-4* 
38 The Hungarian side is more responsible for the worsening of relations between Slovaks 
and Hungarians. 
-5 
36 Discrimination is part of everyday life in all of Slovakia. People often consider 
discrimination part of their life and are indifferent to it. 
-5* 
14 Hungarians disrupt relations all over central Europe. -6* 
 
  
The three factors that prevail in Slovak minority rights discourse show a great deal of 
variation with regard to the assessments of current challenges faced by minorities, the degree to 
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which these represent a problem, as well as the preferred solutions and possible concessions. The 
aim in devising this study was to select the broadest possible range of statements that filled 
Slovak press and public pronouncements on the subject between 1998 and 2008. This meant 
including tenets of liberalism side by side with decidedly nationalist statements. However, the 
subjects were encouraged to express their agreement or disagreement with the statements and it 
was by no means a given that the uncovered discursive pattern would be so contradictory. Factor 
A (informed pragmatism) reflects a high degree of tolerance for minorities coupled with a strong 
desire to address the situation, tainted only by skepticism resulting from an awareness of failed 
efforts to do so in the past. By contrast, Factor B (intolerant nationalism) showed considerable 
preoccupation with dwelling on the past and fueling existing prejudices about minorities. 
Individually, these two discursive positions explain the largest proportions of the variation 
detected by the study (24% and 13%, respectively).
276
 Without attributing representativeness to 
these opinion clusters, which is not something Q-methodology is equipped to do, we are 
nevertheless able to observe a deep split in the Slovak society when it comes to perceptions of 
minorities and their rights.  
 There is one feature, however, that informed pragmatism and intolerant nationalism have 
in common – they both represent rather uncompromising positions characterized by a great deal 
of commitment to defending the claims they make. This involvement does not continue into the 
third factor detected in this analysis – moderately tolerant indifference (Factor C). As the label 
that it was assigned suggests, the discursive investment in the altercation between minority rights 
advocates and “true Slovaks” is minimal. Sweeping all trouble under the rug and hoping it will 
disappear seems to be the solution most consistent with this discursive approach and any 
references to the issue mean asking for trouble. Factor C seems to have absorbed some of the 
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prevailing rhetoric aimed at both satisfying western standards and feeding homegrown 
stereotypes. It shows both indecisiveness and indifference and adequately fills the space between 
the two remaining factors. Feasibly, citizens who subscribe to this position in the discourse on 
minorities could be swayed to join the tolerant camp (Factor A), as well as the more exclusive 
position advancing Slovak national values (Factor B).  
The three positions offer abundant clues about the volatility of support for minority rights 
in Slovakia. Throughout my fieldwork in the country, I was frequently reminded about the 
unpredictability of positions that people might take on the subject and the absolutely lacking 
consensus about what constitutes legitimate policy in this issue area. I encountered repeated 
headshaking about the futility of my research effort, accusations of “siding with the Gypsies,” 
but also whole-hearted support and encouragement, mostly from people who had some 
knowledge about the life of minorities. A one-of-a-kind field encounter illustrates how informed 
pragmatism, intolerant nationalism and moderately tolerant indifference play out in everyday 
life.  
The busy schedule of one of my interviewees, a Slovak-Hungarian sociology professor 
and former representative at the OSCE,
277
 forced us to begin our conversation about the life of 
minorities in Slovakia on a bus, during his morning commute. We were both genuinely interested 
in each other’s perspective on the subject and an involved exchange of view followed soon after. 
At first, we just received strange looks from our fellow bus riders, which I attributed to the fact 
that we were talking about more than the weather. I detected certain animosity only when two 
older ladies, who were sitting in the seat immediately in front of us got up and moved, 
demonstratively, to sit as far away as possible, shaking their heads as they did so. We were really 
in trouble, I thought, when towards the end of that thirty-minute bus conversation a young man 
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across the aisle, who had been looking disapprovingly in our direction all along, finally got up at 
about the moment we were discussing the comparability of the Hungarian and Roma experiences 
and announced: “I cannot listen to that garbage anymore!” My interviewee informed him, 
perfectly calmly, that he did not have to listen – there were several empty seats left farther away. 
After we were almost the only people left in the front of the bus, the Slovak-Hungarian 
intellectual I was speaking with just shook his head and said to me with a slightly sad laugh: “We 
weren’t even saying anything!”278 I agreed but deep inside I was glad this conversation occurred 
on a bus between Bratislava and a south-Slovakian town, where the respect for minorities is 
probably greater than anywhere else in the country.
279
  
 
Lithuania 
 
In its recent journey as an independent nation with a proud history reaching to the Middle 
Ages, Lithuania has not been short on strong national spirit. At about the time the country chose 
to secede from the Soviet Union, the leader of the independence struggle Vytautas Landsbergis 
declared: “Moscow can annihilate us, they can set up another puppet regime here but they cannot 
kill our wish for freedom”280 As the first Soviet republic to claim sovereign rule over its territory 
(1990), Lithuania sent encouraging independence-struggle signals throughout the region. 
Carefully navigating the stormy waters of a disintegrating Soviet Union, the Lithuanian 
leadership managed not to provoke an intervention from Gorbachev, nor did it alienate the 
international opinion. A February 1991 referendum on the independence question, 85% turnout 
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and a decisive “yes” vote (90%), took all the arguments away from conservatives in Moscow, 
and Lithuania’s independence was recognized in September of that year.  
 Given the widespread support for independent statehood and strong nationalist sentiment 
in Lithuania, one might have expected the country to continue the emotional road to 
independence with a strong stance vis-à-vis the minorities. That is the path that post-
independence Latvia and Estonia embarked on, giving way to “majority insecurity” in dealing 
with other ethnic groups in their societies.
281
 The opposite scenario, however, unfolded in 
Lithuania. With the restoration of independence, citizenship was granted to all residents, 
regardless of ethnic origin – the proportion of citizen inhabitants reached 90% by 1996.282 
Looking for reasons behind this path of openness and moderation, some authors have described 
the Lithuanian story as one of “pragmatic inclusiveness and fear of uncertain loyalty.”283 The 
liberal citizenship laws and progressive minority language legislation were not introduced 
without widespread debate of these issues, in which both a radical flank of the nationalist 
movement (Lithuanian Freedom League) and much more cautious reformers that had led 
Lithuania to independence (Sajudis, Communist Party of Lithuania) were represented. The 
Sajudis movement, whose moderate wing made the critical decisions in the early years of the 
country’s existence, proved most influential and chose to disregard the radical demands, banking 
on the pragmatism of such a move and the broad support that it enjoyed in the wake of 
independence. 
This is not to say, however, that gaining minority support for the pro-independence 
measures was an easy task. Ethnic Poles and Russian speakers, some of whom opposed secession 
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from the Soviet Union, organized in the Yedinstvo (Unity) movement, seeking only limited, if 
any, autonomy from the Soviet union. Again, stealing the wind from this movement’s sails was 
an important motivation behind the inclusive approach to minorities that sought to prove that the 
new Lithuanian majority had no intentions of dominating other ethnicities within its territory. 
Opposition existed also on the Lithuanian side, when the Vilnija movement (named after the 
region surrounding the capital), insisted that “re-lithuanization” of their previously “polonized” 
compatriots in the south-east of the country would be the appropriate response to the minority 
situation. However, the young Lithuanian government at the time disregarded these radical calls 
and continued its tolerant minority policies. It was conscious of the international gaze (but not 
explicitly responding to any conditionality arrangements, as these had not yet been fully 
formulated) and sought improved relations with Poland. 
Lithuania was sensitive to the perceived precariousness of the minorities’ situation when 
it passed a law as early as 1989
284
 guaranteeing state aid for cultural development, training of 
specialists to respond to needs of ethnic cultures, and the use of minority languages in public 
areas. The law was soon amended (1991), to secure minority-language education and the use of 
minority languages in offices and organizations located in areas with substantial minority 
representation. The provisions were made more strict only with a 1995 amendment, which did 
not strip minorities of their existing rights, but required representatives of local institutions to 
know the state language, mandated instruction of the state language in all secondary schools and 
assure protection of “linguistic norms” in the use of Lithuanian.285 This change, was to assuage 
the worries that the Russian and Polish speakers had no incentives to learn the state language 
under the previous arrangements. It did not go without some opposition from the representatives 
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of the Polish minority and slightly less so by representatives of the more dispersed Russian 
minority.
286
 Yet, given the low-tension political climate, the increasingly friendly relations with 
Poland, and the tendency of the general ethnic Polish opinion to be “more moderate and more 
indifferent”287 than that of their leaders, the claims-making did not escalate.288  
In a broader measure of the overall attitude towards ethnic diversity, leaders of the 
independence movement and their successors engaged in a dialogue with minorities and worked 
on policies that they believed would be acceptable to all. Consciously referring to Lithuania’s 
historic tolerance for minorities, dating back to the “magnanimous” days of a culturally diverse 
medieval kingdom they highlighted the one element of popular discourse that could be harnessed 
in favor of sustainable minority rights policy.
289
 In a similar way, explicit references to this 
history of toleration were made without exception in my interviews (fall 2008) with members of 
the Polish minority, the Russian-speakers and ethnic Lithuanians. In fact, it was the most 
common way for my interviewees to begin our conversation, whenever I asked them to freely 
introduce their perspective on the subject. 
It is therefore not surprising that this friendly disposition towards minorities translated 
into electoral outcomes as well. In the 2004 parliamentary election, the first after Lithuania’s 
entry into the EU, the Labor Party claimed the victory. Significantly, it’s leader was a Russian-
born entrepreneur, whose heavy accent did not seem to interfere with Lithuanian voting 
preferences. The party formed a coalition with the Social-Democratic Party and made a point to 
include members of minorities in the government. Most notably, a vice-prime ministerial post 
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and that of the special advisor to the Prime Minister for minority issues went to representatives 
of the Polish minority. Lithuania’s Poles and Russians found the social democratic coalition 
more receptive to the demands of minorities and welcomed the commitment to compliance with 
European minority rights standards.  
Yet, the party representing the Polish minority (Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania – 
EAPL) describes itself as a regional party, defending the interests of the less developed regions 
in Lithuania, while advocating a minority friendly (but not minority specific) array causes. On 
some of these, the EAPL comes closer to its social-democratic allies (e.g. on regional growth and 
questions of unemployment), whereas its positions on social issues bear closer affinity to 
Lithuania’s conservative parties. In many respects, it is an issue-driven party, as much as one 
devoted to advocating the rights of the Polish minority. An EAPL candidate for the parliament 
admitted that there are content issues that he could see his party pursuing at the expense of 
ethnically-driven claims, for example the stance on abortion, which they share with the 
conservative parties in Lithuania.
 290
  This overlap was pointed out also by some representatives 
from the non-governmental sector active in the sphere of minority rights. The malleability of 
EAPL’s electoral goals is further illustrated by the coalition that it created with the Lithuanian 
Union of Russians prior to the 2008 parliamentary vote. It did so in an effort to launch an all-
minority platform whose demands centered on alleviating the socio-economic, rather than 
cultural isolation of minorities.
291
 
Integration of minorities and their access to the political process in Lithuania is most 
apparent at the local level. The single-member district element in the electoral system makes 
minority candidates more viable than pure proportional representation would permit. Familiarity 
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with local conditions faced by minorities further helps their representatives. Yet, the most direct 
and effective involvement of minorities occurs at the municipal council level. The issues that 
prevail concern minority education, radio and television broadcasting in minority languages, as 
well as opportunities for cultural development and the related financing questions. These matters, 
do not lag behind other questions occupying municipal politics and the quality of available 
solutions largely depends on the qualifications of representatives, not their ethnic background, or 
even political affiliation.
292
 Notably, Lithuanian majority does not perceive the political 
participation of minorities as a challenge to state sovereignty or as a threat to the nation’s cultural 
purity. Participation is an essential element of the privilege of citizenship that was bestowed on 
all, without difference.
293
  
Detailed observation of political developments in Lithuania since independence suggests 
a widespread preference for inclusiveness in the treatment of minorities. Unlike in Slovakia, a 
broader agreement on the subject has allowed for more coherent policy and public attitudes 
towards minorities and should be reflected in the discourse-mapping study. Again, three distinct 
factors were uncovered and labeled: 1./ self-conscious nationalism, 2./ sympathetic discontent, 
and 3./ distant individualism. The focus from now on will be on exploring the variations between 
these clusters of opinion and relating them to broader developments on the minority rights front 
in Lithuania. In terms of the main argument – that the ease with which the minority rights norm 
spreads is primarily affected by societal attitudes – uncovering a strong nationalist sentiment at 
the level of public discourse would be inconsistent with the core hypothesis. 
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Self-Conscious Nationalism 
 
This discursive position recognizes the value of diversity and the role currently played by 
minorities in securing it (13, 7). In the same way it expresses mild fears for preserving 
Lithuanian identity (15) and advocates defending of the nation’s sovereignty against 
intrusion from surrounding states under the cloak or protecting kin minorities (3, 29, 5). 
The focus is on the future, as opposed to dwelling on the past (16, 18). Existing solutions 
to assuring integration of minorities seem sufficient (6, 23, 11) and there is little reason to 
sacrifice much to address the issue (neutral on 30, 20). Any lingering issues will solve 
themselves and do not require extensive actions from politicians, the majority, or even the 
minorities (22, 8, 18). Minority claims are seen through the historical, inter-cultural lens 
(29) and have little to do with economic issues that concern all Lithuania’s citizens 
equally, without generating ethnic tension (30, 4). 
 
Table 4.5 Factor A – Self-Conscious Nationalism294 
 
No. Statement Rank 
15 A citizen of Lithuania has to know the Lithuanian language, this is his obligation and 
an expression of his respect for the country, in which he's living. 
4* 
6 There are excellent conditions for Polish people to learn and to explore their own 
culture in Lithuania, it's just that not all of them are able to use these. 
4* 
3 The problems, which may arise, have to be solved without the intervention from the 
historical motherland of a national minority and the solution has to match the interests 
of our country. 
3* 
29 Sometimes national minority organizations voice claims, which contradict the 
objectives of the state. Mainly, national minorities stick to the attitudes of their 
historical motherland. 
3* 
25 Lithuania is a multi-national state in which members of all the nationalities that live 3 
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here, have to feel well and be safe - all its citizens have equal rights and 
responsibilities, regardless of their nationality. 
13 The minorities bring different cultures, diversity, and contribute to the life of a 
country. 
2 
23 Often, we exaggerate about the problems associated with ethnic tensions. 2* 
16 Tolerance and the understanding of dignity, require a struggle of soul and mind. 
Opening old wounds, settling accounts or indifference won't help here in any way. 
2* 
 
11 Public policy in Lithuania is designed to help national minorities keep their identity, 
to integrate them into the economic and cultural life of the country and to create the 
atmosphere of tolerance and respect for other cultures. 
1* 
5 The stereotype that the region of Vilnius, as a foreign territory, has to be colonized by 
Lithuanians, is spread by the Polish themselves. 
1* 
   
26 There are few indications that the negative attitude of the society towards the Roma is 
going to change in a short time. 
1* 
2 We have to stop "dwelling on history" and reopening old sores. 0* 
30 Political activity in our society could increase, it is good that national minorities are 
creating their political organizations. 
0* 
20 If we want to be more tolerant, we have to be more self-critical. Clear cases of 
intolerance don't meet with a fast political response in our society. 
0* 
9 The Polish of Lithuania, maybe even without intending this to happen, isolate 
themselves, sentence themselves to the offside of the social life. 
-1* 
22 Politicians make too many mistakes, they talk about tolerance but nothing is done 
about it. 
-1* 
31 Unfriendly attitudes towards national minorities are stimulated by the bad social and 
economic conditions and not by the declarations of the politicians or division between 
national groups. 
-2* 
4 Once Lithuania reaches a higher standard of living, the problems of national 
minorities will solve themselves naturally. 
-2* 
8 Indifference towards the problems of Lithuania's Polish is going to activate their 
alienation, distancing from state affairs and this can lead to social instability. 
-3* 
18 Contrary to official propaganda, the relationship between Lithuania and Poland isn't 
very good. It is overshadowed by the situation of almost 300 thousands Lithuanian 
Poles, living compactly in the region of Vilnius. 
-3* 
7 Recently, a tendency of a monoethnic state has developed in Lithuania. National 
egoism dominates in the field of language usage and a clear policy of assimilation is 
followed. 
-3* 
27 The tziganes don't really want to sell drugs but, if the society doesn't accept them, they 
are going to sell the narcotics. 
-4* 
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Sympathetic Discontent 
 
This element of minority rights discourse recognizes existing obstacles to minority 
inclusion in Lithuania taking a slightly gloomy view of the current situation (33, 21) and 
expected future developments (26, 7). It stops short of blaming the difficult situation on the 
minorities alone (14, 6, 9) or taking an exaggerated view that would simply victimize these 
groups (24). Minorities are not without their share of responsibility (28, 32, 15, 27) but on 
this view, they have a steeper hill to climb and should be supported (12, 6, 14). 
Sympathetic discontent voices considerable dissatisfaction with the measures currently 
employed by Lithuanian authorities (22, 28, 12, 11). Complaining, however, is not enough 
and there is the need for a firm stance regarding the preferred policy solutions (19, 2). 
There are no easy solutions (1, 8, 18) and as much as some would like to blame economic 
factors for the exclusion of minorities, these are not relevant (4, 31). 
 
Table 4.6 Factor B – Sympathetic Discontent295 
 
No. Statement Rank 
26 There are few indications that the negative attitude of the society towards the Roma is 
going to change in a short time. 
3* 
33 The Lithuanian society is rather inhibited and phobic, unfriendly towards the people of 
other nationalities and cultures. 
3* 
22 Politicians make too many mistakes, they talk about tolerance but nothing is done 
about it. 
2* 
19 Regarding anti-Semitism - regrettably, these opinions exist: various statements to this 
effect have occurred in the press. We need to talk to their authors, educate them and 
punish, to set an example for others. 
2* 
2 We have to stop "dwelling on history" and reopening old sores. 1* 
28 The Roma aren't integrated enough. 1* 
32 People of other nationalities don't exercise their rights enough and stay in a periphery 1* 
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of the political processes in Lithuania. 
15 A citizen of Lithuania has to know the Lithuanian language, this is his obligation and 
an expression of his respect for the country, in which he's living. 
1* 
7 Recently, a tendency of a monoethnic state has developed in Lithuania. National 
egoism dominates in the field of language usage and a clear policy of assimilation is 
followed. 
1* 
1 Our divisions can be overcome by looking into the future, understanding citizens' 
position in our country, and participation in social and political life. 
0 
8 Indifference towards the problems of Lithuania's Polish is going to activate their 
alienation, distancing from state affairs and this can lead to social instability. 
0* 
18 Contrary to official propaganda, the relationship between Lithuania and Poland isn't 
very good. It is overshadowed by the situation of almost 300 thousands Lithuanian 
Poles, living compactly in the region of Vilnius. 
0 
12 There is a lot being done for national minorities to keep their national identity, culture, 
customs. But it is no less important that all the citizens of Lithuania, regardless of their 
nationality, are full-fledged members of the society, know the state language very well 
and successfully compete in the labor market. 
-1* 
24 Russian language in Lithuania is like the flag of the defeated enemy. Everyone is 
trying to trample it. 
-1* 
3 The problems, which may arise, have to be solved without the intervention from the 
historical motherland of a national minority and the solution has to match the interests 
of our country. 
-1* 
6 There are excellent conditions for Polish people to learn and to explore their own 
culture in Lithuania, it's just that not all of them are able to use these. 
-1* 
27 The tziganes don't really want to sell drugs but, if the society doesn't accept them, they 
are going to sell the narcotics. 
-2* 
14 Most of the Russian-speaking people admit that it's difficult to get a job because of the 
lack of language skills, but they also agree that it's their own problem. 
-2* 
9 The Polish of Lithuania, maybe even without intending this to happen, isolate 
themselves, sentence themselves to the offside of the social life. 
-2* 
11 Public policy in Lithuania is designed to help national minorities keep their identity, to 
integrate them into the economic and cultural life of the country and to create the 
atmosphere of tolerance and respect for other cultures. 
-3* 
21 Many Russians are content with their life in Lithuania not only because the economy 
has improved, but also because the Russo-phobia is declining. 
-3* 
4 Once Lithuania reaches a higher standard of living, the problems of national minorities 
will solve themselves naturally. 
-4* 
31 Unfriendly attitudes towards national minorities are stimulated by the bad social and 
economic conditions and not by the declarations of the politicians or divisions between 
national groups. 
-4* 
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Distanced Individualism 
 
The strong agreement with the statement that calls for a forward-looking attitude in dealing 
with minority rights questions, rather than “dwelling on history” characterizes this 
discursive position well (2). The individualist focus is reflected both in highlighting 
economic (31, 4), rather than cultural and historic aspects of inter-ethnic relations in 
Lithuania (2, 31, 3) and in emphasizing the role of minorities as Lithuanian citizens (15). 
This impatience with culture-based collectivistic claims extends also to the pro-active 
approach in addressing any remaining inequality (8, 22). Distanced individualism is 
relatively optimistic in envisioning the integration of minorities into the remainder of 
Lithuanian society (7, 26, 18) with only mild criticism directed at the existing policies (11). 
The primary skepticism concerns the likelihood of change in the life of the Roma minority 
(10, 27), and it also betrays a tendency to view ethnic groups as homogenous entities (9). 
 
 
Table 4.7  Factor C – Distanced Individualism296 
 
No. Statement Rank 
2 We have to stop "dwelling on history" and reopening old sores. 4* 
15 A citizen of Lithuania has to know the Lithuanian language, this is his obligation 
and an expression of his respect for the country, in which he's living. 
3* 
31 Unfriendly attitudes towards national minorities are stimulated by the bad social and 
economic conditions and not by the declarations of the politicians or divisions 
between national groups. 
2* 
8 Indifference towards the problems of Lithuania's Polish is going to activate their 
alienation, distancing from state affairs and this can lead to social instability. 
1* 
6 There are excellent conditions for Polish people to learn and to explore their own 
culture in Lithuania, it's just that not all of them are able to use these. 
1* 
22 Politicians make too many mistakes, they talk about tolerance but nothing is done 1* 
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about it. 
4 Once Lithuania reaches a higher standard of living, the problems of national 
minorities will solve themselves naturally. 
1* 
3 The problems, which may arise, have to be solved without the intervention from the 
historical motherland of a national minority and the solution has to match the 
interests of our country. 
0* 
7 Recently, a tendency of a monoethnic state has developed in Lithuania. National 
egoism dominates in the field of language usage and a clear policy of assimilation is 
followed. 
-1* 
26 There are few indications that the negative attitude of the society towards the Roma 
is going to change in a short time. 
-1* 
   
11 Public policy in Lithuania is designed to help national minorities keep their identity, 
to integrate them into the economic and cultural life of the country and to create the 
atmosphere of tolerance and respect for other cultures. 
-1* 
18 Contrary to official propaganda, the relationship between Lithuania and Poland isn't 
very good. It is overshadowed by the situation of almost 300 thousands Lithuanian 
Poles, living compactly in the region of Vilnius. 
-2 
10 Most of the Roma are talented, clever, respectful, they quickly learn languages. -2* 
27 The tziganes don't really want to sell drugs but, if the society doesn't accept them, 
they are going to sell the narcotics. 
-3* 
9 The Polish of Lithuania, maybe even without intending this to happen, isolate 
themselves, sentence themselves to the offside of the social life. 
-4* 
 
Lithuania’s inclusive approach in accommodating ethnic minority demands makes it 
unique in its Baltic neighborhood. The strategy from the early post-independence period, 
continued into the EU-application era and this continuity underpins the consensus about 
legitimate ways of treating ethnic diversity that has since developed in Lithuania. The coherence 
is illustrated accurately by the three most dominant factors extracted from existing discourse on 
the subject. Factor A received the self-conscious nationalism label at the risk of evoking negative 
associations with radical nationalist views. The perspective, however, hardly represents an 
aggressive discursive position – it is inward looking but at the same focused on tangible 
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solutions and in doing so it overlaps considerably with the other, decidedly liberal factors. 
Lithuanian identity is seen as just one of many elements of the diversity that is valued under this 
view. It is a perspective shared with sympathetic discontent and distanced nationalism, variations 
in the broader framing of minority rights aside. All three factors acknowledge minorities’ full 
rights as citizens of Lithuania, while looking for continuing compromise solutions that will be 
fuelled by concessions from both sides. In other words, while all factors value Lithuanian 
identity, they also do not privilege it over the cultural heritage of other ethnic groups. Rather than 
subsuming diversity under a forcefully unified “Lithuanian people,” the survey of the press, 
participant responses, as well as the interviews I conducted reveal a preference for framing the 
issue of diversity by references to citizenship. This perspective alone is capable of incorporating 
the deep-seated awareness of the differences between Lithuania’s ethnic groups. Learning about 
these differences and using the knowledge to tackle their respective challenges seemed a high 
priority to Lithuanians and minority members I interviewed.  
In light of the recognition of diversity in Lithuanian society, it would be inaccurate to 
describe the three factors as representing the perspective of the majority vis-à-vis other ethnic 
groups. In following the diversity criterion for selecting the sample of participants, members of 
minority groups were included in the study (out of the 42 participants, 6 were Russian, 4 Polish, 
1 Belarusian, and 1 Ukrainian). A closer examination of the sympathetic discontent factor (B) 
suggests that this discursive position could easily be interpreted as consistent with a minority-
centered view of the challenges ahead. Again, Q-methodology is not designed to provide insights 
about the representativeness of the uncovered factors with regard to specific subject groups but 
the qualitative analysis that it does allow provides some important clues about the nature of the 
minority rights discourse in Lithuanian society. Sympathetic discontent provides both a 
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comprehensive interpretation of the minority rights questions and shows a strong preference for 
targeted corrective measures, which can benefit the majority as much as the minorities. 
The numerous conversations I held with members of the Russian-speaking minority are 
particularly telling when it comes to the overlap between the sympathetic discontent factor and 
the views held by this minority. More dispersed than other ethnic groups, Russian speakers face 
the challenges of attempting integration into Lithuanian society while preserving their identity 
and cultural heritage. Three students I interviewed all went to Russian minority schools the 
quality of which they were satisfied with, they all secured a spot at Vilnius University, and all 
three have ambitious plans for their future.
297
 The shared ethnic background and early life 
experience, however, did not seem to condition perfect overlap in views on the situation of the 
Russian minority in Lithuania.
298
  
Viola hopes to continue her studies in Russia and feels that the majority attitudes towards 
ethnic Russians, while not confrontational, are lukewarm at best. She worries that whenever 
members of this minority wish to express their culture, they risk being called Russian 
nationalists. Her friend Karina feels that whatever tensions remain between the two groups can 
be traced to older generations of both Russians and Lithuanians and she sees the danger of these 
attitudes being passed on to the youth. Immediately, however, she adds that the challenges faced 
by young people of Russian and Lithuanian descent are practically identical, as they balance 
career and life goals that can lead them to Western Europe with the desire to maintain traditional 
ties to home, regardless of their native language. Finally, Julia believes that Russians may 
sometimes think that the Lithuanians do not like them but this is no longer the case. She points 
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out that the Lithuanian majority is not afraid of Russians and has embraced their integration into 
economic and political life – instead, any lingering fear is directed at Russia as a country and it 
has been exacerbated by the powerful neighbor’s military forays into other former Soviet 
republics (Georgia). As far as the Russian minority is concerned, Julia thinks they could show 
more interest in advancing their own culture. Taken together, the positions presented by the three 
young Russian-speaking girls reflect an awareness of the past, concern with the present and 
relative optimism about the future that also characterizes sympathetic discontent. In addition, it 
betrays the diversity of opinions within the minority group that has the potential of pre-empting 
extreme positions and leaving the door open to compromise solutions, without “dwelling on 
history.”  
Finally, Factor C, distant individualism, also displays a balance of overlap with other 
factors and a unique focus that reflects an essential component of Lithuanian discourse about 
minorities. As the label suggests, it reflects lower intensity of involvement in the minority rights 
debate. Rather than ignorant of the challenges, this factor is better described as impatient with 
the slow progress, as the two most strongly affirmative statements suggest. The individualist 
element of this opinion pattern is telling in that it parallels western-devised priority ordering of 
issues (inclusion of individual citizens will result in the inclusion of minorities as groups). The 
sentiment is confirmed by the significance attributed to economic factors
299
 in conditioning both 
majority and minority preparedness to move past group-based squabbles into a world where the 
public and private spheres remain separate. Ultimately, this aspect of distanced individualism 
offers the potential both for comparing the Lithuanian discourse with the Slovak one and for 
linking its evolution to the EU integration process that the countries have been subjected to. 
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Conclusion 
  
 The primary objective of the comparison between Slovakia and Lithuania has been to 
look to country-specific patterns in minority rights discourse. The detailed analysis of the parallel 
country stories can shed light on the role that societal attitudes play in aligning domestic 
priorities with the minority rights standards stipulated by international treaty documents (the 
Framework Convention and the Accession Treaty with the EU). Thus, even though the details of 
the discourse in Slovakia are not directly comparable to those uncovered in Lithuania (as a 
function of the study’s design), they share a reference point in the minority rights norm that the 
two societies encountered as candidates for EU membership. Beyond the immediately apparent 
difference in the extent to which Slovak minority rights discourse is conflicted and the 
Lithuanian one is consensual, we can examine the detected factors for an overlap with the 
individualistic norm endorsed by EU’s institutions. The extent of this overlap, I have argued, 
determines the likelihood that the incoming European norm will meet with success. 
In the case of Slovakia, the only factor that contains unambiguous references to the 
principles of west-European liberalism is informed pragmatism. It allows ample room for 
addressing the concerns of individual minority members and appears prepared to abandon the 
conceptualization of inter-ethnic tensions as a problem involving collectivities. The two 
remaining discursive positions, however, more than counter the tolerant and inclusive tendency 
revealed by the first factor. Especially the opinion cluster characterized by intolerant nationalism 
raises concerns about deeply rooted societal resistance to the inclusiveness advocated by the 
Council of Europe and its allies. It is true, that the discursive map that the q-methodology studies 
generate offers us only a glimpse of which discursive positions are possible (as opposed to 
probable). In an idealized deliberative society one of them would have as good a chance of 
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prevailing as the other.
300
 Yet, power is an important element of such exchanges. When the 
Slovak prime minister, parliament speaker and the president support the decision to bar the 
Hungarian president from entering a south Slovak town on a private visit (during which he was 
to unveil the statue of a medieval Hungarian king and a saint) the endorsement of extreme 
positions is likely to dominate the discussion.
301
 Few things could have been more dramatic and 
resonate more with substantial portions of the Slovak electorate than turning back the Hungarian 
head of state half way down the bridge over Danube. “Discourses help condition what is possible 
and likely in terms of political development, while political development can change the terms of 
discourses.”302 The political realities surrounding the mix of positions uncovered in Slovakia, 
however, leave little room for optimism. If informed pragmatism was allowed to dominate prior 
to EU accession, it has been followed by what some have referred to as a populist backlash,
303
 
which added fuel into the nationalist fire.   
 In Lithuania, the most strongly individualistic discursive position that corresponds with 
the Strasbourg inspired approach to addressing minority tensions is the one labeled distanced 
individualism. Rather than opposed by the other factors, it is consistent with the opinions 
extracted to formulate sympathetic discontent, and even self-conscious nationalism. To the extent 
that the integration of minorities in Lithuania represents a challenge, the group-based 
conceptualization provides a platform for negotiating a solution acceptable to all (as in the case 
of the “zero-option” approach to citizenship law in 1990). The Lithuanian story thus offers an 
example of how the collectivity-based understanding of minority rights can not only be made 
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consistent with the calls for real equality among citizens, but also to make that equality 
sustainable. By realizing minority members’ rights as individual citizens, Lithuania was able to 
guarantee also their right to a distinct cultural identity or education in the minority language 
(both of which contain a significant element as collective rights). Neither Lithuanians, nor the 
minorities residing in this country saw EU accession and adoption of the norms that define the 
membership, including those concerning minority rights, as contradicting their goals.
304
 The 
change chronicled there thus embodies an articulation of the norms already present in Lithuania 
and while much work still remains, the shared ground allowed for a successful start. 
 The role of EU influence has been more controversial in Slovakia. At first a poster child 
for the membership conditionality mechanism, the country has by now become emblematic of 
the miscommunication between Brussels and candidate countries. In this context, the 
particularities of the accession process become relevant. Reading the Annual Report on equality 
and discrimination issued by the European Commission,
305
 and comparing it with the actual 
ethnic minority challenges in Slovakia, we find a misalignment of anti-discrimination policies 
promoted by the EU and the claims made by ethnic collectivities in the candidate countries. The 
key difference is one in emphasis: it is on individual rights in the case of the former and on 
collective rights in the claims of the latter.  As Douglas Sanders makes clear in his comparison of 
the various right types, “groups suffering discrimination have a tendency to assert a collective 
character, simply as part of the struggle.”306 Not allowed to speak in “group” terms prior to 
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accession, both sides of the minority-majority divide came to revisit these arguments in a way 
that has been inherently exclusive and thus bears dangers for the quality of Slovak democracy in 
the long-run. 
The European Commissioner responsible for enlargement, Günter Verheugen declared in 
the year 2000:  
Enlargement resolves sometimes centuries-old conflicts, it clears up border 
disputes and defuses minority issues. It is obvious that such achievements demand 
a positive response and that those who have worked for them must not be let 
down.
307
  
 
The latter half of his statement is certainly true – progress on matters as complex as guaranteeing 
minority rights should be encouraged and appreciated. The problem lies in the Commissioner’s 
insinuation that “centuries-old conflicts” can be done away with by one stroke of a pen signing 
the Accession Treaty. Assumptions like this underpinned the undiscriminating introduction of a 
version of minority rights protection that was not always consistent with pre-existing conceptions 
of minority rights in Eastern Europe. Having said that, the Lithuanian example illustrates that 
despite long-standing tensions and the potential for them to flare up again, it is possible to 
introduce the new norm, while respecting minority-specific demands and assuaging everyone’s 
insecurities.  
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CHAPTER 5: STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL NORM EVOLUTION: 
ROMA RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE EU 
 
Roma rights benefit when high-profile Romani activists and organizations take on 
human rights issues, jointly with their anti-discrimination and anti-racism efforts. 
Roma rights [are] harmed when we – the now broad and growing coalition of 
groups working to end racism against Roma in Europe – avoid these issues.308 
 
The above statement may seem obvious – how can one fight discrimination and racism, 
without direct references to human rights. In the context of ethnic relations in Eastern Europe, 
however, the two avenues of advocacy are often viewed separately, with human rights affecting 
individuals and anti-discrimination/anti-racism aimed at groups. The study focusing on Lithuania 
and Slovakia revealed a similar division of labor in minority rights advocacy. It detected a 
difference (though uneven across countries and minority groups) between the collective rights 
demands by minorities in the new member states and the individual-rights emphasis by EU’s 
institutions. Yet, there are still some unanswered questions concerning the work of minority 
advocates in Europe and the degree to which they are aware of the gap between the various 
conceptualizations of ethnic minority rights. Do they seek to shape it to their advantage? Does 
the gap interfere with efforts to extend their reach to the European level? How do they reconcile 
the group-based claims, a need to combat stereotypes and other challenges facing the Roma as a 
community with the mainly legal avenues available in remedying the status of this minority? 
And finally, is it possible to map their strategies in the typological framework proposed here? 
The present chapter looks at how these actors have seized the opportunities to 
(re)interpret and (re)negotiate the position of ethnic minorities. Selectively using EU institutions 
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as their ally, as a guide in formulating their claims, but also as a target of their advocacy 
initiatives, non-governmental organizations representing minorities have carved out a niche 
translating the minority rights talk directed eastward from Brussels, and back.
309
 I will argue that 
certain frames have proven more effective than others. The universal/constitutive norms 
exemplified by human rights represent the “ideal” norm with the highest likelihood of promotion 
success. I now extend this reasoning  to suggest that if a norm misses the necessary attributes, it 
pays for the actors involved in its proliferation to make sure it acquires them and to seek a 
corresponding re-framing of the issue.  
Embedding this argument in the typology of international norms that differentiates 
between them based on their palatability to governments and societies, I will argue that the 
attributes of each norm type influence the set of tools available to NGOs. These organizations 
look for most viable avenues for norm promotion and we can expect them to compete for support 
of governments on the one hand and societies on the other. As they do this, they must consider 
the constraints specific to each norm and to the institutional context in the EU. To empirically 
test these propositions, I will turn to the case of Europe-wide efforts to integrate the Roma 
minority. The goal is to provide explanations for the increasingly appealing and widespread 
redefinition of minority rights in human rights terms.  
This chapter represents a contribution to both the international norm literature and intra-
EU politics research as it explores the role of the institutional environment mediated by the 
nature of the norm.  Existing accounts that examine similar interactions tend to privilege the 
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influence of the institutional structures over that of the norm content in their causal stories.
310
 In 
fact, other than differentiating between issue areas, little is said about the nature of the normative 
change involved in Brussels-mandated policy shifts. My argument, by contrast, places the norms 
at the center of the causal story suggesting that the bounded malleability of norm content 
provides the necessary wiggle room for successful convergence of approaches to minority rights 
across EU member states. 
The empirical section will be organized around a three-way comparison of approaches to 
the minority rights question by EU institutions, the NGO/non-profit sector, and the national 
governments (at all levels, with a focus on Slovakia). I will outline the differences between them 
and lay out the options available to the Roma advocacy groups as the key actors engaged in 
facilitating communication with the other stake holders. The goal is to document the effect that 
NGO involvement at the EU level has had on these organizations’ willingness to adjust the focus 
in Roma rights advocacy. I will argue that the key determinant of the shift from collective rights 
to individual rights claims was the desire for improved communication and ground-level 
changes. Ultimately, this flexibility affects the potential for success of the NGO efforts and 
shapes the game of survival that minority rights advocates play every day. 
 
Bringing Norms and Those Who Promote Them Back In 
 
The inadequacy of the rather superficial measures taken in former EU candidate countries 
to comply with accession requirements in the area of minority rights has taught two key sets of 
actors some important lessons. First, with an eye on future enlargement(s), the European 
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Commission is now careful not to leave anything to chance in its negotiations with candidate 
countries in the Balkans. Meanwhile, non-governmental organizations active in the fight for 
minority integration into Eastern European societies have sought to address the disconnect 
between the needs of minorities, the (in)tolerance of majorities, and the hollowness of demands 
from Brussels. Eastern European minorities have certainly benefited from the attention that the 
accession process drew to their often precarious situation. EU’s legal system, however, is 
oblivious to one important element on their agenda: collective minority rights. EU officials are 
struggling to understand the group-identity based claims as much as the perceived threat that 
majority populations often associate with minority demands voiced as those of an entire 
collectivity. In short, when it comes to achieving tangible advances on ethnic minority rights 
questions, it is the NGO advocates who grapple with 1./ the inadequacy of passively waiting for 
the minority rights norm to “diffuse” and 2./ the counter-productivity of holding on to localized 
versions of the norm that often shelter deep-seated prejudices.  
One instance of an ongoing misunderstanding concerns minority language use. To 
minorities this is a group right that goes beyond permitting individuals to speak whatever 
language they choose, especially as it concerns the requisite instruction of minority languages in 
schools and their use in public spaces or official communications. Yet, policy and legal 
instruments available at the EU level only permit treating this issue as one of endangered 
language preservation, or one concerning individual citizens, i.e. parties in potential court cases. 
Not only does this limited perspective leave member states a free (or unsupervised) hand in 
devising minority policy, it also constrains appeal options for those harmed in the process. In 
other words, the EU treatment of the minority question is ill-suited for handling the injustice 
experienced by minorities. Nor does it address the sense of danger perceived by majorities. 
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Ironically, both sides fear that their very existence as a group is being threatened. The problem 
lies in the fact that the EU has called for respect for minority rights without stipulating what this 
actually means. Thus, in the case of Hungarians in Slovakia, the permission to drop the Slovak-
derived suffix “-ova” at the end of female names has been passed up by Hungarian women. 
Instead of taking advantage of greater flexibility accommodating cultural specifics, the women 
were worried about being singled out and potentially discriminated.
311
 Paradoxically, if judged 
by the EU standards, the appropriate law has been in place. Yet, the underlying sentiment and 
minority-majority tensions remain unaddressed. 
New member governments have eagerly adopted the shallow EU discourse on minority 
rights as a seamless way to both comply with external demands and to avoid delving too much 
into this politically sensitive subject. Such inclinations by those officially responsible for fair 
treatment of minorities resulted in shifting the burden of achieving tangible improvement in 
minorities’ status onto NGOs advocating their rights. Thus, initially seeking to mostly influence 
and perhaps facilitate state efforts to better integrate Eastern Europe’s minorities, these 
organizations suddenly found themselves at the center of the policy formulation process, often 
even working to reverse counterproductive government initiatives. They were also faced with the 
challenge of communicating simultaneously with EU institutions, their respective governments, 
as well as their “client” minority groups. It is this closeness to specific minority communities that 
made the revisions in NGO approach to minority rights challenging and ultimately surprising.  
In this complicated institutional environment, what would have been the motivation for 
reframing the norm in Eastern Europe? First, we have to acknowledge that in the course of EU 
accession, the candidate countries did not have any opportunity to cut corners on minority rights. 
What they were able to do was to take advantage of the vague phrasing in the accession criteria 
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from Copenhagen (1993), which conflated minority rights with human rights. The pressure of 
conditionality, however, ceased upon candidates’ entry into the Union, as did much of the 
leverage that Brussels had over governments in Eastern Europe on this issue. Following 
accession, two existing agendas – the EU individual-rights focused version that governments 
sided with, and the NGO-promoted version that followed directly from the group rights claims 
by the minorities – stood head to head with no authority to adjudicate which should prevail.  
The strategic interests of NGOs active at the EU level led them to revise their approach in 
the interest of accomplishing real change on the ground, while not foreclosing the options of EU 
funding and cooperation. Although these organizations’ goals and means of achieving them 
seemed closely tied to the demands of the communities they represented, they proved the most 
flexible in the end. This revision of strategy occurred independently of any shifts in the attitudes 
by the affected groups – minority or not. The task of addressing deep-seated ethnic tensions, 
after all, still lies ahead of the actors involved in this struggle. Instead, the impetus for the 
increased flexibility in approaching the problem of integrating ethnic minorities, including the 
Roma, came from the interaction with EU’s institutions. Oblivious as EU officials have been to 
the complexities of inter-ethnic relations in Eastern Europe, their communication with grass-
roots stakeholders affectedthe latter’s preparedness to negotiate the content of minority rights.  
Yet, we cannot write off the resulting reformulation of Roma rights as a simple case of 
institutional isomorphism. That would imply that a dominant actor’s agenda permeated all 
discussion on the subject. Although the hegemony of EU ways was detectable in Eastern Europe, 
such explanations may apply to the behavior of new member state governments but not the non-
governmental sector. The reason behind this difference can again be found in the close NGO ties 
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to individual minorities, which diminished the potential for “decoupling”312 (formal change 
without ground-level commitment) that was relatively easy for foreign ministry officials to do. 
Being embedded in a community made the NGOs more attuned to its particular challenges but 
also accountable for delivering promised improvement. Similarly, institutional accounts pointing 
to specific opportunity structures at the EU level are incomplete, as they focus merely on varying 
methods of advocacy, rather than changes in the content of the norm itself.
313
 Finally, the 
international relations scholarship that has chronicled the reframing of previously faltering norms 
in human rights terms can only provide partial explanations of what happened with minority 
rights in the EU of 27.
314
 As the empirical study of Roma rights will show, the existing norm was 
redefined altogether, rather than merely having the human rights frame superimposed on it. The 
theoretical approach presented here takes into consideration the interaction between minority 
representatives and their social and institutional environment, providing the dynamic element 
necessary to document and explain the real shift in minority rights advocacy. 
According to minority NGOs’ initial mission, the goal was to improve the status of the 
marginalized groups without increasing intra-societal tensions. One way of achieving this would 
be to increase the norm’s appeal to those resisting it domestically. Even if this change should 
occur for instrumental reasons at first, such as EU funding or approval, the relevant behavior 
patterns and official agendas can be internalized over time.
315
 Regardless of any disagreement 
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about the most desirable means of achieving this goal, detectable improvement is something all 
actors could agree on as a desirable goal. And, unlike some member state governments, the EU 
and the NGOs were actually committed to enacting tangible change, rather than engaging in 
window dressing (or, again, decoupling) activities for short-term political gain, domestic or 
international. 
The second justification for bringing the EU-level and grass-roots informed 
conceptualizations of minority rights closer together is as simple as giving the relevant 
stakeholders a common language. Again, matters were more complicated than the European 
Commission imposing its approach on politically weaker actors. Instead, the policy context and 
underlying power structures within the Union arguably enhanced the convergence of approaches. 
The European Commission and the European Parliament, which were the institutions most 
engaged on the minority rights front before and after the Eastern enlargement, simply do not 
wield tools strong enough to address member-state minority problems on a case-by-case basis. 
Instead, the EC and EP levers concentrate in the area of broader discrimination protection. 
Without implying that the goal was for NGOs and EU’s institutions to team up against member 
state governments, we can say that a degree of interest alignment was at work. 
Using this lens of policy-specific interaction between actors at various levels of decision 
making, we can see the convergence of minority rights approaches as a case of norm 
streamlining, rather than norm diffusion. Local norms were adapted to correspond better to the 
EU discourse, rather than being replaced by it altogether. The NGOs chose to abandon the 
constraining national-level frames that interfered with knowledge sharing, cooperation, and 
lesson transfer throughout the Union. Yet, they never lost sight of the ground-level challenges 
impeding advances on minority inclusion. Elements of the human rights framing were adopted 
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and made comprehensible to members of individual minorities (and majorities). At the same 
time, both groups’ unique apprehensions were recognized as valid but resolvable. The following 
section will provide the evidence for this argument and substitute tangible examples for the 
rather abstract language used to characterize the minority rights norm transformation thus far. 
 
Roma Rights as Human Rights 
 
To deal with the potentially expansive empirical work needed to analyze the process of 
the minority rights norm evolution, I will focus on the Roma minority as a case that has posed a 
shared challenge for the largest number of EU members (old, new, and prospective).
316
 The 
vulnerability of Europe’s Roma has necessitated action by NGOs and governments alike, while 
eliciting responses from the European Commission, the EP, and the Fundamental Rights Agency 
in Vienna.
317
 At the same time, there is sufficient variation in the country- and EU-level 
treatment of this minority to render the apparent convergence of the different minority rights 
discourses surprising. I will examine the role played by Roma rights advocates in this process. I 
believe they ought to be treated as motivated independent actors with unique interests, which, 
through interactions with EU priorities, have the potential to make these NGOs less grass-roots 
but no less effective than their declared mission. 
The Roma are the largest ethnic minority both in the EU and in several of its member 
states.
318
 Still, they wield the least political weight, economic power, and social influence.
319
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This situation is often explained by turning to the historic trajectories mired with exclusion and 
discrimination, culminating in the Holocaust and extending into the communist period. The post-
communist era has been marked with further disruption of the group’s traditional community 
values and cultural heritage.
320
 This impacted Roma ability to assert their identity and interests. 
Eastern Europe’s Roma often live in destitute conditions, without access to jobs, education, and 
even basic infrastructure or health services. Notwithstanding the sometimes exaggerated 
differentiation among members of the minority, where better integrated sub-groups and 
individuals are pointed to as (rare) success stories, the situation of the minority is alarming.
321
 
This is especially apparent in comparisons with the living conditions and opportunities available 
to the majority, as well as other minorities. The Roma have faced an uphill struggle not only in 
carving out space for their identity vis-à-vis these groups but also in the competition for jobs and 
resources. Despite these challenges, the responsible authorities in Eastern Europe have 
downplayed the seriousness of the issue or outright relied on international actors to provide 
resources and ready-made solutions.
322
 Winning governments over to the side of active 
involvement therefore became a core goal of NGOs and international organizations. At the time 
of Eastern EU enlargement, the situation of Roma became the litmus test for EU candidates’ 
commitment to respecting democratic principles more generally.  
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Slovakia was the EU applicant with the most catching-up to do in this regard. It will be 
the country case anchoring the discussion of national-level policies below. The complexity, 
contentiousness and high salience of the issue in this country make it a particularly difficult test 
case for the argument that Roma rights NGOs were prepared to move beyond localized 
conceptualizations of the norm.  
 
European Institutions and the Roma 
 
 Within the EU, the minority rights agenda is dominated by the wide gap between 
ambitious policy goals or rhetoric and the potential for effective enforcement (legal or monetary) 
of this evolving norm. In general, the EU keeps an eye on member state Roma policy but has 
limited levers to influence it directly. As a result, the various monitoring reports issued in 
Brussels describe a rather symbiotic relationship. The carefulness with which the European 
Commission treads around national-level agendas on this politically sensitive issue is all too 
familiar. As observers of the suspiciously non-contentious relationship have noted, positive 
obligations that could ensure “substantive equality” for the excluded Roma minority are 
missing.
323
 The exchanges between Brussels and national capitals tend to be dominated by 
encouragement of even the most modest positive moves, not open scolding or unequivocal 
demands for change. While such a casual approach may be acceptable in some policy areas, it is 
hardly affordable when treatment of vulnerable groups is at stake. According to a Minority 
Rights Group briefing, Roma communities remain at the mercy of the unfavorable political 
                                                 
323
 Galina Kostadinova, "Substantive Equality, Positive Action and Roma Rights in the European Union," in 
Briefings (London: Minority Rights Group International, 2006). 
   
 
 171  
climate within the member states, which is unacceptable when it comes to the realization of 
human rights.
324
 
 It is a fact that the European Commission has little legal groundwork to lean against. The 
most often cited instrument is the “Racial Equality” Directive 2000/43EC but in its focus on race 
it falls short of addressing the unique situation of the Roma. Discrimination of this group extends 
beyond the reach of the directive and goes deeper than job access or service provision for 
individual citizens. At the proposal and report-writing level, this fact seems well recognized. The 
problem lies in a disconnect between the rhetoric applied by East European governments, which 
(for better of worse) focuses on responding to Roma needs as a group
325
 and the EU legal 
framework that can only accept claims of discrimination brought forward by single individuals. 
Along these lines, and exemplifying the persistent miscommunication on the subject, the pre-
accession “democratic” criterion was too broad and vague, especially as the integration of 
minorities, including the Roma, was concerned. This vagueness was not without impact on the 
outcome of membership conditionality and the accession process more generally: minority rights 
policy has been stalled with half-results. On a more practical level, EU accession did not result in 
improved living conditions and social inclusion of the Roma minority.
326
 Overall, minority rights 
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activists have found the EU Reports superficial in the choice of issues covered, and in their 
relevance for minorities.
327
  
 We can describe the inefficacy of EU monitoring as a problem of definition regarding the 
nature of Roma exclusion and the level at which it can be addressed most effectively. According 
to a recent Commission Staff Working Document,  
 
we are committed to closing the unacceptable gaps in welfare and living conditions that 
exist between Roma and the rest of society as well as putting an end to the cycle of 
poverty and exclusion that many Roma find themselves in. We are concerned about 
extreme human rights abuses in education, housing, employment and health care 
systems, about increasing anti-Gypsyism and the multiple discrimination that Romani 
women face across Europe. We believe that the European Union and its Member States 
have a shared responsibility to promote Roma inclusion and uphold the fundamental 
rights of Roma as European citizens.
328
 
 
Despite these goals, the Commission pressure has not had the desired effect on member states, 
who are content to passively respond by demanding external assistance. Meanwhile, the EC 
claims that there is “obviously an implementation gap at the national, regional and local level” 
underscored by “a lack of political will, a lack of strong partnerships and coordination 
mechanisms.”329 The same document highlights the increased openness to mainstreaming the 
specific issues of Roma into policies and programs.
330
 In other words, the Commission has been 
settling for the promise that the very limited change holds for the future. In such a low-pressure 
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environment, it is not surprising that member state governments were so slow to move beyond 
rhetoric and confront the exclusion of Roma head on. Ironically, the EU insistence on tangible 
change had more teeth prior to Eastern Europeans’ entry into the Union. As one Roma rights 
advocate put it: “I wish conditionality never ended.”331 The following section will trace the 
development of government policy towards the Roma, the influence of membership 
conditionality on the degree of official commitment to change, as well as the missed 
opportunities, which, ironically, constitute the bulk of the accession legacy. 
 
National-Level Policy on Roma 
 
 Although country-level differences in the relative size and specific vulnerabilities of the 
Roma minority have influenced the solutions encouraged by the EU and occasionally adopted by 
governments, there are some unifying patterns that allow us to discuss government policy in 
Eastern Europe under one heading. Measures to combat Roma exclusion have been developed 
along two lines – socio-economic and identity-based political. They each correspond to different 
sets of demands. The former is inspired by a broader desire to combat unemployment, poverty 
and regional underdevelopment – this particular line is especially encouraged by EU institutions. 
The second avenue for approaching Roma exclusion targets the “ghettoization” of their 
communities, reinforced by ethnic tensions with the majority population. This set of challenges 
is most often highlighted by Roma rights NGOs, as necessitating an additional layer of 
protection.  
Governments tend to pick and choose between various aspects of the Roma inclusion 
agenda, sometimes seeking to please external actors, sometimes those at home. This dual 
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influence often generates conflicts in terms of policy prioritization, as well as the time frame for 
assessment of progress. As a result, government policies often lack coherence and even 
coordination among ministries of the same executive can pose a problem.
332
 According to a 
report by the European Roma Information Office, national action plans targeting socially 
disadvantaged groups lack “clear and measurable objectives concerning the Roma, limiting 
themselves to just a handful of statements and purposes which do not have any follow-up in 
practice.”333 
 Much like the proverbial cooks that can spoil the broth, the multitude of arenas in which 
the Roma question is being tackled has led to considerable confusion regarding the competences, 
accountability, and financial resources for Roma inclusion programs. Some countries (Bulgaria 
and Slovakia) have as many as three agencies dealing with this policy issue – one directed at EU 
audiences, one to facilitate multilateral efforts (such as the Decade of Roma Inclusion), and one 
intended as a body visible / available to domestic groups, including the Roma themselves. Such a 
lack of coordination and coherence in the practice of Roma policy formation merely reflects the 
absence of a well-defined agenda. This, in turn, is the outcome of the political sensitivity of the 
issue, paradoxically underscoring the pressing need to address it effectively. As one watch-dog 
organization described it, the inconvenient trade-off lies between government commitment and 
fear of responsibility.
334
  
Hopes were high when a multi-country initiative supported by the Open Society Institute 
and the World Bank brought together governments from across Eastern Europe to coordinate 
attempts at integrating the Roma into their respective societies. In several EU member 
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countries,
335
 the Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015 (the Decade) was to provide guidelines 
and useful benchmarks for government-sponsored programs. The goal was to track the 
improvement facilitated by the Decade initiative. Ironically, however, the measures have proven 
most useful in detecting reversal of initial progress and revisions of optimistic forecasts for the 
future.
336
 Overall, the policy measures undertaken constituted positive steps, but they were not 
enough to tackle the core causes of long-term exclusion and segregation faced by Roma.
337
  
Slovakia has faced the greatest challenge in making the Decade a successful initiative. 
Causes and symptoms of these difficulties lie in the pre-accession failure to integrate national 
minorities, including but not limited to the Roma. In addition, the post-accession political 
developments reshuffled the prioritization of the minority rights question and explain the 
backtracking on Decade priorities. In its regular report from 2000 the European Commission 
noted that “in spite of some progress recorded, there appears to exist, in general, a gap between 
the good intentions and their actual implementation. As a result, practical improvement in the 
daily life of the minorities is very minor if not unnoticeable.”338  
For a brief time, diligent work to meet the requirements of EU membership introduced 
the Roma situation into mainstream political discourse and legislative steps were taken to 
remedy the deficiencies. This enthusiasm, however, died down after accession and reached new 
depths following the change of government in 2006, when Slovak nationalist parties entered the 
coalition. As early as 2004, Slovak political leadership, in commenting on anti-reform protests, 
revealed a persistent reluctance to accept responsibility for the minority situation and to 
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internalize the need for lasting solutions.
339
 The empty regurgitation of the message from 
Brussels was followed by a haphazard approach to Roma inclusion. The indecisiveness and 
reactive nature of Roma minority policies continued, reflecting the conflicting commitments by 
the government: to EU institutions, to nationalistically inclined voters, and to the relentless but 
often under-resourced NGOs. The office of the plenipotentiary for the Roma minority became 
the canary in the mine, suffering most from the repeated revisions in the government’s minority 
agenda.
340
 Following the electoral turnover of 2006, the Slovak executive abandoned the multi-
tiered projects launched by this office and reverted to addressing a narrowly defined socio-
economic exclusion of the Roma minority.
341
 
The inadequacy of past policies in tackling Roma exclusion is felt most directly by those 
working to implement and make sense of government policy at the local level. This has been the 
task of the regional offices of the Roma plenipotentiary. In my interviews at these institutions, 
the tension between government commitment to EU rhetoric and the wide range of Roma needs 
that do not respond well to a piecemeal approach became apparent yet again. The EU framing 
dominates the discussion. The need for equal treatment of individual citizens and a focus on 
poverty, education, social inclusion and human rights were mentioned as the main areas of focus 
since Slovakia joined the EU.
342
 When the minority is singled out occasionally, it is not because 
of its unique vulnerabilities but because inappropriate generalizations about the group are made. 
At the same time, regional offices of the Roma plenipotentiary struggle with the excessive 
leeway granted to their supposed partners in local government offices, swayed too much by 
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public opinion. Along the same lines, the existence of inclusive legislation passed in response to 
EU pressure does not guarantee its effective use in everyday situations.
343
 The minority rights 
norm, as applied to the Roma situation appears deeply imbued with pre-existing stereotypes that 
blind adoption of EU templates is unlikely to resolve. This is where the role of the non-
governmental sector has gained significance and the following section will lay out the strategies 
that (variously successful) NGOs have pursued to make Roma inclusion more effective. 
 
NGOs on Roma 
 
As the previous two sections made clear, opinions and competing agendas on Roma 
policy in Europe abound. The efforts of NGOs engaged in Roma rights advocacy are 
characterized by yet another layer of activity that generates additional content for the norm. In 
addition to staying current with the EU policy formulation process, they target the European 
Court for Human Rights (ECtHR), adjudicating based on legal instruments devised by the 
Council of Europe.
344
 Interestingly, this well-developed human rights regime has inspired not 
only NGO action but also served as a resource for the European Union to borrow know-how in 
the course of the Eastern enlargement. The European Commission’s contact with the Roma and 
other minorities has been mediated by national governments. By contrast, the NGOs engage the 
minority more directly, unceasing in their effort to communicate the real-life challenges that 
have been omitted from past policy measures. Arguably, the greater the gap between these 
conceptualizations of the minority rights norm concerning the Roma, the greater the potential 
(though not likelihood) for a redefinition of the issue and fusion of approaches into a more 
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comprehensive one. Closing this gap has been a key item on the NGO agenda over the past 
decade. 
Despite the variation in emphasis between the EU and the Roma advocacy network, their 
participation in the Council of Europe human rights regime provides some shared perspective 
that can guide the efforts to reframe minority rights in Eastern Europe. At the minimum, court-
oriented NGO efforts and EU emphasis on protecting rights of the citizens overlap in their 
definition of minority claims through the individual-rights lens. But the first step towards 
fostering a shared agenda is to identify the main points of misalignment. In its monitoring of EU 
anti-discrimination measures, the NGO sector has certainly done a large share of this work. One 
organization has argued that  
 
while boosted by EU law, the anti-discrimination approach is narrow in scope… 
Bearing in mind the total marginalization of Roma from social and economic life, only 
a very limited group of relatively well-integrated Roma individuals will in practice be 
able to vindicate their rights before state’s administrative bodies and courts of law…345 
 
...so far, the EU has approached the question of social inclusion of marginalized 
communities, including the Roma, through a purely policy perspective, rather than as a 
matter of the fulfillment of human rights obligations. In that sense, we are witnessing a 
reformulation of the Roma question from a human rights issue into a policy goal 
issue.
346
 
 
This has been particularly problematic at the level of program implementation, when Roma 
NGOs find it extremely difficult to justify their efforts vis-à-vis the (local) governments, 
majority populations, and often even the Roma minority itself. Despite the near-human rights 
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emergency situation, “the EU lacks an effective human rights enforcement body, and the vacuum 
so created leaves many individuals dangerously exposed to abuse.”347 Presenting social inclusion 
as an economic and social right, rather than an essential human right,
348
 leaves too much room 
for resistance and shifts the “burden of proof” onto the proponents of the minority rights norm, 
not those violating it. By contrast, casting Roma rights as a human rights issue can give it higher 
political priority, especially in a union of liberal democracies such as the EU.
349
 
 The combined approach to human rights and non-discrimination goes hand in hand with 
the advocacy toolkit selected by organizations targeting the EU as both an arena for Roma 
inclusion and as a source of legitimacy in battling domestic racism. The European Roma Rights 
Center (ERRC) has been the leading organization in pursuing strategic litigation to increase the 
salience of discrimination cases, as well as to set precedent that can influence minority policy in 
the future. Their effort has led to progress in providing unified anti-discrimination for Europe, 
bringing the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in line with the principles of 
EU antidiscrimination law. One core challenge that the ERRC has faced concerns their work 
with the Roma as a group, while concentrating its activities on court cases, which inevitably treat 
Roma as individuals. The organization concedes a degree of contradiction in its mission but 
emphasizes the practical effect of both discrimination and the fight against it.
350
 If the Roma 
rights are violated because they belong to a group, these same rights can, and, in fact, should be 
defended with reference to the same group membership.
351
 This attempt to reconcile the 
individual/collective divide to ensure comprehensibility of advocacy measures in both the 
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affected communities and the EU is not unique to ERRC. The Open Society Institute has also 
employed strategic litigation arguing that although the Roma exclusion affects individuals the 
“biggest case are the Roma as a group.”352  
In general, Roma rights NGOs are open to such privileging of the human rights frame
353
 
but the practicalities of minority-majority relations interfere. For instance, the least controversial 
part of the human rights regime concerning children’s rights is directly applicable to the Roma 
community but without attention to the specific challenges faced by the minority, the policies run 
the risk of skimming over crucial issues, as the EU approach had in the past. 
 
Cultural and linguistic differences, long lists of deprivations, and on the whole, 
discrimination by community members, neighbours, welfare workers and state 
authorities contribute to increased risks of Romani children falling into very 
disadvantaged positions as far as the child protection systems are concerned.
354
 
 
In other words, having the “standard” provisions in place does not guarantee protection for Roma 
children. By remaining grounded in the daily obstacles faced by Roma as a group but not losing 
sight of (individual) human rights more broadly, the activist network has been able to begin 
transforming the minority rights norm and even inform the EU perspective on the subject.
355
  
For these NGOs, the goal is not simplifying EU’s and member-state Roma policy. 
Instead, they aim to make existing programs more effective and to apply lessons from past 
failures to improvement of future projects. The call for umbrella initiatives is one example. 
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Proven in the past, comprehensive treatment of the sub-challenges, rather in isolation from one 
another, is what NGOs have come to encourage. Recommendations of practical solutions for 
Roma inclusion also have their counterpart in the discursive framing of the issue. The NGO 
community is not oblivious to methods of best-practice sharing – in order for this to work 
effectively the organizations have to abandon their potentially short-sighted dedication to single 
issues and ties to narrowly localized context. In some way it entails taking their own advice: 
focus on the bigger picture while employing the lessons learned at the most grass-roots level and 
in past minority-majority interactions (positive and negative). This, along with the framing of 
minority rights as human rights, represents a strategy that can secure NGO success in advancing 
their mission.  
Such targeted handling of norm promotion in the European Union is best illustrated by a 
contrast between NGOs that embraced it fully and those that continue to be tied to their local 
context and constrained by the limited openness of national governments to conversation on 
Roma inclusion. Strategic litigation is an expensive undertaking and a tool best suited for better 
endowed NGOs. The European Roma Rights Center has been successful in this regard but as 
their own experience has shown, success depends on effective implementation of judgments at 
the local level.
356
 Thus, involvement of NGOs in the EU-consistent discourse of minority rights 
that nevertheless highlights the human rights component is not necessarily conditioned by 
modest resources. Sadly, many Roma rights advocacy groups continue to have trouble getting 
their message heard and mission accomplished. On a more practical level they are unprepared to 
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receive EU funding and present their work in a way comprehensible to individual-rights focused 
grant administrators.
357
 The human rights framing has been so successful precisely because it 
corresponds to the EU discourse, while emphasizing the degree of urgency in addressing Roma 
exclusion, and this is a broader lesson for the future of minority rights advocacy in Europe. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The EU policy has been vaguely formulated and nearly toothless; national governments 
do the barest minimum, scaling back efforts whenever they get a chance. From the little 
improvement that there has been, we now know that positive change does not depend on 
resource availability. Governments with access to EU funds and benefiting from long-established 
institutional groundwork to combat Roma exclusion (e.g. the Czech Republic, Slovakia, or 
Hungary) have been outperformed in most issue areas by countries in the Western Balkans.
358
 
Much of the variation in success of Roma policies is underpinned by the framing of the 
challenges and whether or not they have been handled in a comprehensive manner. Success will 
continue to be elusive, if the strategy is merely to put out the hottest fires, rather than a steady 
effort drawing on well-established principles, such as the human rights frame for minority rights 
policy. 
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CHAPTER 6: NUCLEAR SAFETY 
 
The Eastern EU enlargement of 2004-2007 added twenty three new nuclear reactors to 
the map of the Union’s energy landscape.359 Or rather, twenty three new challenges for advocates 
of nuclear safety to deal with, as the mostly Soviet-designed nuclear power plants (NPPs) had 
very little new about them. The four oldest and riskiest from the set have been shut down since, 
affecting most notably Slovakia and Lithuania.
360
 The closure of Slovakia’s reactor in Jaslovaské 
Bohunice, anticipated for years, ended up coinciding with the emergency situation that the gas-
supply crisis of early 2009 brought about. In Lithuania, the consequences of pre-agreed reactor 
closure were more predictable but no less dramatic. The country went from generating over 70% 
of its electricity at the Ignalina NPP to depending fully on natural gas-based power generation 
after the second of its two reactors was shut down in December 2009. In addition to these costly 
closures of an entire generation of nuclear reactors, their slightly younger siblings throughout 
Eastern Europe were singled out for equally expensive modernization. This, to be sure, did not 
assuage all fears regarding their safety (most notably in the case of the Czech Republic). Since 
these measures met international nuclear safety standards, however, the EU enlargement officials 
deemed them sufficient.  
We should not, however, interpret the European Commission’s resolute pre-accession 
stance on decommissioning certain Soviet-made reactors, as signaling the existence of 
widespread agreement regarding the highly technical, yet sensitive matters of nuclear safety. 
Throughout the negotiations and onward, the Union could not even present a unified stance on 
the desirability of nuclear power production in general. Traditional leaders in this field, like 
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France or Finland remain committed to employing nuclear energy sources as a stable part of their 
energy mix. Meanwhile, countries like Greece, Ireland and Austria show no inclination to revise 
their outright rejection of nuclear energy as a viable solution. Complicating matters further, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, or the United Kingdom have recently revived the debate regarding their 
nuclear energy policy in light of growing pressures to curb carbon emissions and to reduce 
dependency on foreign fossil fuels. By contrast, the events at Japanese Fukushima plant returned 
Germany from the lukewarm camp to its previous position in favor of decommissioning all its 
nuclear power plants by 2022.
361
 The contradiction and uncertainty in member state nuclear 
energy preferences precluded them from speaking with one voice when vying for competence in 
the area of nuclear safety with the European Commission. Finally, the European Parliament was 
also prepared to offer its opinion each step of the way. 
Thus, the new members entered a highly complicated and still evolving regulatory 
environment inside the Union. First, EU’s pre-accession demands derived from standards agreed 
upon at venues that either preceded the enlargement process (such as the conclusions of the 1992 
Munich G7 meeting) or that were independent of it entirely (namely the IAEA
362
 Convention on 
Nuclear Safety). Reliance on these external standards followed from the absence of equally well-
developed measures within the EU and the poor prospects for reaching speedy agreement on the 
matter. Second, the closure of dangerous reactors in Eastern Europe was only a temporary 
solution and the need to address both energy security and nuclear safety in a more 
comprehensive way remained. Finally, having made considerable concessions prior to joining 
the EU, the new entrants were prepared to weigh in on safety standard formulation as soon as 
they had the chance. Their presence at the negotiating table had the potential to sway the balance 
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in favor of the mildly pro-nuclear camp. At the same time, previous failed attempts at regulating 
nuclear safety at the EU level made the European Commission more conscious of member state 
demands, regardless of their pre-existing positions. As a result, the lowest common denominator 
approach that could assure the passing of only the most widely acceptable principles guided 
subsequent development of nuclear safety standards.  
These unique dynamics surrounding the nuclear safety norm in the EU make it a useful 
case for exploring the framework put forward in this dissertation. A series of case studies 
examining the reception of the norm in East European candidate countries will test the 
hypotheses outlined in the classificatory chapter. As the introductory paragraph briefly indicated, 
there is considerable variation between the challenges that the new EU members had to deal with 
in the realm of energy policy, and nuclear safety more specifically. The core underlying tension 
relates to the trade-offs between nuclear safety and energy security, whether in situations of 
crisis (both emergent and long-term) or with regard to more commonplace balancing of national 
interest and state identity.  
Correspondingly, the case selection for this study aims to map the formulation of nuclear 
energy policy by former EU candidate countries in response to the demands from Brussels. I 
leave out Bulgaria and Romania from the analysis because the EU sharpened its negotiating 
positions in dealing with Slovakia and Lithuania, setting a quasi precedent for the remaining two 
countries. Moreover, the first group of EU entrants covers the full range of variation that is 
empirically and theoretically relevant here. At one end of the spectrum we find Lithuania, whose 
dependence on Russian natural gas following the closure of its only NPP was expected all along, 
creating a much feared but still unavoidable situation of increased insecurity. The case offers a 
useful contrast for the study of Slovakia, where the energy crisis that accompanied the reactor 
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closure was unexpectedly magnified by the consequences of a natural gas trade dispute between 
Russia and Ukraine. Finally, the Czech Republic’s controversial NPP in Temelín was allowed to 
stay open and even expand. Despite the green light from the G7, the EU and the IAEA, however, 
the plant faced stalwart opposition from Austria in the form of threats to obstruct Prague’s entry 
into the Union. Each case presents a different mix of external pressures for change, domestic 
constraints regarding energy production, and official support for the standards stipulated in the 
accession documents. Collectively, the three countries’ respective energy security dilemmas 
cover the full range of variation and promise to trace the reach of the nuclear safety norm 1./ as it 
was pre-defined during EU enlargement and 2./ in its changing form once the Eastern European 
candidates were allowed to join and influence its content.    
 
Between Nuclear Safety and Energy Security 
 
It is unclear how much it cost to build the Ignalina nuclear plant or the other reactors 
singled out for decommissioning under the EU accession treaty. Centralized economies of the 
Soviet bloc did not denominate their investments in dollars, if they even monetized such 
transactions. The plants were built too long ago and nearing their projected life span, the original 
construction costs were not a large part of calculating the losses that the Lithuanian and Slovak 
(and Bulgarian) economies would incur upon shutdown. More relevant has been the cost of 
dismantling these plants, several years earlier than their operating countries would have liked. 
The figure listed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) for 
Slovakia’s Bohunice is 134 million Euros and for Ignalina, which lacked its own 
decommissioning fund, the number is 334 million. Even more daunting is the projected cost of a 
new plant, should the countries choose to replace their closed-down reactors with new ones. The 
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newest generation site under construction in Olkiluoto, Finland, was projected to cost 3 billion 
euros but is now 50% over budget and overdue.
363
 In government accounting books the decision 
to close down a seemingly functional plant is costly, not just in economic terms. Directly 
impacting these dilemmas, the G7/EU interpretation of nuclear safety standards represented a 
very sensitive issue in the small transitioning economies seeking EU membership. 
 The membership conditionality clause requiring the closure of Ignalina and Bohunice 
brought into contact two parallel interpretations of the nuclear safety norm. It was clear that the 
Chernobyl design was fundamentally unsafe and the Lithuanian RBMK reactors – practically 
identical to the one that exploded disastrously – posed a serious risk. The line became much 
more blurry after the essential (and costly) safety upgrades were implemented, following 
pressure and financial assistance from the West. Similarly up for interpretation, the VVER 
reactors across Eastern Europe fell into two groups, mostly corresponding with their age. Some 
made the cut for continued operation, while others did not. All along, the affected governments 
denied accusations of risking the safety of people and the environment in demanding the 
reactors’ continued operation. We now know that this undisputed commitment to radiation 
protection was related to the universal quality of the nuclear safety norm. Despite this agreement 
on the paramount importance of accident prevention, however, the numerous stakeholders 
viewed the same technical data with varying degrees of optimism.  
Recent events in Japan further highlight the fluidity of the nuclear safety norm. The 
nuclear sector claims to be fully determined to keep all nuclear sites incident free – if asked prior 
to the Fukushima disaster, operators worldwide, including those in Japan, would have said that 
their plants are as safe as can be. There was no room for improvement. It was only after the 
devastating tsunami flooding that we found out the same standards were no longer strict enough 
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for some countries, irrespective of their distance from the ocean and tsunami probabilities, most 
prominently Germany. Yet others, Eastern Europeans and Japan among them, were not 
dissuaded from judging favorably their ability to prevent future incidents. In practical terms, 
nuclear installations are safe until the day they are not. The tolerable risk is expressed in decimal 
numbers so small that power notation is used to cut down on the zeroes needed. Yet, the risk 
exists. The disputability of measures considered reasonable in preventing accidents offers 
interesting opportunities to study the political balancing in the normative realm. The nuclear 
safety norm, classified as regulative / universal, led to a shallow consensus dictated by Eastern 
European desire to join the EU and the need for a politically viable approach on the part of the 
old member states. This may have given the false illusion of homogeneity, which the empirical 
work in this chapter sets out to evaluate. 
The competing agendas of the European Commission and the pro- and non-nuclear 
member states carried over into early post-enlargement years, when a basic piece of legislation, 
the Nuclear Safety Directive was still under discussion. The desire to keep Europe safe from 
nuclear accidents seemed universal – the preferred means of achieving this end were not. An 
important player in this game has been the European public i.e. voters, exposed to forceful 
argumentation from all sides. Where the environmental interest groups highlighted the risks of 
nuclear plant operation and waste storage, advocates of nuclear power responded with arguments 
about energy costs and, more recently, greenhouse emissions. When the European Commission 
advocated an EU-wide regulatory body that would guarantee greater independence and stronger 
oversight, governments charged back with concerns about state sovereignty, energy security, 
economic growth and the level of expertise in monolithic supervisory authorities. The opinion 
surveys show that Europeans are susceptible to all these arguments but so far the public has 
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served as an anchor against reckless approaches to nuclear energy.
364
 The classification of the 
nuclear safety norm as universal based on past developments might be reassuring in this regard. 
Nevertheless, chapter 7 will ask the question of whether it is conceivable that the case for a 
“particularization” of nuclear safety could be made and what it would take to “spoil” the 
societies.  
Prior to discussing potential shifts within the typology, however, we need to carefully 
examine the hypotheses relating to the cell occupied by nuclear safety. The regulative properties 
of the norm, affecting states more directly than societies, generate compelling questions with 
regard to the norm’s proliferation. If the nuclear safety norm meets with resistance, this should 
happen at the level of governments, whose officials find themselves balancing the imperatives of 
safe NPP operation against the stability of energy supply and the costs associated with both. 
Along these lines, the core hypothesis guiding this chapter stipulates that as long as they are 
subject to pressures outside the realm on nuclear safety, governments will be reluctant to give in 
to the EU-advocated norm without reservations. I will examine official documents, as well as 
speeches by the Czech, Slovak, and Lithuanian government representatives to uncover the 
underlying motivations for their behavior, as related to nuclear safety requirements in the course 
of EU accession. I will pay attention to the incentives the three countries received from their 
Western European partners and primarily the ways in which such nudging may have masked the 
real dilemmas faced by candidate country governments. 
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Methodology and Data 
 
Whereas in the case of societal resistance the data needs to be collected at that level, as 
the minority rights chapter has done, in the case of competing policy approaches which tend to 
be government dominated, it is most productive to focus on official documents illustrating both 
the initial tensions and subsequent adjustment, if any.
365
 Following this structure of empirical 
analysis, the current chapter will be devoted to a comparison of EU formulations of the nuclear 
safety norm with government documents from the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Lithuania. The 
approach promises to uncover the degree to which the candidate positions overlapped with those 
of EU institutions or, conversely, where they disagreed the most. At the same time, we should 
not lose sight of the fact that governments are not insulated from their respective societies and 
that domestic dynamics often influence international commitments. Given the regulative / 
universal quality of the nuclear safety norm, we can expect societal pressures to moderate 
government enthusiasm about nuclear power as a simple solution to energy security challenges.  
The empirical analysis begins by examining EU documents that shaped the understanding 
of nuclear safety since the Chernobyl accident. These documents fall into several main categories 
with respect to origin and intended audience. Together, they cover the full range of official 
formulations and so provide a sound basis for this study. First, I will consider the periodic 
communications from the European Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
regarding the state of nuclear safety in the EU, as well as Eastern Europe and the Newly 
Independent States (NIS). Equally important are the regular reports submitted by the European 
Commission to the IAEA directorate concerning the compliance by EU member states with the 
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provisions of the Nuclear Safety Convention. Third, it is important to trace the attempts at 
developing an EU-specific Directive on Nuclear Safety, which began in 2003. The effort 
encountered serious setbacks but was revisited in 2008 and the new Directive was approved in 
2009, providing crucial evidence about the norm’s development. Finally, it is also relevant to 
include the Accession Treaty Protocols stipulating the conditions for the mandatory reactor 
closure in Lithuania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria. This set of documents (twenty in total) is well 
defined but nevertheless constitutes a considerable volume of written text.
366
 As a result, the task 
of analyzing the data has been accomplished with the help of qualitative text analysis software 
(Atlas.ti) that permits a combination of semi-automated and human coding of the content in EU-
issued documents, representing the first stage of the present study.  
My approach to content analysis combines computer-aided and human coding seeking to 
strike a balance between purely qualitative and strictly quantitative measures. The former are 
subject to researcher biases and idiosyncrasies, while the latter risk omitting important concepts 
detectable only through a close reading of documents.
367
 The purpose of the combined approach 
is to avoid either of the two weaknesses affecting the findings. A degree of code standardization 
and reproducibility is desirable given the subsequent application of these codes in the analysis of 
government documents collected for the three countries under examination here. Defining a 
coding scheme that is easily comprehensible to the text analysis software sets the stage for a 
fruitful comparison of the results obtained by examining three diverse sets of country-specific 
documents at a later stage, using that same software. In addition, this project will use codes 
deductively derived from the underlying theoretical framework alongside those uncovered 
inductively from the relevant EU documents. Mere “word crunching,” which the strictly 
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quantitative approaches require, does not lend itself well for combining these two strategies of 
code generation. 
Effectively, the initial exploration of EU documents in isolation from the country-level 
data satisfies the requirement of a priori design in generating coding schemes.
368
 Once the coding 
scheme capturing in detail the content of the European nuclear safety norm has been established, 
it will be applied to official documents from Lithuania, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. The 
goal is to assess their respective adherence to the EU norm, as defined by the documents 
analyzed in the first stage of the study. In this second stage, rather than taking advantage of the 
hybrid content analysis approach justified previously, it will be possible to apply the two 
approaches to content analysis sequentially. First, a relatively straightforward tally of code 
occurrence in country-level documents promises more generalizable conclusions from the three-
way comparison. Next, a more nuanced analysis will help uncover the underlying dynamics and 
possibly generate further hypotheses regarding the evolution of the nuclear safety norm in an 
enlarged EU.  
The issue of comparability naturally arises with this research design – each country case 
is built around a different set of documents. This is particularly problematic for text analysis 
because counting the occurrence of individual codes tells us little without a shared base that 
could “standardize” the results. I get around this problem in two ways. First, akin to the solution 
used in the minority rights chapter, I use the EU documents and the codes derived from these as 
the shared reference point for all three country cases. Second, unwilling to give up the 
advantages of quantitative text analysis entirely, I employ paired coding that mirrors the two-
pronged indicators of norm types developed in the theoretical chapter (table 2.1). What this 
means is that following a detailed analysis of EU documents, I was able to uncover an either/or 
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metric for each criterion classifying a norm as particular vs. universal or regulative vs. 
constitutive (see table 6.1 below).   
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Table 6.1:  Norm-type derived content analysis codes. 
 
Content Analysis Codes Indicator level 
Shared empirical 
questions 
Indicator level Content Analysis Codes 
 
P
a
rt
ic
u
la
r 
 
n
o
rm
s 
- Exceptional circumstances determine 
nuclear policy priorities 
 
Society/community-
specific norm origin 
 
Is the origin of the 
norm identifiable? 
 
Shared experiences 
facilitated 
widespread 
comprehension and 
appeal of the norm 
 
- Interdependence 
- Environmental degradation 
prevention*  
- Vulnerability to radiation 
U
n
iv
er
sa
l  
n
o
rm
s 
- Country-specific framing of 
challenges and solutions (non-nuclear 
consequences of NPP closures) 
- Country level economic / strategic 
imperatives 
 
Collectivities 
concerned and 
victims of violation 
defined by the norm 
 
 
Does the norm alter 
the patterns of 
interaction between 
individuals and re-
designate the groups 
they belong to? 
 
 
Scope of the norm’s 
effectiveness, also 
determines norm 
content 
 
- EU-wide challenges and solutions 
- Nuclear risks affecting nuclear and non-
nuclear states alike 
- National interests first 
- Self-sufficiency/competitiveness 
trumps climate change 
 
Legitimation 
follows norm 
adoption 
 
 
Do the justifications 
for following the 
norm aim to draw a 
line behind the pre-
adoption past? 
 
 
Legitimation 
precedes norm 
adoption 
 
- Inherent risks and uncertainties of 
nuclear safety: prevention, assessment 
- Climate change / integrated 
environmental and energy policy* 
 
- Opposition to harmonization 
- Local (financial) constraint salience 
 
Local material 
realities matter for 
the processing of 
the norm 
 
 
Is there high 
variation between the 
local approaches to 
the norm’s 
implementation? 
 
 
Pressure 
concentrating on 
centralized norm 
guarantors (e.g. 
governments) to 
enact change 
 
- EC as nuclear policy coordinator 
(EURATOM vs. member states) 
- Regulator independence 
- Regulation harmonization at EU level 
* Framed as policy goals, rather than description of reality or the current state of nuclear safety in the EU 
 
R
eg
u
la
ti
v
e 
 
n
o
rm
s - EU financial support as necessity 
- National Strategic imperatives – 
nuclear power is too special 
- Optimism on reactor life 
Mutually agreed-
upon rules of 
behavior 
underpinned by 
instrumental 
reasoning 
Does the norm define 
a certain identity, 
discernible by its 
bearers and by 
others? 
Compliance with the 
norm delineates the 
difference between 
members and non-
members 
 
- Financial support as solidarity 
- Int’l obligations as justifications for 
action; Accession documents key 
- Chernobyl/past lessons 
 
C
o
n
stitu
tiv
e 
n
o
rm
s 
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For instance, the financial assistance provided for the decommissioning of risky nuclear 
reactors in Eastern Europe was presented (and received) as either an act of solidarity or one of 
necessity. The former indicates a constitutive quality of the approach to nuclear safety, the latter 
results in labeling it as regulative instead. The code pair, along with several more, was applied to 
the country cases, making it possible for us to gauge the overall balance between solidarity and 
necessity (and so the constitutive or regulative effect of norms on governments). The resulting 
comparison between EU and member-state documents, as well as that among the three countries 
studied here is rigorous and immune to bias from document length, audience, or method of 
delivery. 
 
 
The EU and Nuclear Safety 
 
  In 2004, Lithuania and Slovakia joined the EU under the condition that they will shut 
down their most risky nuclear plants. The uncompromising position that the enlargement 
officials took on this issue, however, is not necessarily reflective of a broad consensus on 
minimum nuclear safety measures in the Union. On the contrary, considerable discord stems 
from the combination of reliance on IAEA standards, the built-in flexibility in following them, 
and still-evolving nuclear safety regulations at the EU level. Despite efforts to expand the 
community legislation on the subject, the road has been rather bumpy, with limited agreement 
attainable among member states, as well as between them and the Commission. As a result, the 
norm stipulating the closure of the reactors in Ignalina (Lithuania) and Jaslovské Bohunice 
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(Slovakia) was consistent with the Commission’s preferences but perhaps did not fully exhaust 
them.  
The analysis of key EU documents in this section will lay the groundwork for comparing 
these documents with the perspectives presented by Lithuania, Slovakia, and the Czech 
Republic. The most telling story unfolded as the proposal for a nuclear safety directive went 
through its various iterations between 2003 and 2009. The process effectively transformed the 
discussion of nuclear safety into a negotiation, if not battle, over competence between the 
Commission and member states. As a result, the stakes were high and the trail of documents 
leading to the final directive contains evidence about the Commission’s highest priorities, as well 
as areas where it was forced to compromise. The EC desire to develop a framework directive on 
this issue provides the counterpoint to the hypothesis-expected resistance from governments and 
though it does not warrant reclassifying the norm as constitutive, rather than regulative, this is 
the area where we should look for most disagreement. 
When Eastern European states first expressed their desire to join the European Union, the 
safety culture in their nuclear power plants lagged behind that of Western Europe. Nicely put, the 
post-Soviet approach to nuclear safety was more “laid back.”369 As early as 1993, a 
Communication from the EC to the Council and the Parliament on the state of nuclear safety in 
Eastern Europe concentrated on introducing changes to the safety culture and emphasized the 
transfer of Western know-how in staff training and twining projects.
370
 The document 
characterized the general management of nuclear power plants as suboptimal and failing to 
properly ensure a smooth flow of information. In a way typical of post-communist organizations 
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at the time, “the NPPs [were] over-staffed and there [was] no clear identification of 
responsibilities.”371 The European Commission deemed this lack of communication and 
transparency particularly problematic – a smaller scale incident similar to the one in Chernobyl 
had occurred earlier at the Ignalina plant but was never communicated to the Ukrainian 
authorities, which likely contributed to the disaster.
372
 Information sharing with the public also 
lagged behind practices common in the West and regulatory authorities were not readily open to 
external review of their procedures.
373
 While the deficiencies in approaches to nuclear safety in 
the East seemed clear, the alternative and presumably superior measures in the West did not. 
The inability to agree on uniform standards within the EU was compensated by feigned 
resoluteness on the reactor decommissioning issue in the course of accession. The decision 
making on closure dates was telling. If the reactors were not safe, the experts charged, they 
should have been closed right away; the IAEA standards already regulate such pressing 
situations. In an overt example of politically driven decisions dominating safety imperatives, the 
shutdown of the controversial reactors was in all cases scheduled for winter time (end of the 
calendar year), when additional measures had to be taken to provide heating of sensitive 
equipment that was no longer generating its own energy. In Lithuania this necessitated the 
construction of a whole new heating unit and left nuclear safety experts shaking their heads.
374
 
Itself dissatisfied with this ad hoc approach to decommissioning, the Commission set out to 
develop new standards that would set the tone for future development of the nuclear sector in 
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Europe. The reasoning was simple: if certain standards were applied during the accession, they 
should apply across the Union.
375
 
 
The work carried out in the Community framework in order to bring nuclear 
installations in the candidate countries up to a high level of safety allowed a 
European perspective to emerge in this context. This perspective, developed for 
the candidate countries, is universal.
376
 
 
There was a long way, however, from highlighting the universal quality of the desire to keep 
Europeans and the environment safe from radiation to asserting a link to a European identity, or 
“perspective,” suggestive of a constitutive nature of the norm. The European Commission tried 
its best but these efforts were curtailed by the defensiveness of national-level authorities. 
In practical terms, the greatest challenge lay in navigating the political landscape marked 
by the sensitivity of energy security and nuclear safety questions, in addition to turf wars 
between the Commission and the Council. The EC made the initial step in suggesting that the EU 
as a community accede to the IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety, to which individual states 
were parties already. This was rejected by member states on the grounds that the Commission 
did not possess the competence to regulate this issue area. In 2002, however, the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) ruled that nuclear safety did, in fact, fall within the scope of the Euratom treaty, 
which already governed radiation protection. Simply put, although the use of nuclear energy 
remained a member state issue, the question of nuclear safety was now an EU-level 
responsibility.
377
 Encouraged by this ECJ decision and pressured to address the normative 
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vacuum vis-à-vis candidate countries, the Commission proposed two parallel directives to 
regulate nuclear safety and the disposal of radioactive waste. The events that followed suggest 
that despite being the designated target of this legislative initiative, nuclear safety took the 
second seat to political battles within the EU. 
The proposed directive package enjoyed support only from France and Spain. Other 
member states had various reasons for rejecting the 2003 nuclear safety / waste directive draft. 
Besides the traditionally non-nuclear states like Austria, Ireland, or Greece, The United Kingdom 
worried about the impact of the vaguely formulated directive on its unique reactor types and 
received backing from Finland and Sweden in this regard. Germany was mired in domestic 
disputes, when the Ministry of the Environment supported the waste directive but had difficulty 
with the nuclear safety measures, deemed insufficient, while the Ministry of Industry had 
precisely the opposite preferences.
378
 A comparison of the original nuclear safety directive with 
its iteration from 2009 and a look the “corrections” that the latter version included reveals three 
main reasons why the 2003 package did not go through.
379
 First, the request to keep 
decommissioning funds completely separate from other commercial activity was unacceptable to 
plant operators. Second, the safety standards were not properly defined in the text, which left 
member states unsure about what steps they would have to take and, more importantly, what the 
longer term repercussions of the directive would be. Third, attempts to centralize inspection 
competences were deemed problematic: they challenged the tradition of national regulatory 
independence, yet had not addressed the question of qualified staffing for the proposed EU core 
of inspectors. The failed legislative attempt led to a political silence on the issue until 2005 when 
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the efforts to develop a common energy policy necessitated a more comprehensive approach that 
covered also coordination on environmental commitments and energy mix.  
Member states, now including former candidates, began making plans for new nuclear 
reactors and those that were not, struggled with the question of energy supply upon their existing 
plants’ closure. The Commission was aware of the looming decisions to extend the lifetime of 
older reactors along with the security risks associated with their higher average age, seeing room 
for EU-level cooperation.
380
 In particular, the EC sought to develop reference points to guide 
future safety evaluations and introduced a substantially revised proposal of the nuclear safety 
directive, this time without the waste management add-on. The new text was more sensitive to 
the principle of subsidiarity and presented as its main objective strengthening the role of national 
regulators. It acknowledged their authority and at the same time provided EU-level enforcement 
of prior obligations under the IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety. This time, the Commission 
reassured the member states that it does not want to look over regulators’ shoulder but instead 
give the relatively weaker IAEA commitments legal certainty within the Union.
381
  
 
It is useful to build on the process where the national safety authorities of the 
Member States having nuclear power plants on their territory have been working 
together in the context of Western European Nuclear Regulator’s Association 
(WENRA) and have defined many safety reference levels for power reactors.
382
 
 
The Commission retained the right to propose new measures, solidifying its ECJ victory on 
nuclear safety competence, but expected reporting from member states on the specific conditions 
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of both their reactors and those of their peers. The new directive filled a void caused by 
WENRA’s lack of a legal personality, despite its high profile in the nuclear safety policy area. 
The main complaint about the content of the revised directive was that it did not result in 
substantive change as it still relied heavily on the existing IAEA standards. The Commission, 
however, viewed this as an important contribution to the legal enforceability of nuclear safety 
within the Union and better control over future developments in this field.
383
 Though no one 
dared use the language of identity, it is apparent from the Commission’s ambitious move at the 
outset and its willingness to bide its time in the end that the EU battle for control over nuclear 
safety, as well as its nature as a norm, is not over yet. 
 
Technicalities and Identities: Government Positions on Nuclear Safety in Europe 
 
 The classification of the nuclear safety as universal and regulative led us to expect 
government resistance to the technical details of the norm. The wiggle room that governments 
enjoy in connection to regulative norms is much greater than with norms described as 
constitutive. The latter norms are by definition tied to a unique identity and the membership in a 
normative community that they designate makes their violation unthinkable or, at best, highly 
costly. Regulative norms, by contrast, are put in place for instrumental reasons that lend 
themselves well to calculations by rational actors like governments, especially if they face other 
more compelling constraints. In the case of nuclear safety, the interference may come in the form 
of worries about energy security, the economic cost of scarce or expensively produced 
electricity, or a premium placed on policy independence and state sovereignty. On the flip side, 
and contributing to its designation as universal, the norm is aided by public concerns about the 
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risks associated with nuclear energy. Governments need to address these trade-offs if they wish 
to construct and operate nuclear power plants.  
 As the preceding section about the state of nuclear safety at the EU level made clear, the 
Commission-formulated version of the norm competes for policy space with conceptions of 
nuclear safety put forward by individual member states. We now know that from the perspective 
of the European Commission there is the “preferred” version of the norm and the one that was 
politically feasible in the midst of continued disagreement on the subject among member states. 
Those wishing to pursue peaceful use of nuclear energy have been confronted with both versions 
– the former as a policy statement by the Commission, the latter as a newly legal norm with 
consequences for nuclear sector regulation. The distinction may be more analytical, than 
practical, but it nevertheless provides a solid basis for tracing the member state responses to the 
evolving formulations of nuclear safety in Europe. A parallel examination of official EU 
documents and those issued by the Czech, Lithuanian and Slovak governments
384
 will help us 
evaluate the degree of government resistance, reasons behind it and implications for the future of 
nuclear safety as a Europe-wide / international norm. 
 Table 6.2 below summarizes the coding results for the regulative/constitutive dimension 
in the typology proposed here. Each indicator of the norm’s attributes has been associated with a 
pair of codes to indicate the relative weight attributed to one or the other in the official texts. 
Obviously, the assembly of documents I examined is different for each country case and the 
results are organized accordingly. For greater legibility, the higher figures in each paired 
comparison have been highlighted in bold.  
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Table 6.2: Coding of the regulative/constitutive dimension 
  
 
 
 
REGULATIVE NORM 
CODES 
 
CONSTITUTIVE NORM 
CODES 
 Financial support as 
necessity 
LINK 
BETWEEN 
THE NORM 
AND AN 
(EU) 
IDENTITY 
Financial support as 
solidarity 
EU 25 57 
Czech 
Republic 
0 0 
Lith ania 17 5 
Slovakia 2 0 
 National strategic 
imperatives 
International/EU 
obligations justify action 
EU 8 97 
Czech 
Republic 
12 4 
Lith ania 16 7 
Slovakia 19 6 
 Optimism on reactor life Lessons from the Past 
EU 0 34 
Czech 
Republic 
7 7 
Lith ania 8 1 
Slovakia 18 1 
 
 
The first category juxtaposes an instrumental approach to financial assistance, which 
takes into account safety and security threats to Europe’s people and economies, against the view 
of funding as solidarity. As the label suggests, if the aid was offered (or received) as an act of 
solidarity, it was likely voluntary and underpinned by membership in a community of states. A 
shared identity as safety-conscious European states that reach beyond the minimum measures 
required by the IAEA has the potential to generate much greater pressure on candidates aspiring 
for membership in this club. The European Commission’s steps to lay the necessary legislative 
groundwork on nuclear safety prior to the Eastern enlargement coincided with an attempt at such 
principled defense of the norm. The member states, as well as EU candidates, however, were 
quick to pick up on this intention and made their own preferences clear. The comparison of the 
   
 
204 
 
relative weighting of solidarity versus necessity in connection to the funding provided for safety 
upgrades and decommissioning makes the dividing line quite clear. 
To be sure, the Commission acknowledged the urgency in addressing pressing 
deficiencies of Soviet-built reactors,
385
 and recognized the low safety levels in NIS countries as 
particularly problematic.
386
 Arguments about the necessity of supporting states in their 
decommissioning efforts, which the Commission was not blind to, derived from the fact that the 
expensive upgrades were externally mandated at a G7 meeting,
387
 the economic realities of post-
communist transition threatening risky cost-based trade-offs involving safety,
388
 and security 
implications more generally.
389
 These reasons for funding, however, were far outweighed by the 
Commission’s references to solidarity in financing the costly upgrades that the East European 
governments suddenly faced. Such justifications focused on promoting regional cooperation and 
dissemination of know-how that nuclear regulators in both the East and the West could benefit 
from.
390
 The main principle guiding aid to countries in the EU candidate pool and beyond 
advocated “help for self-help”391 and attracted funding also from institutions not commonly 
engaged in this issue area (e.g. European Parliament).
392
 The Commission was not indifferent to 
the inherited liabilities that Lithuania, Slovakia, and also Bulgaria faced as they closed down 
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their reactors.
393
 Unlike the grant recipients, however, it expressed solidarity with the closure 
commitments and expected this approach to generate a desire for acquiring an EU-member 
identity.
394
 
In selected contexts, the Lithuanian government made appeals for increased funding 
amounts on solidarity grounds as well. As Prime Minister Kirkilas put it prior to the closure of 
Ignalina’s second reactor, “I am confident that we will be able to find a mutually acceptable 
solution based on the principle of solidarity and good will.”395 Same reasoning was also an 
important element during the Ignalina decommissioning negotiations: 
 
Acknowledging the readiness of the Union to provide adequate additional 
Community assistance to the efforts by Lithuania to decommission the Ignalina 
Nuclear Power Plant and highlighting this expression of solidarity, Lithuania 
commits to the closure of Unit 1 of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant before 2005 
and of Unit 2 of this plant by 31 December 2009 at the latest and to the 
subsequent decommissioning of these units.
396
 
 
Yet, whereas the language of solidarity was convenient in direct communications with the 
Commission, especially when it promised additional assistance, it was quickly abandoned when 
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discussing the pressing nature of the challenges the country would face upon giving up its 
NPP.
397
  
 
Closure of the Ignalina NPP will cause a number of problems that will call for 
immediate action with the view to ensuring nuclear safety, security of electricity 
supply, quality of the atmosphere, and adequate standard of living in the Ignalina 
NPP region.
398
  
 
The priority for Vilnius was the acquisition of sufficient funding to pay for 
decommissioning, construction of capacities to compensate for the outage through gas-based 
electricity generation, as well as interconnections with power grids in Poland and Scandinavia. 
The Lithuanian position agreed with EU’s emphasis on safety but also included a declaration of 
an inability to carry the burden alone. If safety was not to be compromised, Lithuania would 
require considerable external help. From their perspective, this was a matter of necessity. The 
same approach was mirrored in the Slovak case but the discussion of funding the country had 
received for decommissioning of Bohunice generally took the back seat in the documents 
examined here. The priority was the completion of half-built reactor blocks at another NPP in 
Mochovce. In the case of the Czech Republic discussion of financial assistance is entirely absent, 
which is not surprising given the continued operation of all its reactors. On this first measure, 
therefore, Lithuania represents the best example of the instrumental reasoning used by candidate 
countries, in contrast to the EU discourse of nuclear safety funding as bearing a constitutive 
quality. 
                                                 
397
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The second measure of norm effect on governments considers the attention to national 
strategic imperatives on the one hand and nuclear safety in the context of international or, more 
narrowly, EU obligations on the other hand. This coding scheme references theories about the 
role of identity in international relations that object to arguments about states always pursuing 
their narrow strategic interests. As is often the case, states sometimes forego immediate interests 
for those defined by membership (desired or actual) in a community of states. The national 
strategic imperatives therefore summarize the traditional conception of state interest, whereas the 
international obligations justifications draw on an international identity for legitimacy. 
An overwhelming majority of coded quotations in EU-issued documents incorporates the 
need for a community-conscious approach to nuclear safety. This most frequent overall code 
refers to nuclear safety as an imperative of membership in an international community. Such 
socializing relations range from loose statements of obligation under the IAEA or G-7 standards 
to the dense interactions within the European Union. The latter have been particularly ambitious. 
According to the Commission President Barroso 
 
we need to develop further in Europe the most advanced framework for nuclear  
energy, meeting the highest standards of safety, security and non-proliferation. 
The EU should also continue their efforts to ensure that such high standards are 
observed internationally, in the context of increased cooperation with the 
IAEA.
399
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Although this desired reach of the community-wide approach has been curtailed by member 
states as the nuclear safety legislation took shape, the frame has dominated in EU documents on 
the subject.  
The Czech, Lithuanian, and Slovak texts, by contrast, pay marginal attention to the 
European face of nuclear safety and instead focus on the impact of any prospective safety 
standard revisions on their unique energy security situations. The rhetoric by Slovakia’s Prime 
Minister is particularly interesting in this regard. At all occasions marking the EU-mandated 
shut-down of old reactors in Bohunice, as well as in pronouncements responding to the gas crisis 
of early 2009 Robert Fico took the opportunity to give a nod to international obligations and 
challenge them at the same time. His use of the phrase “pacta sunt cervanda,” or treaties are to 
be fulfilled, often occurs simultaneously with calls to revise said treaties:  
 
The Government of the Slovak Republic wishes to be a trustworthy partner and 
we respect the international law principle of pacta sunt servanda. If, however, an 
extraordinary situation in the supply of electricity should come about, although 
there is no reason to fear this likely, we would view these commitments [to close 
down reactors in Bohunice] differently than we do at the present time.
400
 
 
…what can we do now? The principle pacta sunt cervanda holds – we have to 
fulfill our obligations [and shut down Bohunice]. This principle can be broken 
only through agreement. As a result, I would equate solidarity with interest by 
European institutions to discuss this serious topic with us. We reject the position 
of “leave this matter alone, pacta sunt cervanda.”401 
 
                                                 
400
 Robert Fico, "Press Conference on the EC Opinion Regarding Construction Completion at the Mochovce Nuclear 
Power Plant," (Bratislava2008). 
401
 "Press Conference by Mirek Topolanek, Robert Fico, Gediminas Kirkilas and Andris Piebalgs, European Nuclear 
Energy Forum,"  (Prague2008). 
   
 
209 
 
In fact, the Slovak prime minister questioned the underlying commitments more often than he 
affirmed them. This position is closely related to the dominance of the national strategic 
imperatives frame that rejects attempts at drawing links between nuclear safety and a narrower 
(European) identity. 
All three governments emphasize the role of nuclear power in remedying the pressures 
resulting from dependence on Russian-supplied fossil fuels.
402
 Nuclear safety standards that 
streamed from the West and led to the closure of reactors in Ignalina and Bohunice came to be 
associated with the precarious energy security situation that resulted.
403
 In this context, the 
protection of national interests has taken precedent over any desire to reformulate these 
preferences in favor of an identity shift towards a broader European perspective. On the contrary, 
the lagging efforts to develop a common EU energy policy have exaggerated the insecurities 
experienced by Lithuania, Slovakia and even the Czech Republic and resulted in these 
governments’ resistance to certain aspects of the nuclear safety norm. 
 The final measure of opposition to the norm in the three countries examines the extent to 
which the governments relied on optimism about reactor life to countery-balance the need for 
attention to risks and lessons born by past nuclear accidents (Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and 
most recently also Fukushima). The misalignment between the EU language on the issue and that 
used in the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Slovakia, is again notable. The EU documents 
frequently point out that the current safety standards have their roots in responses (and non-
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responses) to past accidents.
404
 Even more explicitly, the texts highlight the need to remain 
cautious and continue measures that can help reduce the risk of nuclear disasters occurring in the 
future.
405
 The EU documents also refer to past incidents as the main reason for viewing the 
safety of reactors in former Soviet bloc countries with skepticism.
406
 Especially the Chernobyl 
blast has had a strong impact on the formulation of nuclear safety in Western Europe, 
traumatized by the intransparency that left them helpless prior to, as well as following the 
incident. The verdict on operation of reactors scheduled for a shut-down was clear: 
 
No Community assistance will be considered for projects which could contribute 
to prolonging the operation of these reactors beyond the provisions of the agreed 
closure commitments.
407
 
 
For EU officials, lessons drawn from past events are the new safety norm. As a result, it is 
possible to treat attitudes to past accidents as a litmus test for government openness to the norm’s 
principles.  
 On this count, the approach to safety has been relatively balanced in the Czech Republic. 
The coding of government documents reveals roughly equal emphasis on lessons from the past 
and hopes for the future, including an optimistic assessment of reactor safety features. This is in 
part a result of uninterrupted operation at all Czech nuclear power plants, despite some essential 
safety upgrades. The discourse in Prague, however, does not overlap with the EU focus entirely. 
The concern with past accidents in speeches by Czech officials seems to be mostly related to 
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worries about the lasting impact that Chernobyl (and now Fukushima), may have had on general 
disposition of the public towards nuclear power.
408
 As the Czech government has been actively 
involved in further expansion of nuclear power capacities, its take on past accidents diverged 
from that uncovered in documents published by the European Commission. Most notably, where 
the EC has highlighted the seriousness of past accidents (conscious of the diverse voices from 
within the Union, including those openly opposed to nuclear energy), the Czech ministers 
viewed past nuclear accidents primarily as an obstacle to nuclear renaissance in Europe.
409
 
Qualitatively, this is a significant difference with respect to the processing of the norm, if not in 
connection to practical steps towards safe nuclear power generation. Whatever their reasons, it is 
encouraging that Prague officials remain conscious of the specters of the past. At the same time, 
the Czech approach to nuclear safety illustrates the possibility of governments subscribing 
merely to the norm’s regulative aspects that retain their appeal only until there are outweighed by 
other instrumental reasons. 
 As is apparent from the text coding results in table 6.2, the scale tips more decisively in 
the direction of the non-safety concerns for Lithuania and Slovakia. Shockingly, despite the fact 
that the reactors in Ignalina were nearly carbon copies of the exploded one in Chernobyl, we see 
little acknowledgement by Lithuanian officials that past events in Ukraine may have an impact 
on the operation of other NPPs. The issue is discounted with remarks about upgrades that ought 
to allow the second Ignalina reactor to operate safely if the EU norm permitted this.
410
 The 
perceived unfairness in treating the Ignalina plant translated into calls to reassess the allegedly 
strict decision to decommission its reactors as a requirement of accession: 
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We would welcome a reevaluation of this reactor’s safety with a focus on the 
possibility of its continued operation.
411
 
 
The agreement on closure of the power station was concluded at a time, when 
prices of electric energy were different from the present prices. We undertook to 
close both blocks. One of them has already been closed; the second one is to be 
closed by the end of 2009. But there are certain clauses in the agreement on the 
aid of the European Union in case of some energy problems occurring in 
Lithuania.
412
 
 
“Some energy problems” would not be hard to find. The cost of electricity generation alone 
represented a key factor for a country whose infrastructure is built around easy access to cheap 
electricity.
413
 Energy efficiency of buildings is lagging far behind EU standards
414
 and the 
transportation network in all Lithuania’s major cities is built around electric buses and trains. 
With the threat of rising electricity prices imminent,
415
 the government found quick allies among 
the public.
416
 This sentiment was captured by the referendum that took place in October 2008, 
when nearly 90 percent of participating voters demanded the plant’s extended operation.417 
However, the participation was just shy of the required 50 percent and so the uncomfortable 
conversation between Lithuania and the European Commission about revising the fate of the 
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plant as a consequence of public pressure was ultimately avoided. The referendum result is, 
however, indicative of the ambivalence with which the nuclear safety norm entered Lithuania 
and of the extent to which government compliance depended on sufficient funding flowing to 
Vilnius. 
 The case of weighing optimism about reactor life against the red flags raised by past 
nuclear accidents is even more telling in Slovakia. The only mention of an accident was by the 
current Prime Minister Iveta Radičová in the immediate aftermath of events at Fukushima. 
Otherwise, the warnings and symbolism of Chernobyl are conspicuously ignored. Instead, 
Radičová’s predecessor insisted that the closure of two reactors in Jaslovské Bohunice was a 
political decision that had little to do with questions of nuclear safety.
418
 According to Robert 
Fico, there were no positives for Slovakia in following the “international commitment by the 
previous government to close down two healthy reactors in Jaslovské Bohunice, [it] suits 
everyone else but not the Slovak Republic.”419 The perceived low credibility of nuclear safety 
claims by the EU also led the Slovak government to use the costly reactor closures as negotiating 
leverage in demands for approval of construction at the Mochovce NPP – it would sacrifice one, 
or the other, but not both.
420
 The approach to nuclear safety in Bratislava purportedly mirrored 
the politicized treatment of the norm by Brussels. When the political stakes were higher, such as 
during the natural gas supply crisis of early 2009, the rhetoric escalated as well. Nuclear safety 
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was viewed as only one of many constraints and if Slovakia’s economic or security interests 
were threatened, the government was open to compromising its commitments under this norm.
421
  
 These snapshots of the approaches to nuclear safety in three former EU candidates show 
that nuclear safety as a regulative norm met with resistance from governments. Czech, 
Lithuanian, and Slovak positions differed noticeably from those put forward by the European 
Commission. This may be seen as vindication for the strictness with which enlargement officials 
approached the issue – had the candidate countries not been pressured through membership 
conditionality, it is unlikely they would have followed through on the promises to close down 
their controversial reactors. We have to be careful, however, and keep the desire for EU 
membership separate from decision making in the nuclear energy sector. The resulting treaty 
obligations were binding for the governments but as the Slovak case illustrates, pre-accession 
commitments had little impact on post-accession policy.  
 
Particular Questions About Nuclear Safety 
 
 The objective of this chapter has been to test the hypothesis about anticipated government 
resistance to the nuclear safety norm directed at candidate countries in the course of the Eastern 
EU enlargement. In light of the dual focus of the broader typology, however, we have to also 
consider the interaction between government policies and societal preferences. The argument can 
become a lot more compelling, if we keep our eyes open to signs of particular framing of the 
norm as well. To this end, I extended the text analysis carried out to test the primary hypothesis 
about the universal/constitutive dimension to also examine whether the universal part of the label 
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was assigned correctly. Table 6.3 provides a summary of the findings organized according to the 
paired coding that structured the analysis.  
 
Table 6.3:  Coding of the Particular/Universal Dimension 
 
 
 
PARTICULAR NORM 
CODES 
 
UNIVERSAL NORM 
CODES 
 
 
Exceptional 
circumstances 
determine nuclear 
policy priorities 
NORM ORIGIN 
Interdependence and 
equal vulnerability to 
radiation (people and 
environment) 
EU 0 83 
Czech 
Republic 
0 37 
Lith ania 0 33 
Slovakia 14 14 
 Country-specific 
framing of challenges 
and solutions; 
consequences of NPP 
closures 
CONTEXT FOR 
NORM VIOLATION 
EU-wide challenges 
and solutions; nuclear 
risks affecting nuclear 
and non-nuclear states 
alike 
EU 71 63 
Czech 
Republic 
34 15 
Lith ania 51 10 
Slovakia 15 9 
 
National interest and 
self-sufficiency as 
priorities 
NORM 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
Climate change / 
integrated 
environmental and 
energy policy, 
including life cycle 
issues 
EU 0 86 
Czech 
Republic 
33 55 
Lith ania 38 38 
Slovakia 39 33 
 
 
Local financial and 
energy constraints; 
nuclear power too 
special ROLE OF LOCAL 
MATERIAL REALITIES 
EC as nuclear policy 
coordinator, 
harmonization 
EU 0 2 
Czech 
Republic 
10 8 
Lith ania 0 11 
Slovakia 7 2 
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Even if we assume that the linkage between government rhetoric and public opinion of 
nuclear safety
422
 is only indirect, the above results require explanation. The first measure is the 
least problematic - Slovakia was the only country to repeatedly emphasize exceptional 
circumstances that may surpass in significance the risks associated with nuclear power. The 
remaining two countries and the EU lean decisively towards the universal formulations of 
nuclear safety. The opposite outcome, however, characterizes the second measure contrasting 
country-specific and EU-wide approaches to challenges and solutions related to nuclear safety. 
Even the European Union is visibly conscious of the unique challenges faced by individual 
countries in the nuclear sector. The remaining two measures provide mixed results that raise a 
number of questions. We have to ask whether governments hold sway over public opinion on 
this count, or whether it will be the societies who restrain their leaders to institute a “boomerang 
effect” towards greater nuclear safety. It is only a small step form admitting the possibility of 
such norm evolution to having to inquire about the conditions that facilitate such shifts in either 
governmental or societal positions.  
Detecting a pattern that does not support  a trend towards universal framing of nuclear 
safety does not necessarily invalidate the present theoretical framework – on the contrary, it 
allows us to explore in greater detail the two-dimensional analytical space that it offers and 
uncover additional hypotheses regarding normative shifts along both the particular/universal and 
the regulative/constitutive continuum. It goes without saying that the programmatic objectives of 
governments do not arise in isolation from demands by their electorates. As a result, we can 
indirectly gauge the public opinion of nuclear safety by examining government positions. The 
next chapter will take a closer look at the delicate balancing that engages the governments as 
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international actors on the one hand and as inward-facing, voter-responsive institutions on the 
other. 
 
Mission Impossible? 
 
 It is clear that where the European Commission would have liked to build a Union-wide 
consensus around the subject of nuclear safety, the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Slovakia 
viewed the norm merely as a technical requirement, and one made unnecessarily strict at that. 
What does the discord mean for our assessment of this norm-proliferation dynamic initiated in 
the course of the Eastern enlargement?  
To be sure, there was no question about the desirability of safe and reliable nuclear 
reactors during accession negotiations. The disagreement concerned the criteria according to 
which safety assessments were carried out, especially as these seemingly technical decisions led 
to real political and economic costs in already struggling societies. Tensions emerged as 
candidate countries, who had been previously subject to voluntary, peer-review safety 
mechanisms under the IAEA umbrella, had to comply with non-negotiable requirements that, 
they believed, burdened them unduly. The European Commission followed the G7-inspired 
consensus on nuclear energy safety worldwide and took the opportunity of locking in 
commitments that East European governments would not have agreed to without the added 
incentive of EU membership. The power of conditionality is best illustrated by the closure of 
Lithuania’s Ignalina plant, while reactors of exactly the same design (Chernobyl-style RBMK) 
continue to operate in the St. Petersburg region in Russia.  
The constraints on new member states were treaty based, increasing the cost of any 
contemplated violation. Still, the firmness with which the norm was enforced does not 
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necessarily correspond to its legitimacy in the target societies, nor does it prevent attempts to 
circumvent it in the future. This uncertainty about the prospects for the nuclear safety norm 
derives from its classification as regulative – the identity-based foundation that could frame 
compliance as an unquestioned aspect of EU membership does not exist. Instead, the norm was a 
condition of membership, meaning that once this goal was attained the revisiting of its premises 
was fair game. 
Believers in the power of social mobilization might object that such slipping back would 
inevitably be curbed by public protest. Environmental movements, after all, have a history of 
organizing on the issue (especially in Lithuania and the Czech Republic). No wonder – the norm 
falls within the universal category. We must not forget, however, that no norm that entered EU 
candidate countries traveled in isolation from other norms. Here I do not mean competing 
understanding of safety by norm suppliers and receivers because in the realm of environmental 
protection the societal consensus happens to be considerable. Rather, nuclear safety represents 
only one point on the agenda of governments concerned with guarding their political-economic 
interests, and energy security more specifically. In other words, there are other norms that 
nuclear safety is constantly ranked against and, if the powerful argument could be made that a 
moderate compromise on reactor design or operation may help preserve a nation’s sovereignty in 
the face of resource-dependency threats, societal resistance need not be guaranteed.  
This is not to suggest that any of these developments would not be possible had the 
Commission not conditioned membership with the closure of Ignalina, Bohunice and Kozloduy. 
On the contrary, the attempts to facilitate a shift towards the constitutive cell were a sound 
strategy to add yet another hurdle obstructing a possible return to the regulative/particular cell, 
where compliance tends to be elusive. It is questionable, however, whether such a mission could 
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have been accomplished from the outside and against the background of continued disagreement 
on nuclear safety (and energy policy more generally) within the Union.  
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CHAPTER 7: NUCLEAR SAFETY IN CRISIS 
 
Nuclear accidents are a serious matter. They are dangerous, costly, they have long-term 
impact that travels across borders easily, and they remind people of the inherent risks associated 
with nuclear energy. They also have a surprising effect on the wishes and actions of those 
involved in the debate on nuclear safety. Environmental activists fight unsafe plants with all their 
might but, paradoxically, they see accidents, the bigger the better, as unique opportunities to 
highlight the movement’s cause and achieve a nuclear-free world.423 Representatives of the 
nuclear industry, by contrast, try hard to avert any negative publicity in order to continue their 
plants’ uninterrupted operation.424 Ultimately, the key factor curbing nuclear risks is the public 
opinion to which both these groups report and, by extension, societal acceptance of the nuclear 
safety norm itself.  
The impact of nuclear safety, however, is much weaker on governments whose 
preferences incorporate economic and security concerns. These sensitive issues make states 
reluctant to give up control over the nuclear energy sector and even if there is a certain degree of 
consensus about safe operation of nuclear power plants (NPPs), this is underpinned by utility, 
rather than identity. Even if official pronouncements describe safety as an “absolute priority,” 
cost-benefit analysis couched as risk optimization drives official decision making on the subject. 
Still, because the safety-demanding public is also the voting public, governments commonly 
establish the regulatory environment that minimizes the risk of accidents. Past research has 
focused on the ability of grass roots appeals to not only bring about such practical policy 
improvements but also to change the underlying government attitude with regard to the norm. In 
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the case of the anti-personnel landmine ban campaign, the activist network was able to frame the 
norm as a question of civilian immunity, on par with human rights, making government 
resistance much harder.
425
 For the present case, however, the analysis of key documents from the 
Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Slovakia has shown that government support of nuclear safety in 
the context of EU enlargement has been less than tentative. For now, the norm lacks the 
constitutive component and so remains distinct from the human-rights resembling norms (see 
table 6.2). 
To be sure, societies are not immune to some level of governmental convincing either, 
usually through education campaigns. Public opinion is also susceptible to appeals on national 
interest grounds and, more recently, in consideration of the need to curb greenhouse gas 
emissions.
426
 Mindful of past nuclear accidents, public endorsement is conditioned on safe 
operation of the NPPs. This nearly obvious statement leads to a less obvious question. If a 
nuclear accident represents a transformative crisis event, what other pressing situations might 
seem imminent enough to soften societal demands for nuclear safety? I will examine the 
possibility of nuclear safety shedding its universal quality (in the EU context) that brings it 
halfway towards the bottom right cell.
427
 This continuation of the nuclear safety case study 
explores the possibility of two-way shifts between categories, and so challenges the approaches 
that take the universal quality of international norms for granted. It also promises to address any 
suspicions about an underlying teleology in the present framework. 
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My overarching argument points to norm content as the determinant of their palatability 
to societies and governments. On issues as sensitive as energy policy, we have to be able to 
account for conditions under which the “boomerang effect”428 of converting governments to 
principled defense of nuclear safety could lose its power and the societies could give in to 
growing concerns about sky-rocketing energy prices and lacking supply. This scenario is not 
unlikely in a region like Eastern Europe, where most of the energy infrastructure still points 
eastward and dependence on Russian fossil fuels is nearly exclusive in some cases. Nuclear 
energy generation therefore enjoys the endorsement from governments on energy-strategic 
grounds, in addition to political-economic ones. Both these arguments resonate loudly with the 
public, independent of the desire to live in an environment free from the effects of harmful 
radiation.
429
 As a result, governments must respond to domestic pressures for affordable and 
reliable electricity sources. Meanwhile they are subject to international agreements regulating 
day-to-day operation of their NPPs, as well as those mandating the closure of reactors that fall 
short on safety. Complicating matters further, ambiguities have surrounded the blending of IAEA 
recommendations with continued pressure from the European Commission to further specify and 
solidify (in legal terms) the broad international commitment to safety. Many states have viewed 
this regulative flux as an opportunity to voice their own interests and win their societies over in 
the process. 
Uncertainty about the final face of nuclear safety in Europe is not without precedent or 
corresponding attempts at theoretical explanation. The consensus among international law 
scholars is that “soft” laws are often devised to gradually evolve into “harder” prescriptions that 
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can ultimately become codified and readily enforceable.
430
 This gradual norm development is 
influenced by state and non-state actors alike. The hard-law outcome, however, is not 
guaranteed. Soft laws and the norms they enshrine may retain the more informal status without 
detraction from their effect on states.
431
 In the most compelling case of non-binding agreements 
facilitating momentous change, the Helsinki accords of 1975 ultimately empowered the dissident 
movement in the Eastern bloc and contributed to the fall of the Soviet empire.
432
 In a different 
recourse to soft law, the International Labor Organization has focused on issuing non-binding 
recommendations, rather than mandating ratification of treaties to circumvent obstacles to 
domestic approval and so retained its institutional prestige and impact.
433
 How far the 
development of international legal instruments will advance depends on the level of consensus 
that the parties to each prospective treaty can reach.  
The IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety seeks to maximize the impact of this consensus, 
trading-off the benefit of a finite document for dynamic and interactive improvements in safety 
standards: 
 
The Convention is an incentive instrument. It is not designed to ensure fulfillment 
of obligations by Parties through control and sanction but is based on their 
common interest to achieve higher levels of safety which will be developed and 
promoted through regular meetings of the Parties.
434
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The European Commission, by contrast, has sought to supplement the IAEA safety 
fundamentals with a legal certainty that would facilitate enforcement at least within the 
Community. The member states, as we found out previously, responded with objections about 
undue constraints on their ability to regulate the nuclear installations on their territory. What 
does this mean for the evolution of the norm away from a soft law and towards greater 
enforceability? I will argue in this chapter that rather than becoming “harder” over time, the soft 
law of IAEA recommendations has interfered with attempts to deepen the norm’s reach in the 
European context. I will also demonstrate that the sense of crisis, as perceived by states in the 
(former) EU candidate pool, has been decisive for the relative prioritization of the nuclear safety 
norm. This may not have been surprising in the wake of Chernobyl, or more recently Fukushima. 
Crises, however, can work as wake-up calls in ways that do not necessarily lead to a fortification 
of the norm. Further development of the Lithuanian and Slovak case studies can provide 
compelling evidence for an argument about the effect of crisis on norm content in instances 
where states have sought to respond to adversity by diluting the norm. Such (non)events are 
relevant for the classification of nuclear safety in the present typology and for our answers to 
questions about government-society interaction on questions of nuclear energy, environmental 
protection, and state security. 
 
Critique of Practical Reasonability 
 
Despite the recent EU success in concluding a framework directive regulating nuclear 
safety, the norm remains in flux. The discord uncovered in the preceding text analysis illustrates 
this vagueness. With regard to the norm’s regulative quality the dividing line runs between the 
governments’ and the EU position (table 6.2). Matters are more complicated in the 
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universal/particular realm (table 6.3). We have to keep in mind that this dimension describes the 
acceptability of norms to societies and government documents provide only a secondary glimpse 
of societal attitudes. Yet, the decisiveness with which the East European cases challenge the 
universal impact of nuclear safety is striking. Formal commitments aside, Slovakia privileged 
exceptional circumstances over concerns about shared vulnerability to radiation in the 
government-dominated debate about nuclear safety. Lithuania clamored about the non-nuclear 
consequences of its plant closure at the expense of integrated energy/environmental policy. What 
lies behind this state-perceived amenability of the nuclear safety norm to particularistic 
challenges? Again, we need to look for answers in the nature of the norm itself. 
The IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety (Convention) is a legally binding document. 
That sounds impressive in the often limited-reach world of international law. A closer look at its 
content, however, reveals that the main commitment it enshrines is peer review among states 
party to the Convention. “Detail is not conducive to agreement.”435 Even this level of obligation 
is a significant improvement over intransparencies of the pre-Chernobyl era.
436
 But for the most 
part, the Convention relies on secondary instruments that are applied with various degrees of 
flexibility. At the most non-compromising level, the fundamental safety principles, ten in total, 
lay out the core priorities for devising nuclear safety policy. They are 
 
binding on the IAEA in relation to its operation and on States in relation to 
operations assisted by the IAEA. States or sponsoring organizations may adopt 
the principles, at their own discretion, for application to their own activities.
437
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The fundamental principles contain no references to the crucial technicalities of nuclear safety, 
as they were deliberately drafted “with the non-specialists in mind,” namely the politicians 
responsible for decisions about the uses of nuclear energy. As their name suggests, they provide 
the basis for more detailed recommendations: the General Safety Requirements, which outline 
the basic standards and focus on narrower areas of nuclear policy, and the even more targeted, 
technical, but also à la carte General Safety Guides. The regular review mandated by the 
Convention makes this staggered system of requirements the core content of nuclear regulators’ 
agenda, and the resulting regime that governs the states’ respective reputations holds 
considerable sway over the consistency with which the standards are applied.  
Their effectiveness, however, extends only as far as the consensus among the states that 
are party to the Convention. The intentionally underspecified safety fundamentals are an attempt 
to preserve this delicate balance of state interests, while maximizing the strength of the 
regulatory framework surrounding nuclear safety. The quest for common ground has greater 
impact than the lowest common denominator policy. It reflects a commitment to at least limited 
principles consistent with the universal qualities of nuclear safety – acceptable to all 
governments and societies and deriving from human vulnerability to radiation. It is in the interest 
of NPP operators to keep them safe and prevent accidents that may result in public rejection of 
nuclear power altogether. At the same time, governments have to guard their reputation as 
reliable partners, conscious of the trans-boundary consequences of uncontrolled radiation 
releases.  
The question of how safe is safe enough therefore permeates all deliberations on the 
subject and has led to the formulation of the ALARA principle. This “rule of thumb” is perhaps 
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the most prominent among the ten IAEA safety fundamentals. It stands for “as low as reasonably 
achievable” and seeks to optimize protection of people and the environment. Incorporated into 
the body of the Convention it states that “the Contracting Party shall ensure that all reasonably 
practicable improvements are made as a matter of urgency to upgrade the safety of the nuclear 
installation.”438 The principle has been an indispensable tool in the hands of nuclear regulators 
seeking to combine the outcomes of design-based, probabilistic, and deterministic risk 
assessment.  
Unfortunately, it applies with much greater ambiguity to decisions about the optimal 
lifetime of entire plants than it does to relatively simpler calculations of maximum permissible 
radiation exposure by nuclear sector workers. Even the European network of ALARA 
professionals has recognized the underlying vagueness that may have contributed to the 
longevity of the principle
439
 but also resulted in some undesirable flexibility in its interpretation. 
The network’s 2006 meeting concluded that “there is no universally agreed definition of what 
ALARA culture is, despite the wide acceptance of the need for such a culture.” The group 
responded with a proposed definition that takes us beyond a simple spelling out of the acronym, 
if only slightly. 
 
Based on scientific knowledge and characterized by risk awareness, optimization of 
radiation protection is an ongoing and iterative process, to keep  
- the magnitude of individual doses, 
- the number of people exposed and 
- the likelihood of potential exposure ALARA, 
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taking into account technical, economic and societal developments, requiring qualitative 
and quantitative judgments and involving all parties having an interest in or concern 
about an exposure situation.
440
 
 
The latter part of the definition qualifying the principle with references to economic and societal 
developments is the most policy sensitive but also the most problematic. Similar language was 
used in the text of the IAEA Convention, creating the root of the challenges faced by Lithuanian 
and Slovakia en route to EU accession. 
 
If such upgrading cannot be achieved, plans should be implemented to shut down 
the nuclear installation as soon as practically possible. The timing of the shut-
down may take into account the whole energy context and possible alternatives as 
well as the social, environmental and economic impact.
441
 
 
While the international expert community has relied on the impact of lessons from past accidents 
and the inherent motivation to operate nuclear reactors safely, the “social, environmental and 
economic” determinants of government positions on nuclear safety have been under siege from 
many directions. The most dramatic effect came in the form of challenges to energy security of 
already vulnerable states. As much as the Chernobyl crisis highlighted priorities previously 
ignored in defining nuclear safety standards, the near-emergency that surrounded Slovakia’s 
energy sector in 2009 and the long-term crisis faced by Lithuania shaped the willingness with 
which the two countries accepted the EU-mandated shutdown of their main electricity sources. 
From the East European vantage point, a previously universally applicable norm suddenly 
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appeared much less so. Or rather, the answer to what was “reasonable,” “practical,” and 
“achievable” became a matter of opinion. 
 
Between a Rock and a Hard Place 
 
 Optimization of nuclear-energy related risk became salient to East European governments 
twice in relatively quick succession. First, EU membership conditionality presented Lithuania, 
Slovakia, as well as Bulgaria, with a new conception of what constitutes reasonable levels of 
threat and how they are assessed. These countries’ previous participation in the IAEA standard-
developing process based on best practice, peer review and administrative checks was 
supplemented by the strong messages coming from the European Union in the wake of the 1992 
G7 summit in Munich. The political charge that this added to the issue changed discourse on 
safety throughout the region.
442
 The decision was made that the VVER 230 reactors (constructed 
in Bulgaria and Slovakia between 1970 and 1974) and the RBMK reactors (of Chernobyl 
infamy, at the time operating in Lithuania, Ukraine and Russia) were unsafe in principle – they 
lacked an outside containment shield.
443
 This made them vulnerable to external attacks, a 
concern aggravated in 2001, and at risk for uncontrolled radiation releases following an 
explosive accident.  
Pressure and financing from the West facilitated immediate upgrades to these reactors, 
considerably reducing their operating risks.
444
 Yet, the design-based risk assessment that 
highlighted the absence of containment as a crucial weakness outweighed the probabilistic 
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estimates of threat. This decision caused displeasure in nuclear power circles for privileging 
political reasons over technical arguments. The over-cautious move made for a useful public 
relations talking point for West-European politicians justifying the Eastern EU enlargement to 
their publics. It made for a much harder sell on the other side of the EU border. Lithuanian and 
Slovak governments found themselves between the proverbial rock of domestic energy-security 
needs and a hard place, represented by membership-conditioning demands from Brussels. 
The second opportunity for Slovakia and Lithuania to reevaluate their commitment to 
decommission the less safe reactors came as the countries’ dependence on Russian fossil fuels 
grew more pressing. In Slovakia the reminder about vulnerability to interruptions in Russian 
natural gas supplies came during the crisis of January 2009. The dispute between Ukraine and 
Russia started about a week after the shutdown of the second reactor in Jaslovské Bohunice and 
made the restarting of its operation highly tempting. In Lithuania the precarious energy situation 
was the result of gradually aggravated combination of the looming Ignalina closure deadline with 
growing prices of natural gas that multiplied the non-nuclear cost of this obligation. 
 The two crisis case studies that follow will examine the communication between 
governments and their respective publics, as well as pronouncements intended for the EU 
audience. I will look for signs of commitment to safety on the one hand and inclinations to 
compromise it on the other. I will argue that in Slovakia the compliance with EU-candidacy 
obligations was the default and the government was forced to use strong language to appeal to 
the public and to justify its arguments in the context of the Accession Treaty. The discursive 
space for such argumentative forcefulness opened up as a result of the escalating gas crisis. The 
protracted struggles in Lithuania, by contrast, permitted the development of not only official but 
also societal opposition to the EU-mandated requirement for RBMK reactor closure. Although 
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both attempted reformulations of the nuclear safety norm and the related ALARA principle were 
ultimately ineffectual, they provide crucial evidence about the feasibility of normative shifts 
away from the universal cell in the proposed typology of international norms. 
 
The Slovak Emergency 
 
In early January 2009, several days after Slovakia stopped receiving deliveries of Russian 
natural gas, I arrived in Bratislava to conduct interviews at the Ministry of Economy and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Authority. My goal for these appointments, which my interviewees kindly 
kept despite the unforeseen circumstances, was to discuss issues surrounding the 
decommissioning of the VVER 400-230 reactors in Jaslovské Bohunice. By then, the “crisis 
committee” (consisting of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Economy, heads of Slovak utilities 
and other relevant officials) was holding daily press conferences about viable and appropriate 
responses to the crisis. The option of restarting the second reactor grew in appeal and my 
research topic was becoming more current by the minute. 
On January 10, the Slovak government announced that it decided to initiate the technical 
preparations needed to restart the still warm reactor, with the explanation that the stored gas 
supplies were dwindling and the resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian dispute was nowhere in 
sight. Slovakia had to be prepared to use what energy capacities it had. And, the lay public was 
told, restarting a reactor requires more than a flick of a switch. Prime Minister Fico, however, 
had more explaining than that to do: 
 
I emphasize that this reactor was not shut down at the end of 2008 for safety 
reasons – it meets all criteria, it had been monitored and is still being monitored 
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by all relevant international institutions, and its closure was the outcome of a 
political decision, because the previous government committed to shutting it 
down in order to join the European Union. We accept full responsibility and 
realize that in taking this step we violate the conditions of the Accession Treaty 
but we do so at a time of crisis, and I would even describe this step as remedying 
an emergency situation. The damage that will be done to the Accession Treaty is 
much smaller than the damage that would have threatened Slovakia if we had not 
done this. This is the principle of emergency. We simply had to do it.
445
 
 
Contrary to the Prime Minister’s implied message, however, the crisis did not have a 
substantive impact on his government’s preferences. Forceful language had accompanied his 
pronouncements in the past already, especially regarding the closure of Bohunice and planned 
completion of two additional reactors in Mochovce.
446
  
 
We begin a period of Slovakia’s energy dependence on foreign sources. For the 
new government this is a big test. A test caused by stupidity and disregard for 
national interests. We came to Jaslovské Bohunice not only to witness this sad 
event [reactor closure] but also to make it known … that this is not this plant’s 
last day. We are committed to the obligations accepted by the previous 
government – to close both reactors. Yet, we hope that since both reactors are in 
excellent technical condition, the time may come when they produce electricity 
for Slovakia again.
447
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As this statement shows, Prime Minister Fico’s preparedness to question the content of the 
nuclear safety norm as applied in the course of EU accession had deep roots. When he was asked 
in July 2008 whether his government intended to honor the commitment regarding Bohunice 
reactor closure, he answered mysteriously that he “preferred to leave the back door open” on that 
question.
448
  
An opportunity to open that back door arose as the gas-supply crisis put Slovakia at high 
risk for energy supply failures. Fico had previously argued that small countries like Slovakia 
have to have respect for international law but “in exceptional situations we might have to view 
this differently.”449 The sudden shortage of gas seemed to have brought about such a situation 
and warranted relegating the international obligations on nuclear safety to the back burner. A 
dramatically posed question left little room for qualifying Fico’s distaste for the Accession 
Treaty: “do we want to be cold and in the dark or do we want to be patted on the back abroad for 
respecting the Accession Treaty?”450 The emergency situation of January 2009 merely shifted the 
range of plausibility and opened up room for new arguments that highlighted immediate-term 
security and political-economic priorities over distant (and some would say overstated) concerns 
about nuclear safety.  
The implications of the decision to apply for an emergency operating license at Bohunice 
were two-fold. First, it enveloped Slovakia in the familiar aura of disregard for international 
agreements that had marked the pre-1998 period. Partially with this history in mind, the response 
from the European Commission was uncompromising – legally this was not an option for 
Slovakia. Fico’s government, however, was banking on the very long time that it would take to 
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adjudicate the issue, should the Commission choose to take Slovakia to Court. The distant 
horizon for these legal ramifications was at a sharp contrast to the sense of immediate-term crisis 
that had permeated the Slovak economy by then. The second important consequence of 
Slovakia’s flirting with the idea of restarting the nuclear reactor against EU’s will was felt most 
strongly in Lithuania. There the political leadership was holding their breath to see the outcome 
of the situation and hoping for a precedent that would allow them to hold on to their reactor as 
well (due to be shut down in December 2009). 
Without doubt, my interviews in Bratislava during this time were highly informative. Not 
only were my contacts extremely helpful, coincidence also seemed to be on my side. While I was 
interviewing the head of the Energy and Resource Policy Department, one of his colleagues 
entered his office and, completely disregarding my presence, inquired about an accident at a 
coal-burning power plant that had happened two days ago and purportedly aggravated the 
imminent crisis. The colleague wanted to know how long it would take to have the thermal plant 
operational again. The media had been informed that it would take three weeks but the response 
of my interviewee made it clear that the time period would be much shorter (about a week).
451
 
This exchange revealed that the government had been providing conservative estimates to the 
press to heighten the sense of crisis, which it was using as the primary argument for violating 
agreements with the EU. Such justifications had to be made not only to build a legal argument 
for the evolving policy but also to justify it to the Slovak public, who had learned about the 
sanctity of accession documents by that time.  
The effectiveness of this backtracking on nuclear safety commitments remains 
questionable. The counter-pressure from the European Commission was not without impact, and 
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“solidarity” from Slovakia’s western neighbors in sharing gas supplies took the wind from the 
Prime Minister’s crisis sails. Once Slovakia gained access to French and German gas supplies 
(from a pipeline bypassing Ukraine), the main negotiation objective of renewed energy security 
was attained, if temporarily. By the end of that critical week, I was interviewing the head of the 
EU affairs unit at the Nuclear Regulatory Authority who had just returned from Brussels. As I sat 
in his office, again briefly invisible, he informed a colleague over the phone that the Slovak 
government had decided not to restart Bohunice after all. Soon thereafter the information 
appeared in the press and many sighed with relief. 
 The Slovak gas crisis turned out quite instructive for the student of nuclear safety, and 
environmental norms more generally. It made clear that economic and energy-security interests 
were at the forefront of the priorities pursued by the Slovak government. It is apparent that other 
objectives, besides safety, became salient during the energy crunch. Was this challenge to the 
norm accompanied also by an increased risk of nuclear accident? Ambiguities of the ALARA 
principle aside, to answer this question, we need to know whether turning nuclear plants on and 
off again, as the Slovak PM intended to do, increases the risks associated with their operation. 
Dana Drábová, the head of the Czech nuclear safety authority and also the president of the 
Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Association explained that while it does not pose any 
inherent threats, it does entail an increased risk of an accident (a distinction she was quite 
adamant about). It is analogous to most plane crashes occurring during take-off and landing, 
where human error and numerous other factors interfere. “The rest is just autopilot,” she said.452 
Policy makers, however, tend to know little about the technical details with far-reaching 
environmental impact and the public they address trails even farther behind them.  
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Although the crisis press-conference pronouncements did not include direct references to 
the ALARA principle, its main premise featured prominently in the decision by the Slovak 
Nuclear Regulatory Authority to approve restarting the reactor. In giving its consent, the 
Authority faced the question of “what is the greater evil here,” along the lines of the Prime 
Minister’s concerns about a potential black-out.453 Since there were not any inherent risks to this 
step and the potential social and economic impact was great, the Authority saw no obstacles to 
issuing the necessary permit. Operation of the reactor for another few weeks seemed reasonable. 
Fortunately, this playing with fire (nuclear and international) did not cause any serious incident 
and on the decidedly positive side, it shed light on the process of environmental norm evolution 
at times of crisis, enriching both the theoretical and empirical account under the present 
framework. 
 
Lithuania’s Energy Crunch 
 
 For Lithuanians, the question of nuclear energy has been loaded with symbolism and 
historical meaning. As the country inched towards independence in the late 1980s, the anti-
nuclear movement helped channel the anti-Soviet sentiment, in addition to opposing a proposed 
third reactor at Ignalina. The environmental movement was not just a simple surrogate for 
Lithuania’s quest for independence but it helped catalyze the desire for sovereignty.454 The 
Chernobyl-twin rectors provided a very visible focal point in this struggle. Opposing the 
construction of unsafe reactors became tantamount to opposing the system that produced 
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them.
455
 Paradoxically, as the Lithuanian desire for independence grew, the meaning of the 
Ignalina plant changed as well. Trying to stem the secessionist tides in the Baltics, Moscow 
initiated an energy blockade in 1991 and suddenly the Ignalina plant became Lithuania’s lifeline. 
It continued to fill this role even after independence was attained, as the country had to cope with 
sudden exposure to world prices for energy imports from Russia. A simple story of 
environmental activism with roots to the post-Chernobyl period therefore would not provide an 
accurate account of Lithuanian attitudes to nuclear power. The topic evokes more than 
environmental or political-economic concerns – it is directly tied to Lithuania’s perceptions of its 
sovereignty and the sentiment permeates the society well beyond governmental circles.  
The political salience of the issue did not wane over time either. The national-strategic 
view of nuclear energy likely affected the results of the October 2008 referendum, asking voters 
whether they supported the EU-mandated closure date of the Ignalina plant (scheduled for 
December 2009). The plebiscite was ultimately invalid because slightly fewer than 50 percent 
cast their vote. Of those who did, however, almost 90 percent expressed support for continued 
operation of the one remaining reactor.
456
 Arguably, the public was sensitive to further increases 
in the cost of electricity, which would impact common Lithuanians directly.
457
 Prime Minister 
Kirkilas described the difficult situation in his speech at a 2008 European Nuclear Energy Forum 
meeting: 
 
There is an increasing public pressure in Lithuania to extend the life of Ignalina 
NPP for as long as it can be safely operated. The Government presently sees no 
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real possibilities to bridge the energy security gap of 2009 to 2012. I believe that a 
different decommissioning regime could be discussed among the EU family 
members as an alternative to the immediate shutdown.
458
 
 
From the one-dimensional measure that the referendum provided, however, it is difficult to 
gauge the opinion of nuclear safety as distinct from that on nuclear energy more broadly. To 
pinpoint the interaction between perceptions of the Ignalina plant’s safety on the one hand and 
the desirability of its closure on the other, I conducted a representative survey simultaneously 
asking about the safety and future of Ignalina.
459
 The results are captivating and point to other 
determinants of energy-mix preferences, than just the perception of safety.  
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Table 7.1:  Lithuanians on the safety and future of Ignalina
460
 
 
Question: Please select one of the following options that characterizes your opinion on the 
Ignalina nuclear power plant most accurately: 
 
 N % 
  
1. I believe the plant is safe and I think that its 
operation should be extended beyond 2009 
 
 
522 
 
52,1% 
  2. I believe the plant is safe but its operation should 
cease next year 85 8,5% 
  3. I believe the plant is NOT perfectly safe and its 
operation should cease next year 57 5,7% 
  4. I believe the plant is NOT perfectly safe but I 
think its operation should be extended beyond 
2009 
243 24,3% 
  5. Don’t know  /no answer 94 9,4% 
   
Total 1001 100,0% 
 Source: Original Data. Omnibus Survey. 2008. 
 
 
A look at the history of nuclear energy in Lithuania provides the explanation of this 
apparent disregard for safety. Contrary to the Prime Minister’s announcement in Prague, a 
considerable proportion of voters demanded its continued operation, irrespective of whether this 
could / would be done as safely as possible. It turns out, some level of risk from the plant seems 
tolerable to a quarter of Lithuania’s population, if counterbalanced with reduced risk of energy 
dependence on Russia and infringement on the country’s policies from Brussels. Clearly, the 
relations with Russia (as weighed against those with Europe) shaped not only the behavior of the 
government but also that of the broadest public.
461
 Aside from being highly informative about 
the development of nuclear policy in Lithuania, these findings document the possibility of 
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normative shifts within the typological framework proposed here. The Lithuanian case illustrates 
the delicate trade-offs between short- and long-term foreign policy goals, intertwined with 
historically rooted insecurities and the need to guard the hard-won independence. Yet, to 
complete the argument about potential shifts of norms away from the seemingly desirable 
universal cell, we have to show that the nuclear safety norm had been a priority for Lithuania 
until it got replaced by other concerns. I suggest that this occurred as an after-effect of the 
protracted crisis.  
A number of nuclear scientists, government officials, and members of the EU-accession 
negotiations team whom I interviewed in Vilnius described the closure of the Ignalina nuclear 
plant as a product of political pressures from the West.
462
 But to them this perspective is 
consistent with commitment to nuclear safety. They argued that Ignalina was safe enough, “it 
had been allowed to operate under strict IAEA standards after all.”463 Still, in accepting the 
parallel EU / G7 standards, Lithuania was willing to respect the political decision to close down 
its NPP, especially if this opened up flows of financial support for decommissioning.
464
 The 
government accepted the new norm, even if just as a trade-off for EU membership, and intended 
to follow through on its obligations.
465
 The question became highly politicized only gradually.
466
 
In fact, the Ignalina Protocol accompanying the Accession Treaty was preceded by the “cheap 
agreement” to close down Ignalina. This first tentative step towards decommissioning signified 
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the initially low profile of the issue at the outset. According to the country’s Chief EU 
Negotiator, “even the EBRD was surprised to see Lithuania give in so easily.”467 In other words, 
the norm as formulated by the G7 (and later the EU) has not always been a problem for Vilnius. 
The government (and societal) commitment began to waver only when gas prices 
increased rapidly and when Russia’s cross-border forays to assert its power468 raised worries 
about the security of gas supply, which was to replace nuclear energy.
469
 These concerns were 
further magnified as the prospect of a new nuclear plant ran up against the realities of fifteen-
year construction and certification period,
470
 in addition to sky high investment costs.
471
 The 
nuclear safety norm has therefore been correctly classified as universal but the developing 
circumstances that highlighted a sense of crisis in Lithuania led to a rebalancing of short-term 
and long-term priorities.  
 Not only should we not assume that all international norms possess the universal quality, 
we also cannot count on them remaining so, once they have been classified as such. Lithuania 
provides a rare example where a widespread environmentalist opposition to unsafe reactors 
gradually evolved into attitudes marginalizing the nuclear safety norm. Both the government and 
sizable groups within the society took note of political-economic and energy-strategic 
developments to which nuclear energy seemed an easy answer. First driven by the crisis of 
Chernobyl, the Lithuanian preferences eventually morphed under the prolonged crisis that the 
country faced in its position of energy dependence on Russia and isolation from the rest of 
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Europe. The case also hints at the insufficiency of consensus-based international instruments on 
nuclear safety and the reasonability of EU-based efforts to codify the existing framework, despite 
resistance from member states who fear they may face the Lithuanian conundrum themselves. 
 
How Not to Rest on Laurels 
 
My typology, populated by cases of minority rights and nuclear safety, in addition to anti-
corruption and human rights, redraws the previously simplified picture of the norm proliferation 
landscape. Existing work on norm cascades, spirals, and boomerangs describes the diffusion of 
norms as an inherently dynamic process but it views the norms themselves through a surprisingly 
static lens. Once we turn our sights to norm content, it is impossible to avoid questions about 
norm transformation and the resulting shifts across the cells in the current framework. From the 
history of some international norms, such as gender equality, we know that their evolution is not 
linear.
472
 Governments, societies, and institutionalized non-state actors have been deeply 
involved in these transformations, each of them uniquely positioned to facilitate the spread of a 
norm, to impede it, or to initiate further development of its content. With implications for its 
future success, of course.  
In principle, all norms are subject to such weathering over time. Even a norm as 
widespread as human rights often faces blatant violations and it has not been immune to 
discursive cooptation by dominant states seeking to accommodate their foreign policy 
objectives.
473
 From a different direction, it has been challenged by the “politics of exceptional 
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circumstances” that led governments around the world to curtail freedoms in the name of the 
security-liberty trade-off in the war against transnational terrorism.
474
 Still, so far the human 
rights norm has survived – as a counterfactually valid principle that does not cease to exist when 
violated.
475
 It takes more than the occasional delinquent to kill a norm. Such deterioration occurs 
as a more complex process of misalignment between norm content and the broader normative 
environment.
476
  
The nuclear safety case in Europe offers a magnified look at the underlying tensions that 
lead to norm contestation. The “normative environment” characterized by attempts to codify 
nuclear safety at the EU level was becoming stricter. Meanwhile, the changing (energy) security 
landscape grew ever fiercer. This situation qualified as a crisis – it “raised the stakes for norm 
interpretation as time constraints reduced the social feedback”477 that normally helps police norm 
compliance. In response, discursive attacks by government officials on nuclear safety were 
issued to garner further support from the societies. In Lithuania, the protracted crisis produced a 
more coherent demand for an “exception” under the norm, whereas in Slovakia the government 
could rely on tacit support from the public only and had to exert most of the pressure through its 
own rhetoric. Ultimately, the two episodes underscored the usefulness of the institutional 
measures put in place in the course of EU accession. The treaties anchored the nuclear safety 
norm deeper than the effectively voluntary framework under the IAEA and made prioritization 
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of other non-safety objectives more difficult. The concerted effort with which Lithuania and 
Slovakia tried to save their limping reactors, however, points at the vulnerability of norms 
seemingly unquestionable at first. In this light, even the powerful commitments under the 
Accession Treaty should be viewed as a basket of norms that may have partially attained a 
universal or constitutive status but that need not remain so forever. 
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CHAPTER 8: INTERNATIONAL NORMS: RULES OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
 
 The main gauge of international norms’ success is their legitimacy. Standards that lack 
legitimacy cannot be effectively enforced and risk losing all their meaning.
478
 This is a practical 
problem that is closely linked to a theoretical one. The legitimacy of norms cannot be assessed in 
isolation from the system that they constitute or from the sources of power wielded by the actors 
promoting them. Thus, in the global arena most norms tend to be “thinner” because of greater 
disparities among societies’ historic and political-economic experiences that lead to norm 
formulation. Similarly, the process of promoting and enforcing norms internationally requires a 
level of consensus that is difficult to achieve without regular political contestation. Its absence in 
the international realm can be compensated with a momentum that sometimes follows 
transformative shifts in international discourse.
479
 The liberal-rationalist agenda that emerged at 
the end of the Cold War provided such momentum for a near-viral spread of the norms 
constituting it, such as the Washington consensus and its splinter norm battling corruption. 
Discrediting of the main alternative to capitalist democracy reinforced these norms’ visibility and 
states that did not enthusiastically subscribe to the new template were persistently nudged in that 
direction. It is no coincidence that the international gaze turned to developing countries and the 
post-communist region where corruption was endemic but rarely recognized as such.
480
 The 
initial thrust with which this and other norms entered the global arena benefited from the absence 
of an alternative.  
 Put differently, as long as the liberal-rationalist norms sailed on the wave of a newly 
hegemonic discourse, they appeared universal. This consensus, however, began to unravel as it 
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became apparent that a one-size-fits-all approach would be politically unviable and ultimately 
unenforceable, even in the special case of Eastern Europe. Crucially, the “victors’ benefit” in 
promoting the value metric that provided certain norms with superiority, however brief, should 
not be equated with the universal quality of norms like human rights. The appeal of basic human 
rights derives not from the loudest voice in the international arena but from the similarity of our 
experience as human beings and the unchanging vulnerabilities comprehensible to all.
481
 In a 
contrasting scenario, once the anti-corruption norm weathered the post-Cold War legitimation 
storm, its promoters responded by linking transparency to questions of underdevelopment. 
Eventually, confirming the key difference between the two norms, they borrowed the human 
rights frame to generate global appeal, if not legitimacy for anti-corruption. 
Legitimacy comprises two qualities that we should view as mutually reinforcing rather 
than as alternatives. The first, input legitimacy, derives from the procedures and participation in 
norm creation and/or internalization, while the other relates to output, or the extent of purported 
benefits from norm-informed policies. In contexts characterized by power asymmetry, however, 
as is commonly the case in international norm promotion, the focus on policy outcomes may 
overshadow concerns with procedural aspects of norm adoption. In the case of the Eastern EU 
enlargement, the membership conditionality clause inadvertently led to precisely such an 
unbalanced focus on formal policy change with little room for legitimating debate.  The template 
of “unconditional” accession requirements simply was not amenable to negotiation, not even 
much discussion. This approach to multilevel negotiations is not new in the European Union - 
“the ‘output’ legitimacy of regulations is frequently stressed, even if the ‘democratic deficit’ of 
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the mode of arriving at the decision is admitted.”482 In the context of the enlargement, this 
dynamic might have seemed like an outright imposition of West European values on candidate 
countries. However, the latter’s vocal demand for credibility-building constraints made the 
asymmetric arrangement possible, temporarily legitimate, and also potentially damaging.  
This dissertation has called into question the tendency of influential norm promoters to 
treat their export “goods” as universally applicable. It turned to the story of EU enlargement to 
demonstrate the flaws in such a generalizing approach. The task was made especially difficult by 
the unique political-historic context in which the expansion of the European community unfolded 
– although the transferred norms were not universal, they could be (and were) treated as such 
because of the desirability of EU membership to candidate countries. So, if the norm suppliers 
and norm demanders both agreed that they were part of the same club, that they subscribed to the 
same values, and shared the same overarching vision for the future of Europe, what is the basis 
for questioning the strategies they chose in sharing the normative commitment entailed in EU 
membership? Simply put, they tried too hard. 
In the human rights context, Thomas Pogge has argued that universality of norms does 
not require uniformity in their fulfillment.  
 
We should allow that human rights can be realized in other ways, that secure 
access to their objects is really what matters…There is no good reason to insist 
that such secure access must be maintained in the same way everywhere on 
earth.
483
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In Europe, however, the candidates had to adopt 80,000 pages of EU legislation in full. Such 
were the conditions of membership and, effectively, uniformity in norm implementation became 
the primary goal. The main reason Pogge, along with weak cultural relativists, calls for 
“flexibility” in putting forth demands for human rights protection worldwide is the respect for 
underlying cultural diversity, which, if ignored, could pose ethical challenges and jeopardize the 
delicate mission altogether. Lacking such sensitivities, the EU enlargement unfolded under the 
unnecessary and faulty assumption that any relevant differences between the old and prospective 
members could be overcome by the unifying force of institutional transformation.  
Confirming this, the reach (or interest) of the European Commission, did not extend 
beyond observing formal change. More importantly, the periodic assessments by the 
Commission looked for positive change, acknowledged difficulties, and even issued warnings. 
Rarely did its officials consider the causes behind any lags in compliance. The question of 
alternative normative structures that may have competed with those streaming in from Brussels 
was irrelevant in a process that lacked meaningful avenues for their incorporation. This strict and 
ambitious approach produced remarkable results as national parliaments passed laws at record 
speeds.
484
 Somewhere along the way, however, the Eastern Europeans realized that they might 
not have fully anticipated the extent of the changes that they would be expected to undergo. 
Meanwhile, their West European counterparts learned with surprise that even basic rules about 
the geographic origin of products may suddenly cause great controversy, as when Slovak and 
Hungarian wine makers battled for the right to claim the Tokaji brand (they share the Tokaj(i) 
region with 10% and 90%, respectively). 
Although the idea of EU membership did not lose legitimacy, the support for individual 
measures, as they became apparent, faltered and continued to do so after accession as well. 
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Whereas the enlargement project began with Eastern Europeans demanding EU norms, and the 
old members reluctantly supplying them, the conditionality mechanism ended in the West’s role 
as both the supplier and the demander of norms. Old member states expected that their legal and 
social norms would function also in the East. Perceived as universal and inherently legitimate, 
they should have been “adhered to by others because of [their] reasonableness (all things 
considered), by [their] minimal disturbance of ongoing practices or the necessary sacrifices of 
other values, or by [their] expected overall benefit to the community.”485 With respect to some 
norms this was, in fact, the case. Yet with others, the road was much bumpier. Inconveniently, 
the issue areas that were particularly sensitive in the East ranked high among the priorities with 
old member governments, as well as publics. 
We have to keep in mind that citizens of the pre-enlargement EU saw disaster prevention 
as a key justification for permitting the project to proceed in the first place. With this mandate, 
the Commission officials used the carrots and sticks at their disposal to push hopeful candidates 
on issues that presented the greatest threats to peace and stability in Eastern Europe.
486
 First, 
bloody ethnic clashes in former Yugoslavia and along the edges of the Russian Federation were 
enough to make European politicians tread carefully and prevent importing such tensions into 
their community. Thus, protection of minority rights became one of the key priorities in guiding 
East European transitions from communism. The second disaster that loomed large as post-
communist societies embarked on their westward journey was the Chernobyl nuclear accident 
that had fundamentally changed perceptions of nuclear power in Europe. As with minority rights, 
the EU used the leverage it possessed to redefine the understanding of nuclear safety and pressed 
for decommissioning of the outdated, Soviet-style nuclear plants operating in Eastern Europe. 
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Before long, these two areas also became the display cases for misalignment of expectations on 
both sides of the EU border.  
The typology presented in this dissertation allows us to sort these norms according to 
their content and their effect on states. The location of minority rights and nuclear safety along 
the diagonal characterized by incongruence in government and societal responses sheds some 
light on the difficulties with which they traveled eastward (see figure 8.1). The comparison of 
minority rights discourses in Slovakia and Lithuania uncovered results consistent with the 
hypothesis expecting resistance to the norm to occur at the societal level. In Slovakia, attitudes 
towards minorities fell into three opinion clusters, each of them sharply defined and firmly 
differentiated from others. The divisiveness of the minority rights discourse is consistent with 
Slovakia’s experience on the policy formulation front, where a lot of stop-and-go measures 
struggled against the indifference and even hostility from substantial portions of the public. In 
Lithuania, by contrast, three separate discursive positions reflected much greater levels of 
consensus, and, what is important, considerable overlap with the individual-rights based version 
of the norm promoted by Brussels. 
The nuclear safety norm enjoyed support from societies, conscious of the danger of 
nuclear accidents. The support was not as heartfelt as we might have expected, however, because 
the Slovak, Lithuanian, and the Czech publics remain sensitive to questions of energy security 
(meaning dependence on Russia). Fears about skyrocketing electricity prices have persisted as 
well. With these public reactions in mind, and aware of the full cost of reactor decommissioning, 
governments received the nuclear safety standards reformulated by the G7 in 1992 with 
hesitation. The analysis of official documents issued in each country and their comparison with 
the European nuclear safety agenda revealed a sharp dividing line between the EU and the 
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candidates. There is no indication that the three countries viewed nuclear safety as a matter of 
European identity and in each case concern with own strategic interest prevailed, confirming the 
expectation of government resistance. This, I have argued, has consequences for the future of 
nuclear safety in the EU and internationally. 
Each set of case studies confirmed the theoretically deduced location of minority rights 
and nuclear safety in the typology of norms I propose. This static image that the norm 
classification provides, however, represents only one part of the story about norm adoption in the 
course of EU enlargement. I described in great detail the sensitivity of these two issue areas in 
each country. This, in turn, generated a considerable amount of tension in light of the 
uncompromising demands made on the candidates. The two extension chapters that follow each 
norm case provide insights about the attempted solutions for these pressures. Figure 8.1 below 
captures the movements between cells that my two follow-up studies detected.  
In connection to minority rights as they played out in Slovakia, the main challenge rested 
in the disconnect between the local discourse concerning the norm and the external demands 
seeking fast and permanent solutions to a problem that there was no domestic consensus about. 
In the case study about Europe’s Roma I trace the approaches adopted by non-governmental 
organizations involved in remedying the persistent exclusion of this minority. Guided by the 
institutional channels inside the EU and driven by funding opportunities that favored an 
individual-rights approach, these actors initiated a redefinition of the entire problem. My 
typology outlined the universal / constitutive cell as the one most likely to meet with success in 
norm promotion. In a pattern mirroring this expectation, NGOs active at the European level 
began framing the Roma rights issue as one subsumed by human rights. To the extent that their 
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efforts have been successful, they have demonstrated the hypothesized possibility of norm 
evolution, and the potential for shifts between cells in the typology (figure 8.1). 
 
Figure 8.1  Norm Shifts Within the Typology 
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seized every opportunity to reverse this requirement. In Slovakia, the government’s decision to 
restart a recently decommissioned reactor and ignore the increased safety risks demonstrated that 
even the norm’s universal quality is not immune to change. As we know, its universality derives 
primarily from the shared human vulnerability to radiation and the standardized technical 
requirements of safety. However, if the public could be convinced that the most basic provision 
of electricity was in jeopardy (especially in mid-January) and that the safety risk was relatively 
low, the designation of nuclear safety as a universal norm would have to be abandoned. The fact 
that the interruption in energy supply was caused by Slovakia’s eastern partners was not an 
irrelevant detail. Similarly, in Lithuania a public opinion survey revealed that about one quarter 
of the population favored their nuclear plant’s continued operation, despite the respondents’ 
doubts about its safety. Dependence on Russia seemed like the greater evil. The impact that each 
crisis had on the perception of nuclear risk in Lithuania and Slovakia proves the importance of 
differentiating among norms based on the degree of their universality. The malleable content of 
norms affects the implicit hierarchies among them, which should inform our theorizing on the 
subject as well.  
The approach introduced in this dissertation opens avenues for comparing norms by 
drawing attention to their origin, to the context surrounding their violation or adoption, and to 
their institutionalization. It offers a degree of standardization in our study of normative change, 
while leaving sufficient room for incorporating arguments about country-level variations and 
about the role of power in shaping norm promotion outcomes. Finally, it implies that if an 
international norm meets with resistance, this is likely because a competing norm is resisting 
displacement. 
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Although we can treat some norms as if they were universal based on their intimate 
connection with the hegemonic order that dictates conditions of legitimacy, we should recognize 
that any successful challenge to that order will also weaken related norms, and vice versa. This 
has implications for attempts to cluster international norms with the objective of increasing their 
collective appeal. This has been the case with climate change, human security, and development. 
As in the case of EU enlargement, in the global arena the focus on output legitimacy alone 
cannot guard the anti-climate change agenda from challenges deriving from indirect effects of 
the norm’s (non)implementation.487 A failure to curb carbon emissions threatens to harm groups 
that are already disproportionately vulnerable. Meanwhile, measures to avert climate change 
have serious consequences for the particular development paths that some countries can take, 
contributing further to international discord on the subject. In addition to pointing out such 
internal contradictions, we have to be prepared for clashes among purportedly universal norms. 
For instance, both nuclear safety and climate protection could qualify as such but they actually 
reflect potentially opposing goals. Nuclear safety calls for restraint in spreading nuclear 
technologies to new countries that may be inexperienced, non-transparent and potentially possess 
ulterior motivations in adopting nuclear technology.
488
 The struggle against climate change, on 
the other hand, while boasting equal credentials in the environmental protection and popular 
appeal realm, in principle favors any measures that would replace carbon-intensive technologies 
with alternatives. Are these norms directly contradictory? Which should prevail and, based on 
their respective attributes, which is more likely to be successful?  
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Construction of legitimacy in the international society
489
 provides compelling answers to 
these questions, if we include more than state actors in the process of norm promotion and 
affirmation. The tangible economic consequences of both climate-change remedies and nuclear 
safety requirements result in active competition by governments, societies, and corporate actors 
for control over the norms’ meaning. This, in turn, has been affecting their respective appeal and 
its fluctuation over time. The clash between the climate-change-curbing efforts and calls for a 
strong nuclear safety norm is most apparent in the recent attempts by nuclear reactor producers 
to market their products abroad.
490
 The nuclear accident at Fukushima in Japan caused demand 
for nuclear power to falter in established nuclear countries (Germany, Switzerland, or Belgium) 
and growing natural gas prospects have shifted the economic calculus between these two sources 
of energy. The risks  and cost of nuclear energy have been made newly salient as the concern 
with climate change persists. In response, many developed countries have been turning to 
renewable energy sources and increases in overall efficiency. Subject to a different set of 
constraints, most interested countries in the developing world have not abandoned pursuit of 
nuclear power but they have become increasingly sensitive to the price of reactors. And as is 
well known, the main trade-off in the cost of nuclear installations is their safety. The nuclear 
industry thus faces a difficult dilemma – its most likely customers want cheaper nuclear plants 
but any risk of accident threatens the future of nuclear power altogether. 
These demand and supply issues in the nuclear energy sector are closely related to the 
demand and supply challenges facing the related international norms. Not even reactor salesmen 
can afford to ignore the international dispositions towards nuclear energy and it is in their 
interest to highlight both climate change alleviation and nuclear safety as compatible arguments 
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in advancing their business agenda.
491
 Governments and societies are the core audiences in this 
process – distinct from one another but linked through the process of domestic political 
competition and through their shared exposure to crises around the globe, whether climate-
related or nuclear. If the solution to the tension between the two norms is to be legitimate and 
sustainable, norm promoters must avoid norm imposition. This is a situation in which the target 
(state or society) cannot effectively resist.
492
 One way of avoiding this is to focus on intrinsically 
universal attributes of norms, rather than those imputed by their suppliers. Nuclear safety should 
enter new contexts as a principle supported by a broad understanding of the underlying risks and 
the recognition of the danger to humans irrespective of state boundaries. If it travels as a 
reluctantly accepted rule that will be avoided at the first opportunity, the promotion of nuclear 
energy and associated norms will amount to a dangerous failure.  
When analyzing such patterns of norm promotion, it is worth noting that the norms’ 
embeddedness in a particular hegemonic order can endow them with legitimacy but also opens 
avenues for their questioning on the basis of that system’s deficiencies. As this project has 
sought to show, many norms we call “international” lack the intrinsic validity that would reach 
beyond the value confines of the predominant order and should not be mistaken for universal 
norms. Meanwhile, norms that possess universal attributes remain exposed to cooptation by 
powerful actors, suggesting that even their broad appeal is no guarantee of success. All along, 
specific political-historic contexts shape the appeal of individual norms and highlight the role of 
societies, alongside governments, in generating the demand to meet the always abundant supply 
of norms. 
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APPENDIX 
Interview List 
 
Minority Rights 
 
Lithuania  
 
Andžejevski, Tadeuš, Advisor to the Prime Minister, Government of the Republic of Lithuania, 
Vilnius, Lithuania, September 30, 2008 
Austrevicius, Petras, Former Chief Negotiator of Lithuania’s accession to the EU and Member of 
the Seimas, Vilnius, Lithuania, September 19, 2008 
Beresneviciute, Vida, Senior Researcher, Centre of Ethnic Studies, Institute for Social Research, 
Vilnius, Lithuania, September 25, 2008 
Cecergis, Donatas, Head,  European Information Office, Vilnius, Lithuania, October 13, 2008 
Dimitrieva, Larisa, Member, Vilnius Municipal Council, Vilnius, Lithuania, November 12, 2008 
Gaidys, Vladas, Director, Institute for Social Research, Vilnius, Lithuania, October 23, 2008 
Leončikas, Tadas, Senior Researcher, Centre of Ethnic Studies, Institute for Social Research, 
Vilnius, Lithuania,  November 5, 2008 
Michniova, Tatjana, Director, Pushkin Literary Institute, Vilnius, Lithuania, October 14, 2008 
Mickevičius, Henrikas, Director, Human Rights Monitoring Institute, Vilnius, Lithuania, 
October 1, 2008 
Neverovič, Jaroslav, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, MFA of the Republic of Lithuania, 
Vilnius, Lithuania, September 26, 2008 
Novopolskaja, Svetlana, , Roma Public Community Center, Vilnius, Lithuania, October 15, 2008 
Ramonaite, Aine, Professor, Political Science, Vilnius University, Vilnius, Lithuania, September 
22, 2008 
Rozova, Irina, Member of Seimas, Russian Alliance, Vilnius, Lithuania, October 6, 2008 
Samuolytė, Jolanta, Research Director, Human Rights Monitoring Institute, Vilnius, Lithuania, 
October 1, 2008 
Tyčina, Josif, Roma Public Community Center, Vilnius, Lithuania, October 15, 2008 
Vaskelevicius, Kestutis, Deputy Advisor to the President, Foreign Policy Group, Office of the 
President of the Republic of Lithuania, Vilnius, Lithuania, September 19, 2008 
Vidtman, Stanislav, Deputy Director of the Department of National Minorities, Ministry of 
Interior Affairs, Vilnius, Lithuania, October 1, 2008 
Vilpisauskas, Ramunas, Advisor to the President, Economic and Regional Development Group, 
Office of the President of the Republic of Lithuania, Vilnius, Lithuania, September 23, 
2008 
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Slovakia 
 
Balog, Maroš, Coordinator, Regional Office of the Roma Plenipotentiary in Banská Bystrica, 
Banská  Bystrica, Slovakia, February 9, 2009 
Bučková, Andrea, Program Coordinator, Roma Cultural Association, SR, Banská  Bystrica, 
Slovakia, March 19, 2009 
Daniel, Stanislav, Research and Advocacy Officer, European Roma Rights Center in Budapest, 
Washington, DC, USA, April 7, 2011 
Debrecéniová, Janka, Deputy Director, Citizen, Democracy, and Responsibility, Brezno, 
Slovakia, January 21, 2009 
Drál, Peter,  Program Manager and Lecturer on Human Rights Education and Intercultural 
Education Program, Milan Simecka Foundation, Bratislava, January 16, 2009. 
Gabčová, Lýdia, Project Coordinator, Open Society Institute – Slovakia, Bratislava, Slovakia, 
January 13, 2009 
Gallová Kriglerová, Elena, Research Fellow, CVEK – Center for the Research of Ethnicity and 
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